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Introduction. 
South Africa wishes to consumes less electricity. There are primarily two reasons for this: the first is 
that environmental cost of generating electricity in South Africa is fairly high and the second is that 
the electricity grid is currently capacity constrained. South Africa's electricity consumption is 
exceptionally coal intensive, because of this the CO2 (and other greenhouse gas) emissions per capita 
are amongst the highest in the world and higher than any other country with its level of 
development (Winkler & Marquard, 2009). As a result electricity consumption in South Africa 
currently comes at a large ecological cost. South Africa's electricity generation and distribution 
capacity have also  been hard pressed to match the increased demand for electricity that has 
resulted from the general growth of the South African economy in the post-apartheid era and the 
country has been subject to large scale electricity black outs in recent years. 
 
Given that South Africa's electricity generation is likely to remain coal intensive for a significant time, 
strategies that reduce the demand for electricity are ecologically desirable, since a reduction in 
demand would mean less electricity generation required overall. Strategies to reduce electricity 
demand are also desirable in light of the fact that it is also likely to be some time until sufficient new 
electricity generation capacity is installed to mitigate the peak demand on the electricity supply 
chain. 
 
One of the strategies to manage consumption that has begun to attract attention around the world 
is to use social norms in reports to households about their own consumption. Initial tests of  
strategies using social norms in the USA have yielded promising results. At the same time, research 
into the way people are influenced by others has been growing as a field within economics, 
particularly with respect to social norms. In general it seems that we are influenced by social norms. 
Amongst other things, this influence varies with the number of people who are doing something (or 
not doing something), the social distance between us and the "normal" group and our degree of 
ignorance about the status quo. This influence is able to operate beyond situations of direct personal 
interaction with studies finding significant behaviour changes associated with receiving reports 
about normal levels of behaviour distributed by mail, the internet or over the airwaves. 
 
There are several reasons that reporting norms may influence behaviour. Norms may signal 
important information which it would be difficult for a person to discover independently. Following 
norms may thus be a strategy that lowers the transactions cost of learning new important 
information for  a person. The influence of social norms may itself be a function of the way in which 
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norms remain stable over time, which may be as a result of enforcement, internalisation or simply 
being an optimal coordinating mechanism. If a person has had prior experience of any of these or 
has imbibed a culture that generally defaults to conforming to norms, it is likely that they will have 
developed a heuristic that norms in general are to be conformed to, as much as possible or even as 
much as comfortable. 
 
This research tested whether households in Cape Town would respond to reported social norms of 
electricity consumption in a manner consistent with theory and earlier studies.  
 
Originally this research project was concerned with reactions to reported average levels of 
consumption (descriptive norms) that varied in terms of the social distance between the household 
and the average reported to it as well as implied social approval or disapproval (injunctive norms) 
with regard to where the household's own electricity consumption stood relative to the reported 
average level of consumption. In doing so, this experiment replicated elements of two interventions 
in the USA, Schultz et al (2007) and elements of OPower's home energy reports (Allcott, 2011; 
Violette et al, 2009).  To test these elements four interventions were designed and households were 
allocated randomly to them. 
 
However as fieldwork proceeded, interest grew to address a further field of inquiry: how the 
consumption of households receiving no mailed treatments compared to those that were. 
Constructing the appropriate control group, ex post was one of the challenges faced in analysis and 
which is dealt with in the methodology section.   
 
There are two ways in which this study sought to extend the literature. First, this study sough to 
extend the field experimental literature on social norms and electricity consumption to a developing 
world context. As far as this researcher is aware, this study is the first instance of a norms based 
approach for mitigating electricity consumption that has been tested in a developing world context. 
Second, this study sought to assess the role played by social distance in households' reactions to 
reported social norms.  This is an element that was not assessed in any of the USA studies. The 
results indicate that both injunctive norms and social distance were important influences upon how 
households responded to social norms.  
 
This dissertation begins by examining relevant literature on social norms in chapter 1, we then move 
to discuss the rise and role of field experiments (such as this one) within economics in chapter 2. 
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Chapter 3 deals with the methodology of the field experiment itself as well as the analysis of data 
generated by the experiment. Chapter 4 reports and discusses the results of the data analysis. 
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  Chapter 1. 
Social Norms. 
“No man is an island, entire of itself.” 
John Donne 
Devotions upon Emergent Occasions  
Meditation XVII 
Introduction 
We all, like John Donne, have probably felt at some time or another that our lives are inextricably 
bound up with and influenced by those around us. At the beginning of the 21st century research is 
showing that the influence of others upon us, in apparently non-direct and largely unconscious ways, 
appears to be truly stunning. This influence of others is already the subject of the fairly well 
established, century old1 literature of an entire discipline, social psychology, but it has been receiving 
increasingly greater attention in within the literatures of economics over the last two decades. While 
acknowledgement of the social psychological shoulders upon which current economic research on 
this topic stands is not absent2, this chapter concerns itself mainly with offering a brief review of 
what has been learnt about social influence and social norms within economics over the recent past. 
Traditional economics, as George Akerlof noted (1997), “has been based upon methodological 
individualism.” Within economics this has begun to change. Particularly, and of direct concern for 
this paper, one the directions in this new wave of research is examining the economic nature, role 
and determinants of social norms. Largely, this research has dealt with norms as conventions of 
behaviour and in particular how these conventions solve coordination problems in various markets. 
Electricity consumption in a city has definite elements of a coordination problem, particularly insofar 
as electricity provision is a large-scale commons problem, and so it is useful to examine this body of 
research. However it is the influence of reporting to people what the social norms is that we are 
most concerned with in this project. 
This chapter will discuss research into various elements that are at play in the way others influence 
us through social norms. We begin by briefly discussing, section 1.1,  two studies that have been 
                                                          
1
 Social psychology arguably begins with Norman Triplett’s experiments (1898) with children which highlighted 
how the presence of another can increase physical effort. Although see Strube (2005) for a discussion of the 
veracity of Triplett’s original findings.  
2
 Section 1 pays particular homage to the discipline. 
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profoundly influential in developing the study of how others influence us, one of which has been 
reproduced at least 133 times.  
From here we move on to discussing three elements that appear to determine the amount of 
influence exerted by reporting social norms. These are: the size of referent group, social distance 
and the presence of pluralistic ignorance. Section 1.2 deals with how influence appears to vary 
according to the size of the referent group. Section 1.3 examines the idea of social distance and how 
the influence of the referent group seems to change with the social distance between the 
individual/household and the referent group. Section 1.4  discusses pluralistic ignorance.  
We then move on to discussing how social norms may help to reduce the transactions costs of 
learning (section 1.5) and a brief discussion of other general reasons why social norms can be stable 
over time and persist (section 1.6). The discussion in both of these sections deals with ways in which 
reporting social norms may be potent influences upon behaviour because of their evolutionary 
stability. 
The final two sections cover research that bears on two operational elements of the natural field 
experiment at the heart of this. Section 1.7 examines the question whether social influence through 
reporting social norms can be exerted remotely, that is in situations that are not face-to-face, such 
as through inserts with mail. Section 1.8 then discusses descriptive and injunctive social norms. 
These are the two sorts of norms that are used in the inserts at the heart of the natural field 
experiment. Section 1.9 concludes. 
1.10. Two early studies on the influence of others upon us generally. 
Two early experiments in particular within social psychology zeroed in on how groups might sway 
the decisions of individuals. Muzafar Sherif (1936) and Solomon Asch (1962) developed a line of 
enquiry to investigate the influence of majorities in small groups upon and individual.  
Sherif’s experiments wherein groups estimated by how much a point of light projected onto a wall 
moved during the experiment, demonstrated that a confident announcement by an undercover 
experimental confederate could sway a group’s estimate of how far a point of light, that was in 
reality stationary, vacillated, could sway a group’s estimate of the light’s “movement” significantly 
toward their estimate. In one version of the experiment Sherif replaced half of the group each round 
so that each group from the second round onward was composed equally of new and old subjects 
and no person stayed for more than two rounds of experimentation. The bias introduced by the 
confederate in the initial trial persisted for several rounds in this situation. 
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The experiments by Solomon Asch (1962) are perhaps the most famous demonstrations of the fact 
that the opinion of others can affect our judgement. In these experiments a group is presented with 
two large cards. One card has a single vertical line drawn on it, as in card A below, while the other 
card has three vertical lines drawn on it, as in card B below. On the card with three lines drawn upon 
it, one line is of exactly the same length as the single line on the other card, while the two other lines 
are of markedly different lengths to the single line on the other card. Each of the three lines on the 
three-lined card are labelled. Respondents are asked to call out which amongst the three lines is the 
same length as the single line on the first card. This process is repeated a number of times for 
different cards, all cards being essentially alike in format to those shown below, with only line 
lengths varying. Respondents are asked to do this individually, one after the other. It is clear which 
line on the three-lined card is of the same length as the line on the sing-lined card. The lengths of the 
lines on the three-lined card differed by between a quarter of an inch to an inch and three quarters 
(Asch:1962, p.453). The experiment has one more twist though. All of the members of the group are 
conspirators in the experiment except for one person. That person is oblivious to the conspiracy and 
is the true subject of the experiment. 
When asked to deliver their judgement about which two lines are equal in length the true subject is 
generally asked last out of all the group. In the initial rounds of the experiment all members 
pronounce what is obviously true, in terms of the above example that line B is the match of the 
single line in Card A. However, once the initial rounds are behind, the conspirators assert that lines 
which are obviously of different length to the single line on Card A as being equal in length to that 
line. This would be the equivalent of saying that line C or A were the same length as the line on card 
A. Conspirators are careful to agree about which line is the same length as the former line in their 
statements. Under these circumstances, when conspirators agree upon a falsehood, it has been 
found that between 20% to 40% of respondents apparently ignore their own senses and agree with 
the conspirators. In contrast, almost all respondents who do this test individually, apart from a 
group, match the correct lines all of the time. 
What is amazing about this test and its results is that the task that is set is so simple. It should be 
clear what the correct answer is. Everyone should get it right, no matter what the groups says. 
Indeed, in interviews with the single critical subjects after each of their experiments Asch notes 
(Asch:1962, p.460) that subjects feel a conflict between their judgements and the rest of the 
group’s, the subjects have apprehended with their senses what is clearly the case in terms of which 
lines are to match.  
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          Card A.      Card B. 
However, what subjects talked about in the post experimental analysis was that, to varying degrees, 
the rest of the group’s disagreement with them caused them to doubt the validity of their 
perception. In the words of one respondent “To me it seems I’m right, but my reason tells me I’m 
wrong, because I doubt that so many people can be wrong and I alone right” (Asch:1962, p.46 3-4) 
No doubt the specific reasons will vary person to person, but the thrust of this is pretty much the 
same.  What causes subjects to pronounce a judgement that is at variance with their own perception 
is the fact of all other people claiming to see things another way.  
Since its first publication in 1952, this experiment has been tried many times over all over the world. 
Bond and Smith conducted a meta-analysis of the experiment in 1996 and found 133 instances of 
Asch line experiments in the literature, conducted in seventeen different countries, with conformity 
of the sort described above found in all studies. One major result of Bond and Smith’s meta-analysis 
was the finding that conformity was more intense in societies that also had a more collectivist norm 
operating in society at large, such as the former communist countries (Bond and Smith, 1996).   
It appears that the influence upon the individual in the Asch experiments may be deeper than 
expected. Subsequent study (Berns et al, 2005) has shown that participants, when faced with this 
situation, actually see things as the rest of the group does. In fMRI studies Berns et al found that 
regions of activity in regions of the brain traditionally associated with perception were especially 
active when a subject conformed, whereas this was not the case with subjects who did not conform. 
The literature on “groupthink”, beginning with Janis (1971), provides a series of case studies (see 
Esser 1998 for an overview) which together offer suggestive evidence that decision making groups 
can foster these pressures to conform endogenously. Members of such groups, the literature 
contends, can together herd themselves toward otherwise inexplicably bad decisions by increasing 
degrees by a potent mix of increasing insularity and antipathy to outside groups (Esser, 1998). The 
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various suicide cult tragedies are potentially horrific examples of this as are some high profile policy 
blunders at government level, such as the Bay of Pigs, in the Kennedy administration, and the 
appeasement policy of the Chamberlain government (Esser, 1998).  
1.11. The size of the referent group as a determinant of its influence. 
You are sipping your coffee and checking your email over WiFi in a street-side branch of your 
preferred cafe when a man stops outside on the sidewalk and looks intently up at something; you 
notice because he pauses a good minute before seeming to give up looking for whatever it was he 
was looking for and moving on. You probably would not even have remembered the incident except 
that over the next forty five minutes first two men, then three, then five, then ten, then fifteen men 
pause at different times outside the same window to look up for, presumably, the same thing for a 
minute. What makes the situations more memorable is that each time more and more people 
actually stop to look up too, in fact not too long after the last crowd has dispersed and the fifteen 
men arrive to start looking up, a crowd grows rapidly larger than before and blocks the door of the 
cafe, you know because it stops you getting outside to see what could be so arresting. 
The situation described above of course reflects the now famous experiment conducted in New York 
on two winter afternoons in 1968 by Stanley Milgram, Leonard Bickman and Lawrence Berkowitz3 
where larger initial crowds (confederates of the experimenters) draw ever larger crowds focused 
upon the same action or object, here, looking up.  
The experiment is a demonstration of a fact about human nature that we perhaps intuitively realise 
to be true and which we will explore in this section: we are more likely to adopt a behaviour if more 
people adopt it and, all else being equal, less likely to adopt the behaviour if fewer people adopt it. 
An experiment with informational cascades conducted by Salganik, Dodds and Watts (2006) 
demonstrates this effect operating without any face-to-face social interaction (as in Milgram et al’s 
experiment above). One of the implications of non-face-to-face interaction is that a person’s actions 
are not observable by others. This is reasonably obvious to each person, in this case, sitting in front 
of their computer. To carry out the experiment Salganik, Dodds and Watts created a website that 
hosted unreleased songs from unknown bands to which 14 341 participants were recruited from a 
teen interest site on the world wide web. Participants were not informed that they were now part of 
an experiment, they almost certainly thought that they had arrived at a music site much like many 
on the world wide web. Participants who landed on the site were invited to listen to the various 
songs, rate them and, if they chose to, download them.  
                                                          
3
 Milgram, Bickman & Berkowitz (1969). 
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In real-time, participants were randomly allocated to one of two treatments as they arrived on the 
website. The two treatments were: social influence and independent influence. In the social 
influence treatment participants were further randomly allocated into eight subgroups (or “worlds” 
in the language of the Salganik et al paper). In each of the social influence subgroups, participants 
could see how many times each song had been downloaded for their particular subgroup, while 
participants in the independent influence group saw no information beyond the song title and band 
name. Participants in the social influence groups thus had an indication of the preferences of others 
while participants in the independent influence group had no such indication. The results in the 
social influence subgroups present a fairly compelling story about the influence of norms as well as 
how cascades can develop when social norms are visible. Across the eight subgroups in the social 
influence group “the best songs rarely did poorly and the worst songs rarely did well” (Salganik et al, 
2006) but otherwise the distribution of songs rated highly was pretty much random. It is the pattern 
of results within each subgroup that is most interesting. 
Within each subgroup of the social influence group the highest rated songs were always those which 
had been downloaded more initially. The results demonstrated that with the passage of time those 
songs that were initially popular attracted proportionally more downloads than those songs that 
were less popular initially.  
These results indicate that reporting the evolving social norm had a decisive influence upon the fate 
of each song’s ultimate popularity within each subgroup. This is thus an example of a reported 
behaviour (as opposed to primarily observed behaviour) influencing people in proportion to the 
number of other people who had adopted the behaviour. 
This relationship between the number of people adopting a behaviour, or a product, and the 
likelihood of others then adopting this behaviour may well be at work in all markets that are 
reasonably competitive. There is evidence in the marketing literature that the sort of exponential 
distributions observed in Salganik et al (2006) are also present in a diverse range of competitive 
markets. The distributions that seem to describe the download patterns of least to most popular 
songs in the social influence groups of Salganik et al’s research have been noted in the marketing 
literature since McPhee (1963) as describing the distribution of market share and frequency of 
purchase of goods from coffee to syndicated cartoons (Ehrenberg et al, 1990). Within this literature 
the phenomenon is known as “double jeopardy” after McPhee (1963) who was the first to identify 
the phenomenon. Since Ehrenberg (1972) this sort of “double favouring” of market leaders has been 
noted in many markets across the world from breakfast cereals, to washing powder, coffee and 
toilet soap (Ehrenberg et al, 1990). That this “double jeopardy” pattern accords with the results of 
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Salganik et al’s (2006) experiment provides circumstantial evidence then that the sort of social 
norm-referencing process identified by Salganik et al may well be at work in consumer goods 
markets across the world. Of course this is, at this stage, merely suggestive and not proof of a hard 
and fast sort. 
Several literatures within economics on public goods have also investigated the possible role that 
social comparison may play in influencing contributions to a public good4 or other pro-social 
behaviour.  
Fellner et al (2009) conduct a field experiment amongst potential TV licence evaders in Austria. They 
employ four mailing-based treatments amongst a random sample of potential evaders. The four 
treatments are a legal threat (which was designed to imply a high risk of detection if a consumer 
decided to evade payment of their TV licence), a moral appeal that was designed to appeal to an 
innate sense of fairness on the part of the consumer. Their third treatment was, in a similar vein to 
this experiment, a provision of “social information” that indicated to recipients what the level of 
compliance (in terms of paying their TV licences) was. The final treatment was a control treatment 
where a number of people were not mailed any communication whatsoever. 
The results that Fellner et al (2009) observed have particular resonance with this study. Firstly it was 
found that, overall, the mailed groups exhibited higher levels of compliance than the non-mailed 
group. Within the mailed groups, it was only the legal threat that produced significant results overall 
though, the moral appeal and social information treatment did not seem to produce much of a 
significant effect overall. What is really interesting though is the pattern with which the results differ 
within the social information tr atment. The results differ by whether the consumer lived in a 
community which believed5 that the level of compliance was lower than what the social information 
treatment reported it to be or if the community believed it to be higher. Respondents who lived in 
communities which believed that TV licence compliance was below that reported were more likely 
to comply than those who lived in a community who believed the level of compliance to be higher 
than what was reported.  
                                                          
4
 Electricity may well be considered by many of its consumers to be what amounts to a public good, or a 
common pool resource,  since their contemporaneous aggregate demand - if too great - may instigate a 
blackout that suspends supply of electricity to a neighbourhood, suburb or a city. Similarly, for those aware of 
the ecological impacts of electricity generation in South Africa, the impact of increased electricity generation in 
response to increased electricity consumption may link private to consumption public consequences. 
5
 Fellner et al (2009) obtain figures for what communities believe to be the level of compliance from a survey 
of over 1000 households conducted in 2000. In the survey, respondents are asked whether they believed the 
frequency of licence fee evasion in Austria was between 0%-5%, 5%-10%, 10%-20%, or more than 30%. The 
survey was conducted by the Austrian Public broadcasting Company and also provides data for Traxler and 
Winter (2009, 2012). 
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This sort of result is consistent with a model of contribution behaviour that is truly conditional. Not 
only do we see that the likelihood of compliance increases amongst those who discover that the 
level of  compliance was actually greater than what they at first thought, but we see the same effect 
at work but in opposite direction. Those who discover that the level of compliance is lower than 
what they at first expected become less likely to comply. If people were not conditionally 
cooperative or only partially so, we would expect to see either no effect in any group or an effect in 
only one group, rather than an effect in both groups. 
This sort of effect has also been observed in the norms literature in social psychology, where it is 
known as the boomerang effect (Schultz et al, 2007). A large literature has developed within social 
psychology around the use of social norms to curb alcohol consumption at college in the form binge 
drinking (Prentice & Miller 1993, Perkins et al 2005). Studies and programs in this vein typically, as in 
the social information treatment in Fellner et al (2006), report the average number of drinks 
consumed by a typical college student to students, often freshmen. The goal is to demonstrate that 
a normal college student does not consume as much alcohol as a freshman may at first expect 
(Perkins, 2002). Results from these studies lend support to th  view that people will converge to 
what they perceive to be the normal level of consumption. As with Fellner et al (2009) an 
unfortunate corollary of this is that in many cases reporting a normal level of drinking raises the 
consumption levels of those who were initially consuming less than the reported normal level of 
alcohol (Perkins et al, 2005; Weschler et al, 2003; Werch et al, 2000). Within the broader resource 
consumption literature in economics the data has not, so far, pointed to the presence of a 
boomerang effect. Ferraro and Price (2011) do not observe it amongst water users in Cobb County 
that were compared to norms on mailed interventions and, similarly, Allcott (2011) does not observe 
it amongst OPower households that receive communication which incorporates similar comparative 
social norms.  
Within the tax compliance literature; effects such as those described above have been noted as far 
back as Spicer and Becker (1980) who found the same sort of comparison effects at work amongst 
there sample to whom the reported three different prevailing tax rates of others (a higher, lower 
and middle rate) and found that tax evasion was lower the lower the reported tax rate of others, 
suggesting that people used information about where the tax rate they were subject to stood 
relative to the average rate in order to decide whether to evade tax or not.6 This result accords with 
                                                          
6
 The experiment was not designed to evaluate the effect of comparison per se but rather to investigate equity 
theory, whereby the individual alters their behaviour so as to place themselves in a position that resolves any 
perceived lack of equity.  Thus a person who perceived themselves to be taxed more than the average may 
feel that they are being treated unfairly and so decide to under declare their income, while a person who 
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a  particularly consistent finding from the tax compliance literature within economics, which is that 
citizens tend to be conditionally cooperative (Frey and Torgler, 2007 provide a helpful overview in 
their literature review section). What is meant by conditionally cooperative is that people are more 
likely to pay their taxes if they perceive that more people are also paying their taxes. In their paper 
Frey and Torgler (2007) estimate tax morale across a 30 country European survey7. They find very 
strong support in this data for tax behaviour and tax morale to be strongly determined by an 
individual’s perception of the level of tax evasion in their country. The result is robust to several 
weighted probit estimation techniques and two stage least squares techniques. 
Using a linear public good game design that employs the “strategy method” of Selten (1967), 
Fischbacher et al (2001) test how much each subject is prepared to give in a public goods game for 
varying indicated levels of contributions from other members of the group. Given the structure of 
the game and its payoffs, complete free riding was predicted. Fischbacher et al find in their 
experiment that 50% of the subjects contribute in a conditionally cooperative fashion, while a third 
free ride. Similarly Heldt (2005) finds that cross country skiers in two ski resorts make contributions 
to a ski track in a fashion in a fashion that is positively dependent upon the degree to which others 
contribute to the track. 
Croson (2007) conducted a series of experiments that aimed to test the comparative static 
predictions of linear public goods games based on assumptions about how individuals would 
contribute to the public good. The results supported a model of giving that suggested reciprocity 
sensitive behaviour on the part of subjects. Subjects were significantly and positively influenced by 
their beliefs about how much others were giving, in particular, subjects overall seemed to try to 
match the median contribution of their group.  
Within public goods games agents’ behaviours may be motivated by conformity that is purely 
conformity or by some reciprocity based heuristic or motive. Conditional cooperation is obviously a 
potential candidate for explanation by reciprocity derived actions where agents contribute to a 
public good because they receive some benefit from the existence of the good. Purely conformist 
agents would contribute to a public good from which they received no benefit, purely because they 
perceived that others were doing so, where as a reciprocity based agent would not (Bardsley and 
Sausgruber, 2005) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
perceives themselves to be under taxed compared to their peers may be more likely to fully comply out of a 
sense to restore equity (Adams, 1965, Homans 1961, Tyler and Smith, 1988). It is in this way that the result is 
relevant. 
7
 The European Values Survey. 
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Frey and Meier (2004a, 2004b) find in a field experiment and wherein students at the University of 
Zurich are invited to contribute to two social funds that the University runs at the beginning of each 
year (2004a) and a subsequently deeper analysis in a companion paper (2004b) that conditional 
cooperation is mainly observable amongst students who were indifferent to making a contribution, 
with past behaviour serving to be the main predictor for the balance of the students. 
In a similar application to charitable contributions one experiment, conducted via a public radio 
station by Croson and Shang (2009), was designed to test two major classes of theories that have 
been proposed to explain the relationship between one’s own donation and the donations of others. 
One set of models8 explains one’s donations as being substitutes for the donations of others while 
the other models the individual’s donations as complements for the donations of others. Of course 
what both models to do not presume to explain9 is the relationship between the individual and 
others contributions in fact, but rather they seek to explain the influence of information about 
others donation/s upon really an individual’s donation/s. 
In many instances it seems that information, direct or mediated, about the number of people who 
are adopting a particular behaviour will positively influence the likelihood the behaviour being 
adopted. 
1.12. Social distance and the influence of social norms. 
Social psychology was the first discipline to really take investigation into social norms’ influence and 
social influence seriously. Early research in social psychology seemed to suggest that an individual 
was influenced by another or by a group because that individual wanted, in some way, to be part of 
and like by that one other or that group (Schultz et al, 2008, Bandura, Ross & Ross, 1961, Deutsch 
and Gerard, 1955) this finds a definite resonance in the work of George Akerlof on social distance 
(1997) in economics. In this section we examine how this idea of social distance may influence 
responses to a norm. In particular we are trying to develop a hypothesis about how social distance 
between the respondent household and the referent group may influence the response of the 
respondent household. 
                                                          
8
 Croson and Shang understand these models as falling into 3 major categories: the pure altruism models after 
Becker (1974), Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984) which predict a dollar for dollar crowding out of individual 
giving by high normative giving, the impure altruism models such as those described by Andreoni (1989, 1990), 
Steinberg (1987), Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) which describe normative giving as crowding out less than one 
dollar of individual giving per dollar normatively given, and finally threshold models which differentiate effects 
of normative giving upon individual giving according to whether the threshold for the provision of the public 
good in question has been reached or not (e.g. Andreoni 1998 for public goods and Romano 1991 as well as 
Cornelli 1996 for private goods). 
9
 And it would be almost mystical if they did. 
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Akerlof (1997) develops a simple model which captures the essence of how the idea of social 
distance may influence the direction and degree to which people conform to a reported referent 
group.  The model serves to highlight the thought that a choice with social aspects may be subject to 
three influences in terms of a rational, social, actor’s utility function. The first influence would be the 
utility derived from the good or action (or degree of consumption/participation) in itself, something 
common to all students of microeconomics. The second and third influences are antagonistic in 
Akerlof’s formulation. These influences are the utility derived from being distinct and better than 
one’s neighbours10 and the utility from being similar to your neighbours. Akerlof's formulae for each 
influence are fairly simple and illustrate the concept clearly. 
In terms of the utility derived from being distinct and better we have: 
                            
With     denoting the average choice of one’s neighbours and the right most quadratic form 
denoting the influence upon utility of the choice devoid of social considerations. 
In terms of the utility derived from acting similarly to one’s neighbours we have: 
                          
Here we see that utility is maximised the smaller the distance between oneself and one’s neighbours 
becomes, whether one approaches from “below” or “above” one’s neighbours. As Akerlof discusses 
(1997; p1009-1010) the status of marginal utility as social distance moves to zero depends upon the 
functional form of the utility model. Here we have expressed the idea that non-zero social distance 
decreases the utility from a choice in and of itself for a person. Again the quadratic function on the 
rightmost denotes influence upon utility of the choice devoid of social considerations. 
 Overall then, we have an actor who would choose some level or type of x so as to maximise a utility 
function of the form: 
                                     
The key idea here is that the degree of discrepancy between one’s own action and the actions of 
others drives one’s actions. 
The experimental literature has brought forth examples of where, it seems, the idea of social 
distance as guiding behaviour finds some support. 
                                                          
10
 Neighbours, for Akerlof, need not be geographically close but may just be close in social terms, such as peers 
or friends. 
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Sacerdote (2001) examines Grade Point Average (GPA) and fraternity data for freshmen students at 
Dartmouth, for evidence of social distance influencing GPA.  Students at Dartmouth are randomly 
assigned to dormitories and rooms in their freshmen year, allowing for estimates of roommate 
influence upon GPA to be estimated.11 Sacerdote finds a significant relationship between the GPA of 
roommates is supported by his data (although, a robust magnitude of this relationship is found to be 
somewhat difficult to determine). This experiment builds on similar findings in other research into 
the effects of peers upon GPA, albeit upon non-randomised data where researchers needed to deal 
with this characteristic when estimating the relationships, such as Harris (1998), the Coleman report 
of 1966 and to some extent the social background findings of Betts and Morell (1999).  
Within the context of school attendance in poor villages in Mexico, Lalive and Catteneo (2009) find 
that the schooling decisions of children are affected by those of their peers. They identify a 
significant positive relationship between school attendance of one group of children upon another. 
In particular they find that if the some children are funded to come to school (in this case via the 
PROGRESSA program in Mexico) that not only do they attend more days of school than before, but 
so do their unfunded peers. In the Lalive and Catteneo (2009) analysis this secondary peer-influence 
effect is nearly as important as the direct funding effect. 
The effect of those close to us appears to extend to our waistline too. Christakis and Fowler (2007) 
analyse 12 067 people in the Framingham Heart Study wherein people are assessed with repeated 
measurements over the 32 years from 1971 - 2003 and find that the number of obese persons (with 
a body mass of 30 or greater) were to be found in discernable clusters. The chance of a person being 
obese in the data increased by a considerable 57% if they had a friend that became obese. Similarly 
Leatherdale and Papadakis (2010) find after controlling for between-school random effects amongst 
12 049 school going adolescents from 76 secondary schools in Ontario, Canada that that as obesity 
increases amongst students aged 16-18 years, the likelihood of a 14-16 year old student being obese 
increased significantly.12  Similar effects have also been suggested in studies dealing with adolescent 
smoking (Cameron et al, 1999; Leatherdale et al, 2006). 
In terms of morality; research by Ariely  et al (2009) indicates that when people are confronted with 
a moral norm, such as for cheating, within their own group they are more likely to conform to that 
norm (be it honesty or cheating). However, when confronted with a moral norm, again say for 
                                                          
11
 Where roommates are selected by each other, self selection by students becomes a highly obscuring factor 
in subsequent analysis of peer effects, a difficulty that is usually solved by the use of instrumental variables 
such as in Gavira and Raphael (1999) and Borjas (1992). 
12
 Leatherdale and Papadakis (2010) use a logistic regression approach. The log odds of a 14-16 year old being 
obese increase by 1.05 for every 1% increase in the number of 16-18 year old students who are obese in their 
secondary school. 
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cheating, in a group of which they are not a member, people are likely to be behave in the opposite 
fashion to the norm, that is, they will cheat less if they perceive cheating to be a norm in a group of 
which they are not a member.  Thus it seems that when social distance is small, the tendency to 
conform to a social moral norm is strong but when social distance is larger that tendency is either 
weaker or operating in the opposite direction. 
Moving to consider larger communities Analysis of these sort of effects has also been carried out 
within another sub genre of economics research, namely the neighbourhood effects literature. Here 
the idea is to look for effects that operate over groups of people that are socially close (as opposed 
to socially distant). These groups constitute the “neighbourhoods” in the neighbourhood effects 
literature. Neighbourhoods in this literature need not be groups whose members are necessarily 
geographically close to one another (Durlauf, 2004) but merely, in some way, socially close.13 
Within the neighbourhood effects literature there are uncovered role model effects, where people 
are shown to imitate others as well as peer influence effects, where people contemporaneously 
influence each other (Durlauf, 2004).  
Buchan et al (2006) have also conducted some lab experimental research in this area that suggests 
that social distance may not uniformly exercise an influence upon behaviour, but is rather modified 
by the cultural context of the respondents. Buchan et al (2006) were interested in assaying the 
effects of social distance upon other regarding preferences. To this end they conducted several 
laboratory experiments with students in he USA, China, Japan and South Korea. In each case the 
participants were paired off to play an investor game14. Before each experiment began the 
participants were randomly split into several groups each of which discussed a designated topic, that 
was unrelated15 to the forthcoming experiment, for ten minutes. Once the ten minute discussion 
was concluded, half of the participants were paired with people from within their discussion group 
while the other half of participants were paired with people from outside of their discussion group.  
                                                          
13
 The exact measure of social distance differs from paper to paper within this literature as would be expected 
(Durlauf, 2004. Section 4.6). 
14
 The investor game is a two player game in which both players are given an initial endowment of money. The 
first player has the option to transfer any positive amount of money to the second player or none at all. Any 
money transferred by the first player to the second at this stage is tripled. The second player can then decide 
how much money to return to the first player. Since the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is for the 
second player to return no money to the first player (the second player is essentially playing a dictator game), 
the first player should send none in the first round. 
15
 There were only two types of topics. In one groups participants were asked to introduce themselves and 
then to discuss “a personal question relating to their birthdays”. This was deemed to be personal 
communication. In another group participants were instructed to answer questions from the World Almanac, 
with one participant noting down the answers. This was deemed impersonal communication. (Buchan et al, 
2006; pp.379-80). These discussion topics are related to a further experimental question of whether the 
personal nature of group discussion would influence results of the investor game. 
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The researchers measured what proportion of their wealth was returned by the second player to the 
first player across the various treatments and countries. They find that the reciprocal behaviour by 
second players differs by whether the first player was part of the second player’s pre-experimental 
discussion group, but in a fashion that is different between the USA and China groups (with the 
South Korean and Japanese groups not distinguishably different from the USA or China groups). With 
the experiments conducted in the USA, Croson et al find that second players give significantly 
greater proportions of their wealth, in the “return” round of the investor game, when they were 
paired with first players that were part of their pre-experiment discussion group compared to when 
they were paired with a first player from a different pre experiment discussion group16. There thus 
seems to be a negative relationship between social distance and the proportion of wealth given by 
the second player, which is to say that that decreasing social distance increases the proportion of 
wealth given by the second player in the “return” round of the investment game. Amongst the 
experimental groups from the more collectivist cultures of Japan and South Korea the amount 
returned by the second player seemed to be the same, regardless of whether the first player was 
part of their pre-experiment discussion group or not. In China (the most collective culture) the 
opposite was noted. Second players in these groups gave a greater proportion of their wealth back 
to the first player in cases where the first player was from a different pre-experiment discussion 
group and less to players who were from their own pre-experiment discussion group.  
Buchan et al (2006) appeal to broader research in social psychology17 in order to explain this 
differing behaviour. Specifically, they con end that their results are consistent with theories about 
how in groups and out groups are formed and how people relate to them in individualistic and 
collectivist cultures. Within individualist cultures (such as the USA) the needs of the individual come 
before the broader group, while the opposite is true the more collectivist a culture is (such as China). 
Within individualistic cultures groups are formed for a purpose, are formed more frequently and are 
more flexible and temporary. However, within collectivist cultures, groups are formed less 
frequently and are oriented around long term associations such as family. 
Whatever the precise explanation; what should be noted is that the influence of social distance thus 
differed across cultures. In the USA and China, social distance exerted influence in opposite 
directions, while in South Korea and Japan it apparently exerted no influence at all. This sort of result 
                                                          
16
 Participants did not know beforehand that they would be playing an investor game, so pre-game 
agreements are not likely to have been reached (Buchan et al, 2006; p.380).  
17
 Triandis et al (1990), Triandis et al (1999) and Han and Choe (1994) together provide an overview of the 
work they appeal to. 
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suggests that it is worthwhile investigating how social distance may influence household response in 
Cape Town. 
 
1.13. Pluralistic ignorance and social norms. 
Pluralistic ignorance is an important element to consider when discussing normative influence. 
Pluralistic ignorance is when most or all of a group are ignorant about what others in the group do or 
think. The concept of pluralistic ignorance has particular bearing upon the investigation of normative 
social influence in regard to college drinking in the USA, which has been a particularly active area of 
research. The literature in this regard is motivated by concern for college students over-drinking and 
how to combat this. The literature on normative influence and college drinking is predicated upon 
the thought that college students are, at least partly (but still), significantly motivated to drink too 
much because they think that overindulgence is the norm at college (Prentice& Miller, 1993, Perkins, 
2002, Perkins et al 2005). Several studies have demonstrated that college students routinely 
overestimate how much it is normal to consume by way of alcohol as a student (Berkowitz 2004, 
Perkins, 2002 provides an overview of studies in this area) believing that college students consume, 
on average, more alcohol than they, in fact, do. Interventions in this area have thus been targeted at 
informing college students about what the normal level of alcohol consumption for their group really 
is and so reducing pluralistic ignorance on this issue. 
The results of applying norms reporting to college drinking have been mixed. With over-consumers 
reporting the norm appears to have had the effect of moderating consumption (Agostinelli, Brown, 
& Miller, 1995; Haines & Spear, 1996; Neighbors et al., 2004) some of the time; for under-consumers 
particularly, reporting the normal level of consumption seems to have raised consumption toward 
the norm in a number of cases (Perkins et al, 2005; Wechsler et al.,2003; Werch et al., 2000). We will 
return to this topic when discussing descriptive and injunctive norms below, but the important point 
to note is that these studies indicate that normative influence can be exerted without social 
interaction. 
It is easy to see how pluralistic ignorance could persist in situations where the actions of a significant 
share of the larger group were not easily observable or otherwise discoverable. 
1.14. Thoughts on why social norms may be stable through time: social norms may reduce the 
transactions costs of learning important information. 
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Norms, however they may be maintained through time, can certainly serve the function of reducing 
transactions costs in conditions where multiple equilibria exist (Wärneryd, 1994). Mainly they can 
reduce transactions costs by indicating an desired or just efficient18, action, thus allowing agents to 
find equilibrium action far quicker than they would otherwise. 
It may be too difficult for a household or a single person to identify an equilibrium or, in our case, to 
know what a more efficient level of consumption is. Norms may signal to people what such a level 
could be. People may learn that adopting a social norm leads to a more optimal personal outcome 
being realised with lower transactions or search costs than if they had independently set out to 
gather the information required to inform optimal behaviour themselves. We will deal with this 
particular signalling function of norms when discussing pluralistic ignorance below. 
One situation in which transactions cost of finding an equilibrium or a more efficient level of 
consumption may be if there is an over abundance of data. If there is an over abundance of data it 
may be difficult for people to tell relevant from irrelevant data or to derive a relevant summary of 
the data without incurring significant search costs, such as time foregone that could have been 
devoted to a paid work. Norms would signal what most others actors are doing and may be 
interpreted as best and so adopted. 
In coordination games, the adoption of norms reduces the amount of costly mismatches in action 
before an equilibrium of coordination is reached. Consider here the example of which side of the 
road to drive on. Experimentation in an atmosphere where one is ignorant of the norm could lead to 
some very costly mismatches with other players. Norms reduce the transactions cost of discovering 
a coordinating equilibrium for th  players involved by virtue of signalling to all what it is normal to 
do, Roth (1985) demonstrates this experimentally.  
Of course merely reducing transactions costs does not mean that norms are necessarily enhancing of 
overall efficiency from an individual, household or group’s point of view. Akerlof (1980, 1982) and 
Romer (1984) demonstrate, theoretically, that a norm may be present in a market and generate an 
equilibrium that is not efficient but persist nevertheless. Contracts that are fairly uniform, such as 
those in the Illinois agricultural market (Young and Burke, 2001), rather than capturing the 
idiosyncratic realities of agents different circumstances or more direct efficient contract concerns 
(such as monitoring costs, information asymmetries and risk appetites)  may be real world evidence 
of a norm driving an inefficient market outcome. 
                                                          
18
 Given a particular set of circumstances. 
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Research by Potters et al (2005) demonstrate that there is an incentive for agents within public 
goods games as well as for exogenous third parties who are interested in maximising contributions 
to the public good (such as managers of a charity) to order their giving sequentially. In Potters et al 
(2005) subjects can be either informed about the public good and its attributes or uninformed.  
In game formats when information has a low but positive cost of acquisition and subjects are 
allowed to endogenously determine the order of giving, sequential giving is the equilibrium that is 
arrived at for the most part rather than simultaneous giving. Sequential ordering of contributions is 
perhaps arrived at as an equilibrium in the public goods games of Potters et al (2005) when 
information has a low positive cost out of a coordination of motives. The first mover has an incentive 
to purchase information prior to making their contribution so as to select the best contribution (or 
best level of contribution) if there is uncertainty about this. However, subsequent players do not 
share this motive if they are aware of the first mover’s incentive to acquire information and ability to 
choose. Subsequent players can move according to the signal sent by the first player, specifically, 
they can mimic the first player’s contribution.  
Anecdotally there is some evidence that this already happens with charities. Potters et al cite the 
initial contribution of Brook Astor to the New York library which precipitated three major 
subsequent gifts as such a real world case. Brook Astor was known to only give to charities that she 
had personally inspected.  
When sequential ordering of contributing is imposed exogenously, leaders were shown to perform 
similarly to in the endogenous situation. They seemed to, correctly, anticipate that subsequent 
contributors would mimic their giving. Subsequent contributors did mimic the contributions by initial 
players. 
Although total contributions were found to be highest when allowing players to arrive at the 
sequential equilibrium endogenously, total giving is also raised, compared to simultaneous giving, by 
imposing a sequential giving structure upon the game that requires the informed subjects to 
contribute first. In other words not only do players seem to prefer sequential ordering of 
contributions to public goods when there is uncertainty about the public good and when information 
is asymmetrically distributed, but they are more likely to contribute when they have a clear  positive 
contribution signal from the initial mover. 
What these experiments seem to demonstrate is that in public goods situations, sequential giving is 
preferred by players on what seem to be the grounds of reducing transactions costs as the 
sequential format allows for an efficient use of information, by mimicking contributions of the initial 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
28 
 
mover. Such a study has relevance for this experiment since it suggests that people will follow the 
signalled actions of initial movers when there is a degree of uncertainty. 
 
1.15. Further thoughts on why social norms may be stable through time. 
There are several theories about why norms emerge and for why norms are influential (see Feldman 
& MacCoun, 2005 for an overview of some important ones). Within economics one of the more 
widely accepted explanations rests upon the notion that it is the ability of norms to coordinate 
expectations in situations where multiple equilibria are possible that renders them both powerful 
and stable (see Young, 2007)).  
Within this framework it is this coordination of expectations that distinguishes a norm from an 
equilibrium in general. Consider (from Young, 2007) a game in which two players make simultaneous 
bids for a portion of a pot of money, with players receiving their bids so long as the total of their bids 
does not exceed the total amount of money in the pot, if they do exceed the pot value, both players 
receive nothing. In this situation there are several equilibria that lead to a no-zero return for each 
player, however a fifty-fifty division of the pot is the one that is most often selected (Roth, 1985) 
with the other possible variations almost never selected in such coordination games. 
 Here we see that a fifty-fifty division is a norm because it seems to coordinate both players’ or 
parties’ expectations to focus on a specific division out of many possible divisions. Roth (1985) 
dissolves this coordination by asking players to divide a pot that is denominated in chips of unequal 
monetary value (which are cashed in at the end of the game), thus creating potentially two different 
focal solutions to the game: divide the chips equally or the money equally. In this circumstance the 
incidence of the fifty-fifty norm drops dramatically since neither player is sure how the other will 
denominate their offer.  
Coordination, apart from being a service offered by norms  has also been identified by some as being 
a reason for people to conform to norms. One of the most salient examples in this regard is 
currency. There is exists a strong norm to carry the currency, or electronic access to the currency, of 
the country around with you in your wallet. It would be silly to carry rupees with you in South Africa 
simply because you would probably not be able to find someone willing to accept them in exchange 
for goods and services. With money the strong incentive to stick to the norm of exchange derives 
directly from the need to coordinate with others if you are to have your daily bread. Thus 
coordination itself may often be a factor contributing significantly to the stability of a norm through 
time. 
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The influence of others by way of approval, threat of disapproval or even direct enforcement is 
another manner in which a norm may be sustained through time. Even in games, such as the 
dictator game, where the split of the pot is the decision of one player alone, between 20 and 30 
percent of games are fifty-fifty splits (Camerer, 1997). Beyond dictator and ultimatum games played 
in a laboratory setting, the fifty-fifty outcome is present in more general cases where there is 
something to be divided. It is observed in many real life instances such as joint ventures among 
corporations, share tenancy in agriculture, bequests to children, and splitting the difference is a 
common outcome of arbitration (Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009).  
Where these divisions happen publicly, whether in studies in the laboratory or in real world 
contracts, agents may be motivated in large part by a concern to appear fair. Andreoni and 
Bernheim (2009) present a model of agent behaviour in dictator games that accommodates many of 
the results of dictator games where the division was fifty-fifty by incorporating a concern, on the 
agent’s part, to appear fair to others in their explanatory models.  
Norms may also persist because people are concerned about possible retribution from others if they 
are discovered to be breaking of have broken a norm. Retribution may take the form of social 
judgement possibly augmented with material action. Fehr, et al (2002) is one example of a growing 
literature that demonstrates that third parties are indeed often prepared to enforce norms by 
punishing those who transgress a norm, even if it costs them a considerable amount to enact this 
punishment. The expectation alone that departure from a norm will be punished by social 
disapproval or otherwise may be sufficient to sustain norms, as shown by Sugden (1986) and 
Coleman (1990). 
Apart from the coordination motive or expectation of social disapproval or even punishment, people 
may internalise the norm and regulate their own compliance with the norm. To return to the fifty-
fifty norm, it may be that agents consider a fifty-fifty division to be fair division of a pot of extra 
resources and that they wish be able to view themselves to be fair. Similar concerns may explain the 
tendency for people to comply with tax regimes (Wenzel, 2004). In these cases agents are motivated 
by a desire to feel good about themselves or at least not feel bad about themselves, and this is what 
drives their behaviour to be norm consistent even if they act knowing that they are unobserved.  
Of course these motivations or channels of enforcement may be act together. Azar (2004) develops 
a model in which an agent with such internalisation as well as concerns for social approval can 
contribute to the persistence of a norm, even one that is somewhat costly for the agent, such as 
tipping for service in restaurants. 
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In terms of the labour market, which is the market that Akerlof (1980, 1982) and Romer (1984) apply 
their theoretical models to, Fehr et al (1998) find evidence, albeit in (laboratory) experimental 
labour markets, that norms of reciprocity, where present, seem to have both efficiency lowering and 
efficiency enhancing influences apart from any effects upon transactions costs. Fehr et al (1998) find 
that a norm of reciprocity holds wages higher than the market clearing level when there is an excess 
supply of labour and wages “that are persistently above the competitive level”, however, reciprocity 
raises the effort of labour and hence the efficiency the effort-wage trade.  Efficiency, beyond 
reducing transactions costs, notably search costs, is not however something that norms, by virtue of 
being norms, will necessarily increase (or decrease) that depends upon the nature of the norm, for 
instance, it seems fairly clear that a norm of revenge killing would keep a society from attaining a 
more welfare efficient equilibrium. 
Many norms, or conventions, are often trifling behaviours to keep. For instance, unless you are on a 
sinking ship, letting women go first (through doors, sitting down at table) costs a man very little. 
Similarly breaking a norm by eating with your elbows on the table or wearing a tie longer or shorter 
than your beltline does not seem to do much to altar any person’s well being. As Posner (2000) 
argues, however, the keeping of these more trifling norms may serve as a signal to those around you 
that you a preparedness to observe other, less trivial norms, of the same cultural set which may lead 
to a non-trivial outcomes such as a business deal or a second date. 
1.16. Transmitting the influence of social norms in non-face-to-face circumstances. 
Much of the early research on normative influence seemed to view normative social influence as 
operating only through social interaction, up until quite recently (see, Prentice & Miller, 1993). 
Indeed, the bulk of research in social psychology is still conducted within a setting rich in social 
interaction. However, a growing body of research, both in social psychology and economics, is 
demonstrating that normative influence need not only arise in a matrix of social interaction, but may 
be transmitted though more passive media. In terms of this non-social channel of possible influence, 
what is being transmitted is information. This information is of a particular sort. We turn now to a 
review of research which addresses this topic to evaluate how and when such information may be 
influential. 
One manner in which normative influence may be propagated is by signs of many having passed a 
certain way or adopted a certain behaviour ahead of us. A fairly clear example of this is that of a 
path worn through the bush which suggest to us the way we should walk when hiking. In a study of 
student behaviour when picking up mail from a student mail room Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren filled 
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each student’s mailbox with handbills; they found that when the floor was littered with handbills, 
students overwhelmingly dropped their handbills to the floor but when the floor of the mail room 
was swept and tidy, most students put the handbills into their bags and did not litter (Cialdini et al, 
1990). Similarly, a pile of swept litter in a parking lot induces people in a parking lot to behave in a 
manner that is appropriate for a public space and not litter (Cialdini et al, 1990). 
Situational norms are norms that are embedded in situations themselves and not in direct social 
interaction. Situational norms are almost certainly learned in social interaction. Once situation 
norms are learnt they are however not dependent on social interaction to be activated (Cialdini & 
Trost, 1998). A situational norm which displays this clearly is that of being silent in the library. Aarts 
and Dijksterhuis (2003) find, in a lab experiment, that questions about libraries influence 
respondents to more silent behaviour, as measured by respondents lowering their voices when 
asked questions about library attendance as a part of a more general questionnaire. A similar 
process may be at work to influence how people deal with money. An experiment by Ariely (2008) in 
MIT college dorm common rooms suggests that norms about honesty attach more closely to (or are 
activated more strongly by) money as opposed to other objects such as, in this case, coke cans. In 
the experiment six-packs of coke cans were left in common room fridges as well as a plate with six 
one dollar bills. Ariely reports that within 72 hours all of the coke cans in all of the common room 
fridges had gone, but that all of the dollar bills remained, untaken. While Ariely runs other 
experiments to demonstrate the fact that people seem to act more honestly when dealing with 
money than they do when dealing with objects other than money (Ariely & Mazar, 2006, Ariely et al, 
2008) these all involve personal interaction with an experimenter in some fashion. In the case of the 
common rooms though it seems that being confronted with money or with a can of coke makes a 
difference to how honest you are, even if this means asking those present in the common room 
“whose cokes are these?” but balking at asking the same people “whose dollar bills are these?”. It 
seems then that the norm for dealing honestly with money does not necessarily need social 
interaction in order to be activated. 
Reporting norms, without social interaction, in order to mitigate behaviour, that seems to be driven 
by pluralistic ignorance, has also been applied to littering (Keep Tennessee Beautiful), recycling 
within hotel rooms (Goldstein et al, 2008) to get inoculations against influenza (Blanton et al, 2001) 
as well as energy consumption (Schultz et al, 2007, Alcott, 2011).  
The experiment by Salganik, Dodds and Watts (2006) that measured popularity of downloads across 
various “social information” treatments is also an example of how people may use information 
about the frequency of prior behaviours to guide their choice of their own behaviours when there is 
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a significant degree of uncertainty about what a good choice would be (such as could very well 
characterise the market for music). The circumstantial evidence of the “double jeopardy” effect 
observed in the marketing literature may be circumstantial evidence of the same. One can imagine 
that if someone, such as a student living out of home and in digs for the first time, is uncertain about 
which washing powder to buy, they may well go for the washing powder with the most shelf space 
facing them partly, but significantly, on the basis that that brand is the most popular and hence 
perhaps the best washing powder. 
1.17. Comparative Social Norms of two sorts: Descriptive and Injunctive. 
As we close this chapter we turn to a brief description and discussion of the two sorts of norms that 
will be used in this study. These norms are: descriptive and injunctive norms. Both sorts of norms 
have mainly been used in studies in the field of social psychology but have recently been making 
their way into the field of economics (Alcott, 2011). 
Descriptive norms describe the situation as it is. In the case of this experiment, descriptive norms 
describe to subject households what the average level of electricity consumption over the past 
month was for a household in the City of Cape Town or a household in their neighbourhood.  
Reporting descriptive social norms has been used as a strategy in many programs at colleges in the 
USA in attempts to reduce college binge drinking. According to a survey conducted in 2002 by the 
Harvard School of public health, 746 colleges in the USA had adopted such, descriptive norm-reliant 
strategies (Weschler et al, 2003). Reporting social norms in a comparative fashion has, in these 
cases, been shown to influence consumption behaviour and a large literature has developed within 
social psychology around the use of social norms in to curb alcohol binge consumption (Prentice & 
Miller 1993, Perkins et al 2005). Studies and programs in this vein typically report the average 
number of drinks consumed by a typical college student to students, often freshmen, in order to 
demonstrate that a normal college student does not consume as much alcohol as a freshman may at 
first expect (Perkins, 2002). The norms reported by Croson and Shang (2009) in their public radio 
experiment described earlier were descriptive norms. 
Results from these studies lend support to the view that people will converge to what they perceive 
to be the normal level of consumption. An unfortunate corollary of this is that in many cases 
reporting a normal level of drinking raises the consumption levels of those who were initially 
consuming less than the reported normal level of alcohol (Perkins et al, 2005; Weschler et al, 2003; 
Werch et al, 2000). This tendency for under consumers to increase their consumption toward the 
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norm has been termed the “boomerang” effect (Schultz et al, 2007). Where this study uses the term 
“boomerang effect”, this is what is meant. 
Injunctive norms are norms that embody a measure of social approval or disapproval and when 
reported thus convey some sense of social approval or disapproval for one, or one’s household’s, 
actions.  Injunctive norms have been used in some trial cases to reduce the tendency for consumers 
reported as having consumed less than the norm to increase their consumption when they learn of 
the higher norm. This injunctive norm is an emoticon that is smiling  if a household is reported as 
consuming less than the reported average and frowning  if a household is reported as consuming 
more than the reported average. 
By employing the two elements of an injunctive norm along with the descriptive norm one achieves 
a form of communication where, for an over-consumer, the two norms are harmonious and exercise 
influence in the same direction19 , that is influence to consume less. However, for an under-
consumer these two norms will exert influences that will be in conflict. The descriptive norm will 
exert a an influence upon the consumer to increase their consumption (in order to conform the 
normal level of consumption) while the approving injunctive norm will exercise an influence in the 
opposite direction (society approves of your actions, keep your consumption down below the norm). 
According to the focus theory of social norms (Cialdini et al, 1991), a person’s behaviour will orient 
towards the norm that they perceive (whether consciously or unconsciously) as more prominent at 
the time. The thought is that in all cases it will be the injunctive norm that will be most prominent in 
people’s minds, with the descriptive norm providing information to calibrate any action on the part 
of the individual or household. H nce it is thought that when a person who is consuming less than 
the normal level of consumption receives an approving injunctive norm along with the descriptive 
feedback, they will focus upon the injunctive norm that, in their case, conveys social approval and 
remain under consuming relative to the descriptive norm, while over consumers reduce their 
consumption (since both norms suggest that this is what they should do) relative to the descriptive 
norm.  
The effect of combining descriptive norms with injunctive norms in comparative normative feedback 
has been analysed in two natural field experiments: Schultz, Khazian and Zaleski, (2008) and Schultz, 
et al (2007) - which served as the initial inspiration for this dissertation. Schultz et al (2007) randomly 
assign 290 households in San Marcos, California, to one of two electricity feedback treatments: 
descriptive only or descriptive and injunctive. The results of their study seem to indicate  that a 
                                                          
19
 Assuming that over consumption is socially undesirable and therefore socially disapproved of. 
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boomerang effect was operating amongst the households in the descriptive only treatment, while 
the boomerang effect was not evident amongst households in the descriptive and injunctive 
treatment. As a result, households in the descriptive and injunctive treatment reduced their 
electricity consumption as a group, while the consumption of the group of households in the 
descriptive only treatment did not change overall. Schultz, Khazian and Zaleski, (2008) extend this 
strategy to towel use amongst hotel guests. In this study Schultz, Khazian and Zaleski try to gauge 
the effect of descriptive and injunctive norms upon guests towel use. In particular, they wished to 
see which formulation of the normative message would encourage the guests to use their towels for 
longer periods (thus “recycling” them) before putting them into the washing basket for room 
service. By combining descriptive and injunctive norms they find that guests recycle their towels 
more than whether they are encouraged to do so by only a descriptive or an injunctive norm. 
Alcott (2011) examines the energy saving program run by OPower with several energy utilities in the  
USA. The OPower program uses injunctive and descriptive norms in similar ways to which this study 
used them. OPower partners with utilities by sending households contracted to those utilities "home 
energy reports" that are several pages in length. These reports are not long essays but rather 
contain various modules.20 One of the modules in the report compares households to their 
neighbours and their efficient neighbours descriptively and augments this with injunctive feedback 
as in fig. 1.8. (from Alcott, 2011) below. Households that were "great" in terms of their efficiency 
standing received to smiling emoticons and those that were "good" received one. Households that 
were below average in their efficiency s anding initially received a frowning emoticon but Alcott 
records that customer complaints caused this practice to stop. The other modules provide tips about 
how to save electricity. When a n w utility signed with OPower, households were randomly selected 
to receive home energy reports while others were selected to continue as normal. Comparison 
between these two groups allowed for the effect of the home energy report to be estimated. 
Alcott (2011) estimates the that the home energy reports as a whole generate energy consumption 
that is between 1.4% to 3.3% less than the control group. Focusing his analysis in upon households 
that were close to each other in terms of energy consumption but on either side of the threshold for 
receiving the various injunctive norms he finds, using a regression discontinuity design, that the type 
of injunctive norm makes no difference to the energy reductions achieved. 
Fig.1.8. Social comparison module in the OPower home energy report. 
                                                          
20
More information can be found about the reports at http://opower.com/what-is-opower/reports/ 
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1.9. Conclusion. 
The last two decades in particular have seen economics move away from "methodological 
individualism" and increasingly investigate ways in which the group may influence the individual. 
One of the identifiable themes of this research concerns itself with social norms. From the literature 
it seems that people are conditionally cooperative and are thus more likely to adopt a behaviour if 
there is a signal that a majority have adopted the behaviour in question. A body of research is 
growing around how social distance may moderate this effect and it seems, from this, that the 
influence of a social norm upon an individual or household is generally more potent if the referent 
group is socially close to the individual or household. Given that norms provide information, it is not 
surprising to discover that the literature considers them to be effective modifiers of behaviour when 
there is a large degree of pluralistic ignorance about the topic concerned. 
In terms of their stability through time, social norms may be stable since they may reduce the 
transactions costs of learning for an individual. Other reasons for their stability may be their utility 
for coordinating the actions of actors, social enforcement, people having internalised. These 
potential reasons for social norms being stable through time may further why norms have 
consistently found to be influential, even when there is no face to face interaction and they are 
reported.  
Descriptive and injunctive norms are the two sorts of social norms that were used in the natural field 
experiment at the centre of this thesis. Descriptive norms were reported at two degrees of social 
distance, far (city) and close (neighbourhood), in order to judge the effect of social distance. 
Typically people adjust their behaviour towards the descriptive norms. When one is concerned with 
lowering consumption this produces desirable results amongst those consuming more than average, 
who lower their consumption, but can produce undesirable results amongst those consuming less 
than the average, who may increase their consumption as observed in some studies hoping to curb 
binge drinking by reporting descriptive norms. In order to combat this undesirable "boomerang 
effect" amongst people consuming less than the average a handful of experiments have augmented 
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descriptive norms with injunctive norms in feedback to consumers. Injunctive norms are meant to 
combat the tendency for people consuming lees than average to raise their consumption by 
communicating social approval of their actions. While some studies (Schultz, Khazian & Zaleski, 
2008; and Schultz, et al, 2007) have found this strategy effective analysis of another large scale 
natural field experiment (Alcott, 2011) finds no evidence of injunctive norms having had an effect. 
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Chapter 2. 
Field experiments in the literature of Economics. 
 
Then Daniel said to the steward whom the chief of the eunuchs had assigned 
over Daniel, Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, "Test your servants for ten days; 
let us be given vegetables to eat and water to drink. Then let our appearance 
and the appearance of the youths who eat the king's food be observed by you, 
and deal with your servants according to what you see." So he listened to them 
in this matter, and tested them for ten days. At the end of ten days it was seen 
that they were better in appearance and fatter in flesh than all the youths who 
ate the king's food. So the steward took away their food and the wine they 
were to drink, and gave them vegetables. 
 Daniel 1 v11-16  
The Bible 
(English Standard Version) 
 
The use of the experimental method to evaluate theory and help direct policy can be traced back at 
least as far as the passage from Daniel quoted above, recounting an event that occurred during first 
exile of the Jews from Jerusalem to Babylon under Nebuchadnezzer, at about 605BC21. The use of 
the experimental method in ord r to uncover truth in a more laboratory-like manner can arguably 
be traced as far back perhaps as the Muslim scholar Ibn al-Haytham writing somewhere between 
965-1039 AD (Winter, 1953). Experiments were exceptionally important in the scientific renaissance 
being central to the work of Galileo Galilei22. His use of quantitative experiments to form and 
validate a theory of gravity is a model that science has used ever since the renaissance. Following his 
example the sciences have developed through the centuries largely on the back of experimental 
discoveries made as the method spread through the scientific disciplines to the point where 
physicists, biologists and chemists of various stripes for at least the last two centuries, have taken for 
granted the foundational role of the experimental method in validating their existing knowledge 
base and extending it.  
                                                          
21
 ESV Study Bible commentary on the bible: Daniel. 
22
 Through whom such knowledge at least re entered the West (Fara, 2009). 
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For much of economics' history, economists considered that the only way open for them to move 
the discipline forward was through testing theory based on naturally occurring data23 and not in 
controlled experiments as the quote from Samuelson and Nordhaus' text book (1985)24 makes clear 
"The economic world is extremely complicated. There are millions of people and firms, 
thousands of prices and industries. One possible way of figuring out economic laws in 
such a setting is by controlled experiments. A controlled experiment takes place when 
everything else but the item under investigation is held constant. Thus a scientist trying to 
determine whether saccharine causes cancer in rats will hold “other things equal” and 
only vary the amount  of saccharine. Same air, same light, same type of rat. Economists 
have no such luxury when testing economic laws. They cannot perform the controlled 
experiments of chemists or biologists because they cannot easily control other important 
factors. Like astronomers or meteorologists, they generally must be content largely to 
observe." 
Economics, however, has only recently begun to adopt the method, beginning with laboratory 
experiments that were increasingly used from the 1960's with the work of Vernon Smith touching off 
growth in that field. Over the last three decades however, the experimental method has been 
increasingly employed by economists in order to investigate the likely cause of economic behaviour 
in various situations outside of the lab. It is with these field experiments that this chapter will be 
concerned. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of early field experimental work, culminating in the important 
period of the 1930’s when much of the theoretical foundations for field experiments were laid 
down, with the work of Fisher and Neyman in particular. From here we move on to discussing the 
large social experiments evaluating government policy that were conducted in the 1960's and 
1970's. We then move to the more recent history of field experiments which has grown in leaps and 
bounds from the 1980’s to the present. We describe the use of three major types of field experiment 
(artefactual, framed and natural) that have emerged during this period.  
2.1.The early days: Field experiments up to the 1930's. 
Two of the most important elements of field experiments are the control group and randomisation. 
In order to identify the effect of a treatment we philosophically wish to observe a subject at   before 
treatment and at     after treatment and the same subject at      without being treated.  
                                                          
23
 Recorded in national accounts, crop yields, sales figures, share prices and the like. 
24
 pp.7-8 
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Observing the same subject with and without treatment at     provides the perfect 
counterfactual. Practically this is of course impossible and so various methods of treatment effect 
estimation have had to devise methods that approximate this philosophical ideal. The random 
allocation of subjects to various treatments, including a control group is the experimental way of 
solving the counterfactual problem. Through randomly allocating subjects to various treatment and 
control groups, subjects face equal probability of being ascribed to any treatment. As a result, if a 
sufficiently large25 number of subjects are chosen for the expected standard deviations treatment 
effects may be estimated at the desired level of precision by comparison of treatment and control 
groups. 
Experiments in the fields of biology and medicine during the 19th century are perhaps the first body 
of experiments to use control groups as a necessary precondition for generating data that would 
provide the basis for scientifically distinguishable treatment results (Levitt and List, 2009). Levitt and 
List relate the story of Pasteur and Rossignol settling the question of the efficacy of Pasteur’s 
vaccination methods (Rossignol had publicly questioned Pasteur’s early work in immunization and 
Pasteur’s results) using a control-group enabled experiment wherein the continued lives of fifty 
sheep randomly split into two groups (one treated with Pasteur’s anthrax  vaccine and then with 
anthrax, the other group just with anthrax) were the dependent variables of interest. The continued 
vitality of all the vaccinated sheep in the face of the apocalypse amongst the non-vaccinated control 
group (all had died within two days) was a dramatic vindication of Pasteur’s thesis. 
The earliest instances of the use of control groups spreading from medicine and biology to social 
sciences appear to have been educational studies conducted near the beginning of the 20th century. 
By 1901 at least one collaboration of field experimenters in education (Thorndike & Woodworth, 
1901) had explicitly identified the need for and employed control groups to allow for such an 
analysis.  
The case most often cited (See, for example: Stigler, 1992) as containing the first example of 
randomisation employed as a basis for designing experiments is that employed by C.S. Peirce and 
Joseph Jastrow in their sensitivity experiments conducted over a period from December 1883 to 
January 1884 and published in 1885.  Anne Oakley contends that the early experimental  researchers 
in education went so far in their efforts as to have “invented randomised assignment to 
experimental treatments...independently of, and considerably earlier than, R.A. Fisher’s work at 
Rothamsted” (Oakley, 1998).  
                                                          
25
 see List, Sadoff and Wagner (2010). 
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Forsetlund, Chalmers and Bjørndal (2007) provide a helpful analysis of the studies cited by Oakley 
(1998) and find that none of the pre 1926 studies cited by Oakley amount to randomised field 
experiments, at least in the important sense that they did not use randomisation to select members 
of control groups and treatment groups. Mainly these studies seem to have relied upon matching 
according to prognostic variables in order to generate comparison groups. It seems then that while it 
is the case that these experiments in social science used what could be called elements of 
randomisation, it is not the case that they used randomisation in the thorough going fashion that 
Fisher used at Rothamsted in England or Neyman did at Bydgoszcz in Poland.26  
For their part, Forsetlund, Chalmers and Bjørndal (2007) cite a 1928 study by H. H. Remmers done at 
Purdue university as the earliest field experiment in social science study to employ randomisation, 
along with 9 other studies published in the period 1932 to 1948 as the earliest examples of field 
experiments based upon randomisation in their design. 
So, it would seem that experimental work done before 1930 seemed to be approaching a design 
based on randomisation, and that by the time the 1920’s and 1930’s came around “randomisation 
was in the air” (Rubin, 1990). Certainly theoretical work on randomisation as a condition to be 
applied in successful experiments in the field, was to a non-trivial degree, put into print before 
Fisher’s work, notably by Charles Saunders Peirce. By way of illustration: a passage in C. S. Peirce’s  
“Reasoning from Samples”27 reads: 
 “The truth is that induction is reasoning from a sample taken at random to the whole lot 
sampled. A sample is a random one, provided it is drawn by such machinery, artificial or 
physiological, that in the long run any one individual of the whole lot would get taken as 
often as any other. Therefore, judging of the statistical composition of a whole lot from a 
sample is judging by a method which will be right on the average in the long run, and, by the 
reasoning of the doctrine of chances, will be nearly right oftener than it will be far from right.  
That this does justify induction is a mathematical proposition beyond dispute...” (Peirce, 
1931) 
Work on the role of randomisation was thus approaching a point where it could inform the design of 
experiments such that a proper counterfactual could be constructed.  However, before the 1920's 
                                                          
26
 As a result it would not be the case that their work could legitimately employ the body of statistical 
inference tools that are based upon randomisation such as are commonly used for hypothesis testing today.  
27 Section 16 "Reasoning from Samples" in Chapter 2 “Lessons from the history of science” in part I " 
General Historical Orientation "of "Principles of Philosophy". Available at 
http://www.textlog.de/charles_s_peirce.html. or http://www.textlog.de/peirce_principles.html 
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statistical knowledge was still very much fragmentary with many fields within the discipline that 
would be essential to any system of statistical inference characterised by confusion. In particular, 
there was no clear explanation of how to assign probabilities to various hypotheses – the inverse 
probability problem (Armitage, 2003). One of Fisher’s contributions would be to develop the idea of 
randomisation as a basis for valid inference in a mathematical fashion such that clarified 
randomisation’s role in validating tests of significance, especially as to how this related to assigning 
probabilities to various hypotheses – thus solving the inverse probability problem.28 
At Rothamsted agricultural testing station, Sir John Russell had succeeded Adam Hall as director in 
1912. Rothamsted manor had first seen experiments  when in 1843, the owner of the manor, John 
Bennet Lawes, together with a young chemist, Joseph Henry Gilbert, began experiments to test 
various fertilisers and crop yield relationships. These were thus truly field experiments. Agricultural 
experiments continued at Rothamsted from 1843 without a stop and continue to this day at the 
manor.29 As a result, when Russell assumed directorship of Rothamsted, he had sixty-nine years of 
experimental data to deal with. His sentiments on this front are captured in this excerpt from his 
"History of agricultural experiments in Great Britain:" 
“On taking charge at Rothamsted I found great files of records which I knew I could never 
deal with adequately...I knew that the Census Authorities had methods for extracting 
information from great masses of data, and in 1919 after the war I applied both to Oxford 
and to Cambridge universities for a young mathematician familiar with similar methods who 
would be prepared to examine our data and elicit further information that we had missed.” 
(1966, p. 325 in Box, 1980). 
The position of statistician at Rothamsted had thus been created with the view to organising, the 
now over seventy years worth of, experimental data and bringing modern statistical methods to 
bear upon it so as to extract  “further information” that had been “missed.30  It was this position that 
was offered to Fisher an which he took up in 1919.31 
                                                          
28
 . In the process also introducing the term “null hypothesis” into significance tests. 
29 Although now run under the auspices of “Rothamsted Research".  
30
 Sir John also records that at the time he had only six months funding for the position. He hoped that this 
would be enough time to determine whether the position of statistician would be useful to Rothamsted and so 
justify making it permanent. One can only imagine the pressure that the newly married Fisher must have felt.     
31
 At the end of World War I, Ronald Fisher was offered at least two jobs; one at the Galton laboratory under 
Karl Pearson, the other, by Sir John Russell at Rothamsted agricultural testing station, where he could be more 
of his own man. By 1919 Fisher and Pearson were emerging as the leading thinkers in statistics. It seems that 
they were not personalities that could easily work together; a rivalry that would grow to outright animosity 
had begun to develop between the two
31
.  Almost certainly because of this growing rivalry, Fisher took up the 
position of statistician at Rothamsted in 1919 in preference to the Galton position. 
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Fisher’s daughter, Joan Fisher Box, records that at the time Fisher began his work his view of the role 
of the statistician was very much that it would primarily be that of the estimator of information from 
data envisaged by Russell (Box, 1980). However, somewhere in the course of what must have been a 
gargantuan work, Fisher realised that all estimation can only generate as much information as the 
data generating process or processes allow. It was a realisation that had significant implications for 
experimental design as it shifted the “weight” of responsibility for generating good data and 
therefore good conclusions, on to experimental design. Fisher felt that the “moral balance” had 
shifted on to process which generated the data which was to be analysed by the statistician (Fisher, 
1947).  
The powerful argument which caused Fisher to declare a swing in the “moral balance” toward 
experimental design was, of course, his analysis for determining the maximum amount of 
information present in experimental data, otherwise known as Fisher information, fully published in 
192532 but apparently hit upon by the man somewhere around 192233. This theorem allowed Fisher 
to prove the maximal amount of information to be gained from any particular experiment with the 
result that, in his view, the role of the statistician changed: 
“The statistician is no longer an alchemist expected to produce gold from any worthless 
material offered him. He is more like a chemist capable of assaying exactly how much of 
value it contains, and capable also of extracting this amount, and no more. In these 
circumstances, it would be foolish to commend a statistician because his results are precise 
or to reprove because they are not. If he is competent in his craft, the value of the result 
follows solely from the value of the material given him. It contains so much information and 
no more. His job is only to produce what it contains.” (R.A. Fisher quoted in Rao, 1952). 
As a result, from some time in the period 1922 and 1925, Fisher began to focus his energies on 
informing the design of the experiments, primarily at Rothamsted, which generated the data and so 
to move his attention, naturally, to better experimental design.  
In a 1923 paper with Mckenzie as well as an accompanying paper published in 1926, Fisher began to 
showcase how randomisation as well as blocking, replication and factorial design could be brought 
to bear upon experimental design such that the optimal amount of information could be produced in 
                                                          
32 Fisher, R.A. (1925). “Theory of statistical estimation” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical society, 
22: 700-725. 
33
 Box, 1980; p1 “Thus by about 1922, Fisher recognized that a statistician, so long as he did his arithmetic 
right, had no responsibility for the value or worthlessness of his estimates; consequently, “the weight of his 
responsibility was thrown back on to the processes by which the data had come into existence”(1947, p. 435). 
Fisher accepted the design of experiments as his charge. 
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an experiment. This work culminated in his book “The Design of Experiments” published in 1935. The 
book was used for many years as a staple text on experimental design as well as statistical inference, 
it also perhaps served most effectively to increase the actual use of randomisation, blocking, 
replication and factorial design in the design of experiments in the field.  
At the same time as Fisher was doing his work at Rothamsted, Jerzy Neyman was doing very similar 
work in Poland, also at an agricultural test station (in Bydgoszcz). Although his work was mainly 
concerned with surveys and sampling his early work, as evidenced in two long papers written in 
1923, clearly took account of the foundational role randomisation played in validating hypothesis 
testing as we know it. For this, Neyman credited Fisher (Reid, 1982), however his work in this 
broader area did much to establish the experimental method in the field and his work on 
randomisation driven sampling, which produced his ground breaking 1934 paper on the subject, 
went on to inform much early work that dealt with sampling. 
2.2. Social experiments in the mid-twentieth century. 
The mid twentieth century saw many states using the randomised experimental methodology as 
part of the broader policy evaluation and formation process. These randomised social experiments34 
could span many neighbourhoods or even whole states. They typically had voluntary participation. 
Social experiments, in general, focused upon evaluations of local or national government policy, 
where the policy being evaluated is either existing or new, proposed, policy. In particular, social 
experiments seem to have focused upon elements of what could be called the welfare state (Levitt 
and List, 2009). 
One the earliest social experiments (Levitt & List, 2009) directly examined electricity consumption. 
The study was conducted across six electricity board areas in Britain, between 1966 and 1972 and 
examined the response of consumption to various (randomly assigned) tariff structures. A Swedish 
study, conducted in 1975 in Eskilstuna, focused upon assaying the influence upon employment of 
extra staffing at employment offices. A randomly split sample saw one group making normal use of 
employment services (1.5 hours per person) while the other group received significantly more 
                                                          
34 
Again, what appears to count decisively, in the literature, in favour of a study being classed as a social 
experiment is that it employs randomisation. Levitt and List (2009) consider a Swedish social intervention to 
extend the years of compulsory schooling to nine years as falling outside the family of social experiments on 
the basis that assignment of the treatment was not done in a random fashion. Greenberg, Shroder and Onstott 
(1999) provide the following definition of a social experiment. “Social experiments are field studies of social 
programs in which individuals, households or (in rare instance) firms or organizations are randomly assigned to 
two or more alternative policy interventions, or “treatments”. ”The same authors quote the following criteria 
for the definition of social experiments from the “Digest of Social Experiments”: “(i) random assignment (ii) 
policy intervention (iii) follow-up data collection and (iv) evaluation” (Greenberg and Shroder; 2004). 
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service (using 7.5 hours per person). The study found that greater use of services did in fact raise the 
chance of being employed, raise earnings and lower the period for which a person was unemployed. 
Since this  experiment a larger literature has grown in Europe dealing with labour market policy35 
(Levitt & List, 2009). 
Large Scale Social Experiments are recognised by most (see, for an overview, Greenberg36 et al, 
1999) to have had their genesis in the United States, a location of many subsequent social 
experiments, with the PhD dissertation of Heather Ross.37 The project appears to itself have grown 
out of the debate in the USA around the welfare system that was generated by the 1966 Coleman 
Report. This debate centred upon the consequences in the labour market of existing welfare policies 
and the possibilities of different sorts of income supplementation.38 It was Ross’ suggestion that 
random assignment of several suggestions being made at the time be used to demonstrate the 
relative benefits of the various proposals in a social experiment. The title of the proposal document 
she wrote (while at the Brookings institution) is informative “A Proposal for Demonstration of  New 
Techniques in Income Maintenance” in indicating the sort of epistemic value that early 
experimenters imagined could be delivered by these social experiments. 
The actual experiment, when implemented39, was an exercise in exploring the effects of negative 
income taxes and guaranteed levels of income. Around 1300 male-headed households were selected 
and treated with negative income tax rates (which varied between 30% to 70%) and guaranteed 
levels of income (which varied from 50% of the estimated poverty line for a family of four to 125% of 
the same) over three years. Every three months, during this period, they were asked to complete a 
questionnaire. The questionnaire explored issues such as family labour supply, consumption and 
expenditure patterns, general mobility, dependence on government, and social integration (Levitt 
and List, 2007). 
Initial analysis of the results by Ross in 1970 indicated that the negative income tax intervention 
slightly raised the labour effort of households, a question of particular concern at the time. Since this 
analysis however, the data have been revisited several times and, it has been pointed out (by Moffit, 
2001 ) that the interventions occurred in the context of a welfare system that, at the time, may have 
                                                          
35
 See Bjorklund and Regner (1996) as well as the various Digests of social Experiments. 
36
 Greenberg is also one of the two editors of “Digests of Social Experiments”, the other being Shroder. 
37
 No doubt of at least a little fascination to academics is the price tag of Ross’ research. Levitt and List indicate 
that the research cost more than US $5 million at the time, more than US $30 million in 2007, making it, in 
their estimation, “one of the most expensive dissertations in economics” (Levitt and List, 2007). 
38
 A debate that current South Africa can readily identify with. 
39
 Levitt and List (2007) indicate “that after the typical fiscal wrangling” Mathematica Inc. (based at Princeton, 
New Jersey) and the University of Wisconsin-Madison (where Heather Ross was based) were commissioned to 
conduct the study.  
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
45 
 
reduced labour effort (by means of large benefit-reduction rates) with the result that the negative 
income tax programmes performed better than existing programs even though the tax regime did 
reduce labour effort (which Levitt and list indicate is the majority view in the literature on this 
experiment), although this was not uniformly the case since in some areas it performed better than 
the status quo, while in others it performed worse. The fact that this sort of comparative analysis is 
possible is, however,  illustrative of the virtues of the experimental method in general. 
This experiment seems to have been catalytic in its influence upon the growth of social experiments 
in the United States of America and, thereby elsewhere in the world. Also influential were various 
treatises upon the virtues of social experiments such as that by Orcutt and Orcutt in 1968 (List & 
Rasul, 2010). During the 1980’s the growth of the use of social experiments to evaluate policy 
provided a context for a largely constructive debate in economics between those favouring the use 
of social experiments and those in favour of structural econometrics (Manski and Garfinkel, 1992). 
2.3. The current generation of field experiments: 1990's to the present. 
Since the 1990's the number of field experiments appearing each year in various journals within the 
discipline of economics has increased steadily, as can be seen in figure 4.1. This section begins with a 
brief discussion of how the increased adoption of the field experimental method by academic 
economists differs from the earlier field experimental areas discussed in sections 2 and 3. The 
discussion then moves to discussing three sorts of field experiments, following Harrison and List's 
(2004) taxonomy, that are current in economics. 
The most important way in which this current wave of field experiments differs from the earlier era 
of social experiments is in their orientation towards economic theory  (Levitt & List, 2007). Field 
experiments appearing in the economic literature of the past two decades are concerned with 
testing and developing economic theory, particularly microeconomic theory. Although many field 
experiments (such as Alcott, 2010) address a practical policy issue directly, many do not (such as List 
& Lucking-Reiley, 2000) and some are a mixture (Duflo, Kremer & Robinson, 2009). Overwhelmingly 
most, however, address economic theory directly by testing the predictions of those theories in the 
field in an experimental fashion (including the two studies just cited). This is quite different to the 
social experiments described in the previous section which were largely concerned with testing 
policy measures. 
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Figure2.4. 
  
This is congruent with what some of the leading economists engaging in field experiments view as 
the methodologies role within economics. List and Levitt are advocates of field experiments being 
used in closer conjunction with other methodologies available to the economist. List, in particular 
has argued in several places40 that field experiments have a particular role to play in taking 
economics forward. He views field experiments as providing researchers with a bridge between 
laboratory experiments and the study of naturally occurring data (such as that collected by labour 
surveys). List’s view of how field experiments provide such a bridge may be summarised as a view 
that sees them providing a controlled test of the degrees to which conclusions drawn in the lab may 
be generalised while providing superior identification of influences (via the controls of an 
experiment – and the apposite employment of randomisation) to inform estimation on larger sets of 
“naturally occurring” data. 
Field experiments have been used in this fashion over the last two decades in a growing number of 
field within economics. Some of the fields making noticeable use of the methodology are: labour 
economics, charity and investigations into the nature of the economic agent.  
A large amount of the work has focused upon the nature of economic agents in development 
contexts, with topics such preferences, reciprocity, and norm enforcement being covered. Perhaps 
one of the most intriguing studies in this vein is the work done by Henrich, Bowles, Barr, et al (2001) 
                                                          
40
 See for instance List 2007, List 2008, List 2006, Levitt and List 2009. 
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amongst 15 small scale, fairly primitive societies around the world which seems to have produced 
some stunning data on the influence of culture upon the nature of “Economic Man”.  
In the field of labour economics, field experiments have been used increasingly to investigate a 
variety of topics across the lifecycle of a person (List and Rasul, 2010). Areas within labour 
economics investigated include the demand for education and human capital acquisition, wages, 
labour market programs, incentives and organisation in the workplace, marriage and the decision to 
retire.  
The growing field of the economics of charity has also made particular use of the field experimental 
method, with notable contributions made by Peter Bohm, one the first researchers to meaningfully 
extend the experimental method beyond the laboratory and out to the field. Within this field 
researchers such as Rachel Croson have made several contributions to indentifying the influence of 
social comparison upon the propensity to contribute41 that are of special relevance to the research 
presented in this thesis. 
In 2004 Harrison and List presented a taxonomy of filed experiments that is fairly helpful in 
distinguishing the main ways in which experiments differ one from the other. Harrison and List 
describe a continuum along which the experimenter has varying control of the data generating 
process. We will discuss these briefly before concluding this chapter with an overview of each major 
category of field experiment. 
At one end of the continuum are artefactual experiments where the researchers is very  much in 
control of the entire data generating process. Artefactual field experiments may be very much like 
laboratory experiments in that subjects are to be found playing games or performing actions that 
have been explicitly defined by the experimenter. Importantly subjects are aware that they are in an 
experiment. Artefactual experiments differ from laboratory experiments in that they use subjects 
that are from the relevant real world setting rather than a convenience sample (such as students) 
and may often also be conducted outside of the laboratory but need not be. 
In the middle of the continuum lie framed field experiments. Framed field experiments are always 
conducted outside of the laboratory in the "real world" setting appropriate for the theory being 
tested with subjects that are naturally to be found in that setting, not drawn from a convenience 
sample. Subjects in these experiments do not play tightly controlled games but rather are randomly 
assigned to a treatment group, where they may be exposed to something like a wage subsidy, 
                                                          
41
 See for instance Croson and Shang (2008)  for the use of social comparison in “downward social 
information” and (2009 ) for the “upward” version. 
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counselling, given free de-worming medication, or a control group. Importantly, subjects are aware 
that they are being observed.   
At the furthest end of the continuum lie natural field experiments. These are experiments that are 
designed by an experimenter in which subjects are randomly assigned to treatment or control 
groups. However, unlike the case of framed field experiments, subjects in natural field experiments 
are not aware of the fact that they are being observed and the treatment, such as the receipt of a 
flyer with their electricity bill, comes as part of their daily routine.  
Before we move on further however, a word here on how field experiments stand distinct from 
another fast growing literature, natural experiments, is probably useful; since field and natural 
experiments may be conflated. Field experiments are distinguished from natural experiments mainly 
by consideration of how the randomisation is generated. In field experiments the researcher is 
responsible for random assignment of treatments, while with natural experiments the researcher 
looks for “naturally occurring” situations where various (potential or actual) influences (treatments) 
have been brought to bear upon people in a fashion that is, or is sufficiently close to, random.  
It is important to note that by “naturally occurring” is meant that neither the situation (be it a 
market or some other setting) nor the “treatments” have been designed by the researcher although 
they may have been designed by somebody else. Thus assessing the effects of differential dorm 
assignment policies at various universities (who draw the same calibre and demographic spread of 
student) could be considered a natural experiment even though these policies would have been 
formulated and implemented by design on the part of the respective university authorities. 
2.3.1. Artefactual field experiments. 
Artefactual field experiments are fairly similar to laboratory experiments in that they are conducted 
under controlled conditions within a “lab” setting or using lab tools. The key difference between 
artefactual and lab experiments lie in their choice of subjects participating in the experiments. 
Artefactual experiments make a point of drawing their subjects from the general subject pool of 
interest (such as traders, farmers or rural tribes-people) whereas lab experiments do not place such 
a restriction upon the subjects recruited, often recruiting college students. 
The benefit that is gained in this is to test the ability of theory to actually explain behaviour of 
people to whom it is imagined to apply. Of course in an artefactual experiment the subjects are 
drawn at random from the context of interest, allowing the exercise to be classed as an experiment. 
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Artefactual experiments perhaps began in earnest around the late 1960’s and early 1970’s with work 
such as that by Bernard Alpert (1967) and Peter Bohm (1972). Alpert’s 1967 paper concerned itself 
with testing whether the results of the behavioural experiments, then entering use in business 
college courses, in fact extended to “real businessmen”. His introduction to this paper explicitly 
highlights a concern about the external validity of conclusions drawn from experiments conducted 
with students or military personnel.  
“With the inclusion of behavioural courses in the business colleges, the results of behavioural 
experiments are being used as a basis for proposing resolutions to simulated business 
problems. But it is not known if the results of such experiments are valid for drawing 
conclusions about behaviour of businessmen. In many behavioural experiments, the samples 
have been drawn from the student population, ranging from nursery school to college, or 
else they have been drawn from military organisations, the next most accessible source of 
subjects.” (Alpert, 1967). 
His proposed epistemological remedy was to use businessmen as subjects in similar experiments and 
see whether the results hold amongst these business men to who it is supposed to apply. 
The results of Alpert’s 1967 paper indicated that reactions to various situations varied widely 
between student, military personnel and business people. The clear implication was that it may be 
dubious to extend results that obtain amongst students to beyond that universe of subjects. 
Bohm’s 1972 work on the difference in elicited value when the payoff and situation is hypothetical 
and when it is not. The paper has generated a significant amount of subsequent work in a similar 
vein in environmental economics (List & Gallet, 2001; Levitt and List, 2009). Peter Bohm’s 1972 
experiment involved examining the differences between respondents’ stated willingness to pay for a 
sneak preview of a Swedish television program when one group stated their WTP when the preview 
and WTP were only hypothetical and the WTP’s elicited when it was not hypothetical. Respondents 
were 20-70 year olds who were randomly sampled from Stockholm’s population and thus likely 
customers in the market concerned. 
Another major research project of recent years that indicates clearly the utility and utilisation of 
artefactual experiments to inform theoretical and developmental concerns is that of the seventeen 
person research team of Bowles, Henrich, Enslinger, Boyd, Smith Henrich, Hill, Camerer, Gil-White, 
Fehr, Gurven, Gintis, Marlowe, Mcelreath, Patton, Alvard, Tracer and Barr.  
This unusually large team conducted experiments with fifteen small scale societies across the world. 
All societies were rural and were selected to a significant degree on the extent to which their 
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members lived their everyday lives separate from a market economy. The aim of the project was to 
test the extensibility of the canonical model of rational decision making as described by the rational 
agent, Homo Economicus, familiar to economics students since Alfred Marshall. The project’s history 
and development is illustrative of the manner in which artefactual field experiments can be and are 
used to inform microeconomic theory and its development.  
By the mid 1990’s cross cultural experiments had uncovered meaningful deviations from 
microeconomic theory (Davis & Holt ,1993, Roth & Kagel, 1995) under a variety of conditions. In 
response to this accumulating evidence, microeconomic theorists began to propose modifications to 
microeconomic theory in order to explain these deviations and incorporate them into 
microeconomic theory ( Camerer, 1997, Henrich et al, 2000). In proposing these modifications 
however, most theorists made explicit or implicit assumptions about human nature universally, with 
the necessary result that all humans everywhere were predicted to respond to various economic 
situations and problems in the same way (Henrich, 2000). 
A large part of the reason for this may have been that these studies had, for the most part, 
employed that most prevalent of convenience samples, college student; the important point is that 
this is the reason Bowles, Henrich, et al most suspected (Bowles, Henrich et al, 2005). In 1996 Joseph 
Henrich had conducted ultimatum game experiments amongst the Machiguenga in the Peruvian 
Amazon. The Machiguenga behaved in the ultimatum games in a way that departed in a clear 
fashion from predictions of the canonical model of human behaviour used in economics and also 
differed significantly from results gained elsewhere in the West (Henrich 2000).42 The use of a 
experimental procedure (the ultimatum game) that is consistent across target and control groups, 
but where respondents were aware that they were being observed,43 in a replicable fashion renders 
the methodology artefactual in terms of Harrison and List’s (2004) terminology.   
This study inspired the subsequently larger study by Henrich, Bowles, et al (2005). This subsequent 
study was a systematic attempt to detect whether behaviour in well-established classes of economic 
games could be correlated to observed cultural differences and, importantly, whether these 
differences in play constituted departures from the predictions of the canonical model that could be 
systematically correlated with observed cultural differences.  
                                                          
42
 Henrich facilitated this comparison by means of two sorts of data for Western respondents. Most 
importantly, he ran a control group with college students in Los Angeles – which differed significantly to the 
Machiguenga. Henrich also used already-gathered data from similar experiments conducted by other 
researchers amongst western respondents in market-based societies (Henrich 2000). 
43
 It is not clear that the Machiguenga understood that they were part of an experiment. Henrich records that 
the Machiguenga were gathered “under the auspices of "playing a fun game for money."”(Henrich 2000). This 
however, is not critical to considering the exercise an artefactual experiment. 
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In order to determine this, ultimatum games were played in all locations (with dictator and public 
goods games being played in addition to ultimatum games in some locations). The ultimatum game 
is highly artefactual in character.44 It is also important to note that the ultimatum game is standard, 
like a game of singles tennis, its rules are the same everywhere and provide definite limits to the 
extent and direction of variation in playing conditions. The rules of the ultimatum game thus allow 
for a meaningful degree of comparability between results obtained at various places across the 
world. Of course, other factors may also vary across locations where the game is played; some of 
these are, of course factors the effect of whose variation the researchers were interested in 
ascertaining, while other factors may be confounding and these the researchers endeavoured to also 
standardise across locations. In terms of payoffs, instructions and how the game is played, the 
process is identical across all locations. 
It was by following this procedure and utilising this methodology that the researchers in Henrich, 
Bowles, et al (2005) hoped to cast light upon the influence of cultural, for want of a more precise 
word, context upon the nature of agents involved in economic theory, especially the degree to 
which they could be described as selfish or unselfish. Their findings are compelling and indicate that 
variations in play in the ultimatum game can be correlated to variation in culture. 
The systematic use of the methodology of games and the broader experimental method, the seeking 
out of variation in the variable of interest (culture separate from the influence of modern market 
economy societies), displays the sort of use researchers have been putting the artefactual field 
experimental method to.  
Artefactual experiments have been used in an agent-examining sense in the developing world by 
many other researchers too, including Abigail Barr, Juan Camilo Cardenas and Jeffrey Carpenter in 
the past decade. Carpenter’s research has included much by way of examining cooperation, 
competition and commons dilemmas. Often times Carpenter’s work has been in development 
contexts but with the notable difference to the Henrich et al team (and in common with most of the 
rest of the literature) that their experiments involve subjects who would be considered to be very 
much a part of the modern market economy. 
Artefactual experiments seem to have lent themselves to being able to explain non experimental 
outcomes apart from allowing closer examination of results generated within-lab. At least one of 
Carpenter’s projects falls into this classification (Levitt and List, 2009), that being his work with Erika 
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 in the course of daily life one does not usually get given a sum of money which one can divide between 
oneself and another and keep, provided the other person agrees to the division, failing which neither party 
gets anything. 
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Seki amongst Japanese fishermen to investigate the likely influence of exposure to competition in 
various contexts on cooperation amongst workers across those various contexts.45 
The inductive mechanisms of that agents themselves are often thought of as using have also been 
examined using artefactual field experiments. Sadoff, Levitt and List (2010) examine a cornerstone of 
many of game theory’s important early theorems, namely that agents use backward induction to 
solve problems. They do so with an arresting artefactual experiment conducted with chess players. 
They find that chess players seem to often pass over the unique subgame perfect equilibrium that is 
predicted for backward inducting agents, in games such as the centipede game, in favour of a 
cooperative gain. This is despite demonstrating a high level of backward inducting ability in chess. 
The results suggest that other signals, independent of backward induction, exist by which such 
players can judge the probability of cooperation to be high. Especially suggestive is the fact that 
chess players reported that cooperative play (in terms of agreed draws near the end of a 
tournament) is something that they often do (Sadoff, Levitt, List, 2010)46. 
2.3.2.Framed field experiments. 
Framed field experiments are defined by Harrison and List (2004) as being experiments that are very 
similar to artefactual field experiment. Researchers still define the parameters of the experiment 
very tightly and the subjects are aware that they are being observed. The major difference between 
framed and artefactual experiments is the degree to which natural context enters the experiment. 
Framed field experiments employ significant elements of the context, beyond using “natural” 
subjects as opposed to students or subjects drawn from some other merely convenient sample, in 
the experiment. As such framed field experiments are run outside of the laboratory setting and in 
the "real world" as part of subject's everyday lives. Framed field experiments have the attraction of 
generating data in a manner that is closer to being naturally occurring than data generated in the 
laboratory or under an artefactual field experimental framework.  
The social experiments described in section 4.3 are a type of framed field experiment. Social 
Experiments differ from the sort of framed field experiments that we will describe below and which 
have been used more extensively over the past ten years in that the subjects in social experiments 
are not just aware that they have been selected but are also aware that they have been randomly 
selected. Most of the more recent framed field experiments that we will discuss have subjects who 
                                                          
45
 They interpret the data generated by their experiment as indicating that working in a more competitive 
environment decreases the probability of cooperation relative to what would be the case for working in a less 
competitive environment. 
46
 See also Gränsmark (2010) as well as Bühren& Frank (2010) for some more recent work on the backward 
induction problem in a similar vein. 
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are not aware that they have been randomly selected. As a result any “randomisation bias” is 
conceivably dealt with. Social experiments were also typically conducted over a much longer term 
(often years) than the current wave of framed field experiments. Such long term studies ran a higher 
chance of suffering from attrition bias in their sample than the current wave which has seen studies 
typically conducted over a much shorter time.   
Framed field experiments have been increasingly employed by development and development 
economics researchers over the last decade. One of the most active research groups in this field is 
the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL).It is indicative of the rise of this field experimental 
method that J-PAL, from one office at MIT in 2003 now has offices in Africa, Europe, Latin America 
and South East Asia (see for instance Duflo et al, 2009, Chattopadhyay & Duflo ,2004). 
These projects are often mainly concerned with government policy or NGO program evaluation in a 
development context. As such these exercises may often be concerned with evaluating bundles of 
influences rather than in isolating the effect of each one by itself. As policies and programs usually 
have more than one element to them this approach makes good sense. However in some of the 
studies the resulting confounding influences does make it difficult to sharply identify the active 
economic ingredients. 
Beyond the arena of policy and development economics, economic theory has also been the target 
of many researchers using this methodology over the past decade and more. Predictions of bidding 
patterns in various auction designs and the hypothetical valuation problem have been subjects of 
analysis by using framed field experiments. These sorts of studies have bearing, particularly in the 
USA upon how contingent valuation methods may be used to value public goods (List and Shogren, 
1998b).  
List and Shogren (1998b) in their baseball card experiment examined whether delegates and dealers 
at a sports card show47 would submit bids for cards in hypothetical auctions that would be 
significantly inflated relative to bids submitted by those same people in actual auctions. Using 
different sorts of baseball cards and different numbers of those cards (1 card and 10 card auctions 
were employed) as good, dealers and non-dealers at the sports card fair participated first in a 
hypothetical second price auction and then an actual second price auction.  
List and Shogren found that bidders did consistently inflate their bids in hypothetical auctions. 
However bidders did not inflate their hypothetical bids relative to their bids in an actual auction in a 
fashion that was uniform across different sorts of cards bid for, or uniform across auctions with 
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 In Denver Colorado, 1995. (List and Shogren, 1998b). 
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different numbers of cards bid for. When compared to results from other experiments testing 
valuation under hypothetical and real auction situations, such as radiated and irradiated meat, (Fox, 
et al, 1998) this result indicated that there probably did not exist a calibration function that was 
common across different goods or different types of market (or indeed, non-market auction) 
situations but rather such calibration functions would probably apply to clusters of goods and 
contexts (List and Shogren 1998a, 1998b).  
Still with sports cards, List and Lucking-Reiley48 (2000) test the validity of theory of demand 
reduction (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn’s, 1998, theory) that predicts that first unit bids will be 
equivalent across uniform-price sealed-bid auctions and Vickrey sealed-bid auctions with Vickrey 
auctions still proving more allocatively efficient than the uniform price auction format since the 
format of the Vickrey auction (like the English Auction) elicits what is thought to be the true 
valuation of the good by a bidder through awarding the good to the highest bidder but only 
compelling the winning bidder to pay the second highest bid price49. To achieve a test of this theory, 
List and Lucking-Reiley randomly allocate subjects into Vickrey auction and uniform-price auctions 
and auction off a significant value of sports cards (328 sports cards were auctioned, valued at 
roughly ten thousand dollars in total) in two-unit, two person formats. While they found that the 
Vickrey auction format elicited a more allocatively efficient bid pattern, with participants 
underbidding in the uniform-bid format, they also found that, in contradiction to theory the first unit 
bids were not equal across the formats but, rather, were significantly higher in the uniform price 
auction format. 
This particular experiment and the responses to it offers a nice example of the dialectic between 
testing and theoretical innovation that experimentation in general makes possible. In response to 
the experiment and subsequent lab experiments that confirmed List and Lucking-Reiley’s anomalous 
result (see Engelmann and Grimm 2004, Porter and Vragov, 2003), Dan Levin (2005) proposed a 
theory that developed Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn’s (1998) theory of price reduction such that it 
could accommodate all of the results from List and Lucking-Reiley’s (2000) experiment which 
generated an observation that was anomalous by the lights of Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn’s 
theory. Furthermore, Dan Levin constructed his theory in such a way that it produced testable 
predictions that future experiments can verify or falsify.        
                                                          
48
 Now David H. Reiley since Augsut 2002, when he changed his name from David Lucking-Reiley 
(http://www.u.arizona.edu/~dreiley). 
49
 In a Vickrey Auction bidders submit sealed bids without knowing the amounts that other bidders are 
bidding. Although the highest bid wins, the price paid by the winner is the second highest bid. This bid format 
gives bidders a rational incentive to bid their highest actual valuation of the object being bid for.  
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2.3.3. Natural field experiments. 
In the last twelve or so years, natural experiments have been used to address problems across 
almost every sub-field of microeconomics (List, 2011). In a natural field experiment, the researcher 
designs the treatments and randomly assigns subjects to the treatment and control groups. 
Importantly, the subjects are never aware that they are part of an experiment, with treatments 
being elements of everyday life. This also means that subjects are not able to select out of 
treatments. As a result, this methodology eliminates selection bias, and allows for parameter 
estimates that are more representative of the whole population of interest. It also eliminates bias 
that may arise from subjects acting differently to normal if they are aware that they are in an 
experiment. Parameter estimates are thus likely to be representative of not only the whole 
population but of that population as it would act under normal circumstances. We discuss two 
experiments to illustrate the typical value of a natural field experiment. 
Since subjects cannot select themselves out of a study, the role of ethics committees is rendered 
much more important when a natural field experiment is undertaken. West and Gunn (1978) 
provide a helpful summary of the framework of ethical considerations of experiments in general 
involving human subjects from a psychological perspective, while  natural experiments get around 
most of the ethical problems of deception discussed by Bonetti (1998). Certainly no subject should 
be made worse off than they would normally be in the course of their natural participation in a 
market or set of activities. 
One experiment, conducted via a public radio station by Croson and Shang (2009), was designed to 
test two major classes theories that have been proposed to explain the relationship between one’s 
own donation and the donations of others. One set of models50 explains one’s donations as being 
substitutes for the donations of others while the other models the individual’s donations as 
complements for the donations of others. Of course what both models to do not presume to explain, 
in what would be an almost mystical sense if they did, the relationship between the individual and 
others contributions in fact, but rather the influence of information about others donations upon 
really an individual’s donation/s. 
                                                          
50
 Croson and Sheng understand these models as falling into 3 major categories: the pure altruism models after 
Becker (1974), Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984) which predict a dollar for dollar crowding out of individual 
giving by high normative giving, the impure altruism models such as those described by Andreoni (1989, 1990), 
Steinberg (1987), Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) which describe normative giving as crowding out less than one 
dollar of individual giving per dollar normatively given, and finally threshold models which differentiate effects 
of normative giving upon individual giving according to whether the threshold for the provision of the public 
good in question has been reached or not (e.g. Andreoni, 1998, for public goods and Romano, 1991, as well as 
Cornelli, 1996, for private goods). 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
56 
 
The manner in which this natural experiment is here used to collect data on the reaction of an 
individual’s giving to information about the donations of others demonstrates nicely the utility of the 
natural experimental method for the development of theory in economics. They start by 
summarising the literature on models of generosity as being able to be split into two classes, where 
donations of others are substitutes or complements to an individual’s donations. This allows for the 
description of a two competing and testable hypotheses: that information about the giving of others 
will be negatively correlated with an individual’s giving if the relationship is of a substitutionary 
nature; competing against the hypothesis that information about the donations of others will be 
positively correlated with an individual’s donations if the relationship is that of a complement.  
The experiment also demonstrates how natural field experiments may be used with laboratory 
experiments in order to inform theory. Croson and Sheng use this natural field experiment as an 
opportunity to gather data for whether earlier laboratory experiments may generalise beyond the 
lab.  
Armin Falk (2007) also pursued an interesting natural field experimental test of the importance of 
gift exchanges in soliciting donations via direct mail. As Falk notes at the outset of his paper, the 
theory and importance of gift exchange had already been discussed fairly widely in labour relations 
(Akerlof, 1982 and Bewley, 1999), customer relations (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1986), 
bargaining (Camerer & Thaler, 1995), and price setting behaviour (Huck & Wallace, 2002). The 
experiment was constructed explicitly to test the degree to which hypothesised gift-exchange 
behaviour would hold in the everyday world. Falk randomly allocated 3 treatments (solicitation 
letters with no gift, solicitation letters small gifts and solicitation letters large gifts) across 10 000 
potential donors to a charitable organisation. 
He found, that a small gift increased contributions by 17% on average when compared to sending no 
gift, with this figure rising to 75% for a large gift. The results make a compelling argument that 
reciprocity in the form of gift-exchange extends beyond the only theoretical.  
Natural experiments have been used in a similar fashion in many other areas of microeconomics too 
beyond these just discussed. In labour economics there are natural experiments addressing most 
areas of a person's life-cycle (see List and Rasul, 2010 for an overview ), improving savings behaviour 
(Ashraf N., Karlan, D., and Yin W., 2006a, 2006b) institutional influence upon behaviour (Bertrand et 
al, 2006), as well as incentives (Azfar and Zinnes, 2006) to name some. 
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2.4. Conclusion. 
Although the experimental method has long been a staple of the other sciences and the 
methodology to execute field experiments was largely described by Fisher and Neyman in the 1920's 
and 1930's it was not until fairly recently that economists adopted the methodology. Once 
economists began conducting experiments out in the field, the experimental literature fairly 
exploded. Today journals within economics will regularly carry articles based upon field experiments 
that may be artefactual, framed or natural field experiments. Of these, researchers particularly 
favour natural field experiments since the mixture of randomisation and "real-worldness" that it 
provides allows them to test theories free of selection bias and Hawthorne effect concerns. 
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Chapter 3. 
Methodology: Experimental design, fieldwork and estimation. 
This chapter describes the field  experiment that was run between January to December, 2010 in the 
city of Cape Town. The experiment tested whether reporting the average level of electricity 
consumption, a form of social norm, would affect the electricity consumption of households. Norms 
were reported at two levels, city and neighbourhood, to different households in order to test 
whether social distance would be a factor that would significantly modify reaction to reported social 
norms. Injunctive norms were also included with half of the treatments in order to assess whether 
they would curb any "boomerang" effects as suggested by some of the literature on social norms. 
The study was initially designed to test the different effects of varying social distance and including 
an injunctive norm. However soon after fieldwork began interest amongst several stakeholders 
about the effect of the treatments relative to a control group receiving no feedback was piqued. This 
raised several difficulties for analysis and these are discussed here too. 
Also discussed are the methods used to estimate the relationship between household electricity 
consumption and the treatment elements that are used, in addition to climatic variables, how these 
variables are constructed and the expected nature of the relationships to household electricity 
consumption. 
3.1. Treatments. 
The treatments administered in this field experiment were designed to test the influence of two 
elements of normative feedback. These two elements were: the influence of injunctive norms and 
the influence of varying social distance between the reported norm and the household to which it is 
reported. Households in the various treatments received the treatment assigned to them as an 
insert in their electricity bill every time they received an electricity bill. In each treatment a 
household's own consumption for the past month was compared to the consumption of an average 
household for that same past month. 
3.1.1. The social distance element of the treatments. 
The element of social distance was included by incorporating two levels of social distance, distant 
and close, in the norms reported in the treatments. The socially distant norm reported to 
households was the consumption of an average household in the city last month. The socially close 
norm reported to households was the consumption of an average household in their neighbourhood 
last month. Both of these norms are descriptive in nature and so are termed descriptive norms. 
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It was expected at the outset that households would respond to reported descriptive consumption 
norms, and being compared to them, by changing their consumption towards that norm. Thus we 
expected that households who received feedback that they had consumed more than the average 
household in their neighbourhood or city would lower their consumption in the following month. 
Similarly, we expected that households who received feedback that they had consumed less than 
the average household in their neighbourhood or city would raise their consumption in the following 
month, the so-called boomerang effect. From an electricity conservation point of view a boomerang 
effect would be undesirable. It was hoped that the injunctive norm, discussed in section 1.2 would 
combat the boomerang effect.  
In terms of varying social distance we would expect that a household would respond with a much 
stronger change in consumption when compared to an average household in its neighbourhood than 
an average household in the city. We thus expect that intensity of consumption response would be a 
negative function of social distance. 
In terms of the monthly figures reported to treated households as average consumption figures for 
households in various neighbourhoods and the city as a whole, 2009 consumption figures were used. 
There were two reasons that "live", 2010 figures were not used.  
First, calculating a live electricity consumption average for households in the city or a neighbourhood 
was untenable since the City's systems were not set up to calculate such averages. To set up an 
automated process to do this within the system would have entailed an expenditure that was well 
beyond the budget for this research project.  
Second, it was likely that any live averages calculated and reported, particularly at the 
neighbourhood level would have been biased. This is likely to have been the case for two reasons. 
First, since the data on household consumption that is used to generate electricity bills to 
households is collected by a meter reading field force that may take more than one day to collect a 
neighbourhood's data, data may come in over two or more days. Second, all data collected by the 
field force goes through a checking process before its data is loaded onto the city's billing database 
and a bill is generated. Data from households from the same neighbourhood can leave this process 
at different times, which could lead to an artificially changing neighbourhood (and city) consumption 
average with each day, resulting in an average being reported to households that that represented 
only part of their neighbourhood, or city. The reasons that a household's electricity consumption 
data may leave this data checking process at a different time to data for another household from the 
same neighbourhood has to do with the manner in which the checking is conducted. Once data has 
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been collected by the meter reading field force and uploaded onto the city's electricity data base (as 
opposed to the billing database) it goes through an initial, automated, checking process. If any doubt 
is raised about the veracity of the consumption data for a household in this automated process, that 
household's data is passed on to a person who manually conducts the appropriate queries for this 
household. Depending on the reason for which a household's data needs to be manually checked it 
may spend a longer or shorter time in this process before being released onto the city's billing 
database.  
Since reporting a live average to households was not tenable it was decided that the monthly 
average household consumption figures from 2009 for neighbourhoods and the city as a whole 
would be used instead. This data was provided with the kind assistance of the City of Cape Town 
municipality.  
3.1.2. Injunctive norms. 
In order to test the influence of an injunctive norm each of the socially distant and socially close 
treatments were split into two further categories of treatment. In one category only the descriptive 
norms were reported while in the other the descriptive norms were reported along with injunctive 
norms.  
As a result, a total of four unique treatments were designed and administered to households in this 
field experiment: city level descriptive norms only (CD), city level descriptive norms augmented with 
injunctive norms (CDI), neighbourhood level descriptive norms only (ND), neighbourhood level 
descriptive norms augmented with injunctive norms (NDI). It was expected at the outset that the 
boomerang effect would be present amongst the descriptive-only treatments and absent amongst 
treatments incorporating an injunctive norm. 
 The injunctive norms used in this study attempted to convey social approval and social disapproval 
to households, conditional upon whether the household was consuming more or less than the 
reported average. In both cases the injunctive norm took the form of a stylised facial emoticon. If a 
household was consuming more than or equal to the average and was in a treatment that utilised 
injunctive norms the household received a socially disapproving injunctive norm. The socially 
disapproving injunctive norm was the following frowning emoticon  in addition to the descriptive 
feedback. If a household was reported as consuming less than the reported average then it received 
the following smiling emoticon  in addition to the descriptive feedback. 
It was expected that conveying social approval to households, via an approving injunctive norm, for 
consuming less than the average reported to them would sustain them in this lower-than-average 
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consumption and mitigate against the boomerang effect. In terms of households reported as having 
consumed more than average it was expected that including an injunctive norm that conveyed social 
disapproval would work with the tendency of households to reduce their consumption towards the 
norm; it was uncertain to what degree the injunctive norm would strengthen this tendency. 
3.1.3. Other information included with the feedback to households 
In addition to comparing the household's consumption for the past month to either the average 
household in the city or their neighbourhood and the injunctive norms which half the treatment 
sample was selected to receive, households also received electricity savings tips with the 
treatments.  
The same tips were given to all households and accompanied all of the treatments. These tips were 
designed by the City of Cape Town and targeted what were thought by them to generally be the 
largest areas of electricity use in households.51  
The total number of treatments, along with the information provided in each one can be 
summarised in the table below. 
 
 
Fig. 3.1. Information provided to households in each treatment 
                                                          
51 The tips which appeared at the bottom of insert were:  
 
Tips that may help you to use less electricity: 
 
Use less hot water. If you can, take a shower rather than a bath. Use as little hot water as possible 
whether showering or bathing. Stack your dishes and wash them in one large load, rather than 
washing many smaller loads. If you go away for the weekend, switch your geyser off. The 
recommended temperature to set your geyser’s thermostat to is 55
o
C. Check what your thermostat is 
set to. Please ask a professional for help if you are not sure how to do this. 
Use your big appliances less often. Hang up washing to dry as tumble dryers use a very large 
amount of electricity. Use stove plates and ovens for only as long as required to cook your food. Cook 
on as low a heat a possible. It is cheaper to boil water in a kettle than on a stove. Once water is 
boiling, only a low heat is required on a stove to keep it boiling. Boil only the water you need. 
Conserve Heat: Closing the curtains helps greatly in keeping a room warm. Close the curtains in the 
early evening. Use heaters and air conditioners only when you are in the room and be sure to keep 
the room’s doors and curtains closed as this helps to retain the heat. Whenever possible and 
convenient, use an extra pullover or a blanket instead of a heater. 
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 Social distance of descriptive norm 
Injunctive norm Electricity savings tips 
Treatment City Neighbourhood 
CD Yes   Yes 
CDI Yes   Yes Yes 
ND  Yes  Yes 
NDI  Yes  Yes Yes 
 
Giving these tips to the treated households allows increased comparability with the growing 
literature on the use of social norms in managing energy consumption since most of the 
interventions used, so far, employ social norms in conjunction with information (Alcott, 2011). This 
does however introduce a confound if we are to try and identify the influence of norms, as a whole, 
versus the situation in the control group (only receiving electricity bills). Thus, when comparing our 
normative treatments to the control we will be unable to identify the effect of a norm separately to 
that of information. 
With respect to identifying the effect of norms compared to a control group this is a methodological 
weakness, however, we decided that it was worthwhile to bundle the norm with information for two 
reasons. First, it allows greater comparability with similar studies in the first world who employ 
similar strategies. Second, within the fieldwork budget we had to decide which elements of the 
norms literature to focus upon. In this case the primary interest was in the role played by social 
distance and by injunctive norms. To this end we needed four treatments that differed 
systematically in these respects alone. Once the fieldwork was complete we could then compare 
these treatments to identify effects. Since an important and unobserved way in which households 
could differ from each other could be in their access to electricity saving information we decided 
that it would be prudent to provide all actively treated households with the information required to 
make the larger changes in consumption behaviour. 
3.1.4. Format of the feedback given to households. 
All households receiving one of the treatments are households that receive their electricity bills 
through the post (the reason for this is discussed in section 2 of this chapter). Since households 
receive their bills through the post, the treatments in this natural field experiment were 
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administered by means of a purpose designed insert included in the same envelope with the normal 
electricity bill and posted with it.  
The inserts which constitute the treatments are all A4 size pages. Each insert is divided into two 
halves, a top and a bottom half. The bottom section of the insert contains the electricity saving tips 
just discussed and is constant across all treated households. The top half of the insert is the actively 
varying portion of the insert, containing information specific to each household’s consumption and 
varying according to the specific treatment that the household has been assigned to. The inserts are 
printed in black and white only. Examples of full inserts are included in the appendix for this chapter.   
Each insert is written in the language of the household. The language of the household is taken as 
the household language indicated on the City of Cape Town’s database. The indicated household 
language is the same language in which the household receives their bills form the city. However, in 
the entire sample only English and Afrikaans were indicated as household languages. This casts some 
doubt upon the accuracy of this information in the City of Cape Town’s contract account database, 
since a significant number of the households in the treatment samples were drawn from the 
townships of Gugulethu and Langa where the most common first languages are Xhosa and isiZulu. If 
households received feedback in a language that they struggled to understand it may have 
jeopardised the veracity of their reaction to the treatments. 
3.2. Fieldwork and fieldwork sample. 
This next section discusses how a sample for the experiment was selected and the process of 
executing the experimental treatment process. The sample aimed to reflect the socioeconomic 
breadth of the City of Cape Town and control for various potential sources of bias between 
treatments. The fieldwork process itself ran from early January 2010 to the end of December 2010. It 
involved matching the various treatment inserts to the electricity bills for the relevant households. 
This was done at the company responsible for printing the electricity bills for the city of Cape Town. 
A checking team of university students, employed by this project, checked the matched bills and 
inserts at the printers and identified errors where they occurred, so that they could be corrected.  A 
major error in the matching process occurred in the middle of the year (August) which resulted in a 
large number of electricity accounts being matched to the incorrect inserts. Thankfully this matching 
error was detected by the students engaged in checking at the printers and the incorrectly matched 
accounts were not sent out. Upon investigation it was found that the mismatching arose from a 
change that had been made at the beginning of August  to the computer code that matched the 
inserts with the electricity accounts. Since correcting the code would take some time, but 
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households still needed to receive their electricity accounts on time and could not be held back 
while the code was corrected,  a large number of households did not receive their treatments during 
August. These households instead were mailed their electricity bills without any inserts while the 
computer code was corrected. 
3.2.1. Selecting the fieldwork sample. 
In selecting the fieldwork sample there were several concerns and challenges to be met. The first 
concern was that the study reflect, as much as possible, the socioeconomic breadth of the City of 
Cape Town. For this reason the likely relative income levels of households were estimated and this 
information used to guide the initial phase of sample selection. The next concern was to identify 
suburbs that had sufficient numbers of households consuming electricity on a credit basis. Once this 
had been achieved it remained to allocate households in an unbiased fashion to each treatment. The 
next three sub-sections elaborate on this process of selecting the fieldwork sample. 
3.2.1.1. Income groups. 
Different socioeconomic groups within the city of Cape Town were identified and included in the 
treatment and control sample in order to assess if they would react to the various treatments in 
different ways.  
Since the City of Cape Town does not collect household level demographic data for its electricity 
customers we could not select households based upon their own level of income. Instead a proxy for 
income was used. This proxy was the general income of the suburb in which the household was 
found as determined by the most recent suburb-level income data for the city of Cape Town, the 
2001 Census. 
Using this Census' data, households were ranked from poorest to richest in order to create an 
income distribution of households within the city of Cape Town. Based on their position along the 
distribution each household was ascribed a percentile value between 1 and 100. Households were 
then organised into suburbs. Suburbs were then examined to see where the greatest proportion of 
their households' income lay in terms of their percentile position on the city's income distribution. If 
the greatest proportion of their households' income lay clearly in the lowest 33 percentiles then that 
suburb was considered a lower income suburb, if the greatest proportion of their households' 
income lay clearly in the middle 33 percentiles then that suburb was considered a middle income 
suburb and similarly if the greatest proportion of their households' income lay clearly in the upper 
33 percentiles then that suburb was considered an upper income suburb.  
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3.2.1.2. Selecting suburbs in each income group that had sufficient households consuming 
electricity on a credit basis. 
Once suburbs had been identified in each of the major income categories these suburbs were then 
examined in terms of how many of the households in them consumed their electricity on credit 
terms and how many consumed their electricity on prepaid terms. Since difference between these 
two sorts of households was an important basis for selecting households into the sample for this 
study it is necessary to explain, briefly the difference between the two. 
Households consuming their electricity on the basis of credit are households who pay for their 
electricity once they have consumed it, they usually are billed every month by the city of Cape Town 
and receive these bills in the post. For the most part these households are billed for their electricity 
consumption, along with their water and other rates once a month. Electricity supply to these 
households would be cut off only after serial non-payment. 
Households who consume electricity on prepaid basis will have a prepaid meter in their dwelling 
which governs whether electricity flows into the home or not installed in their dwelling dependant 
on whether the household has a positive balance of credits or not. Households must purchase 
encoded prepaid electricity credits in order to load them onto their prepaid meter. Purchasing of 
these credits may be done online at various websites, in stores or via cell-phones. There is enormous 
variation in the manner in which the encoded prepaid credits are ultimately presented on electronic 
or paper receipts to prepaid customers. Given these conditions, in order to present this study's 
treatments in a sensible and reasonably consistent fashion to households consuming electricity on a 
prepaid basis, a vast amount of programming work across several platforms would have been 
required. There is also an substantial variation in the frequency with which households purchase 
prepaid electricity, some households may purchase many times a month, some once a month, while 
others will purchase in bulk once every few months. This introduces significant practical difficulties 
into calculating either a household's monthly consumption or an average consumption over the 
period since the household's last purchase to allow a comparison to a norm.  
Given the significant complexities that would need to have been overcome, and the cost of 
overcoming them, in order to administer this study's treatments to households consuming electricity 
on a prepaid basis, it was decided to only include households that consumed electricity on a credit 
basis in the sample.  
As a result of this decision suburbs that had more households consuming electricity on a credit basis 
were preferred over suburbs with fewer such households on the basis that households with more 
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such households would most likely provide a sufficiently large sample for analysis. On this basis the 
following suburbs were selected in each income category.  
 
3.2.1.3. Allocating households from each suburb to treatments in an unbiased fashion. 
Once suburbs had been identified that had sufficient numbers of households consuming electricity 
on a credit basis it remained for those households to be allocated to each of the four treatments in a 
manner that was not likely to introduce bias. This was achieved in a two-step fashion. 
This study primarily set out to compare the effects of the four different active treatments (CD, CDI, 
ND and NDI). Specifically it was hoped that the effect of social distance could be isolated (by taking 
differences between treatments in the following fashion {[ND+NDI] -[CD+CDI]};  ND - CD and NDI - 
CDI) and the effect of injunctive norms also isolated (by taking differences between treatments in 
the following fashion {[NDI + CDI] - [ND + CD]}; CDI - CD and NDI - ND) in the Capetonian context.  
Comparison to the untreated households are also of obvious interest and are thus, where possible, 
made. Comparison to the untreated control group was not initially a goal of this study. Rather the 
control group was composed after households had been allocated to the printed insert treatments. 
As a result the control group was not selected in entirely the same random manner as the actively 
treated groups. This means that when comparing the untreated control group to the treated groups 
more conventional econometric techniques are preferred to simpler measures such as a difference 
of means. 
The untreated control group was selected from households which had not been allocated to receive 
the printed inserts  but were from the same suburbs as  the households selected to be actively 
treated were the households which came to constitute the untreated control group. This led to a 
bias in pre treatment consumption between the untreated control and treated groups. There were 
two very practical reasons for this. Some suburbs, particularly the lower income suburbs, did not 
have sufficient households to allow for five treatments in meaningful numbers, some, in fact were 
totally exhausted by the allocation to the printed treatments. As a result suburbs are represented in 
different proportions in the untreated control group compared to the untreated group. When 
households were selected from a suburb into a treatment, this was done according to a 
consumption band within that suburb (to maintain balance in terms of pre-treatment consumption . 
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When the untreated control was selected, all households in the suburb were selected52 into it in 
order to maintain a sufficient sample size. However since the untreated group would come from 
different consumption bands in different portions, this led to bias in levels of pre treatment 
consumption. Households were allocated to each of the four active treatment types in a random 
manner that was not likely to introduce bias. This was achieved in a two-step fashion. First, 
households were ranked according to their average daily electricity consumption within their 
neighbourhoods53; only households with true readings54 were used and outliers were excluded from 
the ranking. Second, within each neighbourhood ranking, households were grouped into groups of 
four in a contiguous fashion, that is, the four households with the highest consumption would be in 
one group of four, the four households with the next four highest levels of consumption would be in 
the second group of four, and so on. Various groups of four were selected at random and each 
household within them uniquely assigned to one of the study's treatments. In this manner we 
attempted to avoid bias in the treatment sample.  
It was important that a sufficiently large number of households be ascribed to separate treatments 
in a manner that minimised the difference in pre-treatment levels of consumption across treatments 
for two reasons. First, pre-treatment levels of consumption may be a proxy for a number of 
household characteristics that are important determinants of future consumption  but are 
unobservable; these could include income, efficiency of energy use and household size. Allocating 
across the four treatments a large number of households who are close in terms of consumption 
would help minimise the chance of bias between treatments in terms of these unobserved 
characteristics. Second, previous consumption levels may be predictors of future levels of 
consumption (due to the just-mentioned unobserved characteristics) and as such a bias in terms of 
initial pre-treatment consumption levels. 
The sampling procedure just described led to a sample across the four treatments at the beginning 
of the study that looked as in table 2.1.3 below 
  
                                                          
52
 Although households that are defined as outliers according to the criteria in the "Bias" section below are 
excluded from analysis (as was the case with households in the treated group). 
53
 The definition of a neighbourhood for this study was what is known in the City of Cape Town as a Meter 
Reading Unit (MRU). An MRU is a small area of households that is read by one of the meter-reading teams 
within the city of Cape Town in a day. A suburb may contain several meter reading units. 
54
 As will be discussed in the estimation sample section, households may have their electricity consumption 
estimated, and be billed on that basis, as opposed to actually read off of their electricity meters.  
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Table3.2.3.1. Sample selected for treatment: numbers of households in each treatment by suburb. 
 
CD CDI ND NDI Control 
All mailed 
households 
Total 
households 
Total 1423 1378 1411 1415 5510 5627 11137 
Upper Income 603 577 569 590 3060 2339 5399 
Constantia 157 161 156 162 203 636 839 
Durbanville 182 176 174 173 2105 705 2810 
Pinelands 161 154 149 162 292 626 918 
Tamboerskloof 103 86 90 93 460 372 832 
        
Middle Income 513 505 539 519 1769 2076 3845 
Athlone 139 149 148 138 662 574 1236 
Bonthewul 88 77 104 102 200 371 571 
Grassy Park 156 151 159 152 287 618 905 
Heideveld 60 64 56 59 136 239 375 
Salt River 70 64 72 68 484 274 758 
        
Lower Income 307 296 303 306 681 1212 1893 
Gugulethu 163 150 154 160 295 627 922 
Langa 54 52 55 54 158 215 373 
Mannenberg 90 94 94 92 228 370 598 
 
Bias: 
In any experimental design it is important to demonstrate that randomisation that resulted in an 
allocation of households that is unbiased across treatments. Using the data which was available on 
electricity consumption, August - December 2009, the average daily electricity consumption for the 
period 1 August 2009 to 31 December 2009 was calculated.  The median value and mean values for 
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this measure of consumption is shown for the pre-treatment sample in the table below. The means 
were compared between treatments (pairwise and using a t-test) and no significant differences, at 
the 5% level,  were found between the various treatment cells.  
Two things stand out from the table however. One is the large degree of heterogeneity found in the 
data - all standard deviations are quite large with respect to the means. The second is that the 
median consumption for all groups is very similar while the means seem to vary substantially, but 
apparently not significantly.  
Looking at the average consumption percentiles we see that the top quintile appears to be made up 
of  households with consumption that is significantly different to the rest of the households. A 
significant contributor to the observed heterogeneity appears to be these  households with 
abnormally large consumption.  At the lower end of the consumption values are a significant number 
 
of households with consumption at zero or very low. In order to remove the influence of very low 
and abnormally high consumption we  also consider households that recorded average daily 
consumption that was below 200kwh (excluding roughly the top quintile) and those that consumed 
less than 3kwh on average each day (excluding roughly the bottom quintile). For this constrained 
sample we obtain a sample with a much reduced, although still large, level of heterogeneity. The  
means of pre-treatment consumption for each treatment cell (including the control) obtained for 
this constrained sample are tested against each other in a pair-wise fashion and no significant 
differences are found between them. This remains true when we test the pre-treatment 
consumption for each treatment within each broad income level. 
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Average daily consumption percentiles  
(August - December 2009) 
100th percentile value is 4605171 - not shown on the graph 
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Table 3.2.3.2 Pre-treatment mean and median average daily consumption levels (Aug- Dec, 2009). 
  Treatments 
  CD CDI ND NDI Control 
Unconstrained Total Sample 
 Median 27.86 29.29 27.35 27.64 26.04 
 Mean 65.38 67.87 59.22 60.30 1726.95 
 (sd) (277.95) (281.58) (194.17) (218.94) (70935.09) 
 (n) 1423 1378 1411 1415 5510 
Excluding lowest and upper quintile of the sample (Constrained sample) 
Total sample 
Median 26.60 28.41 26.47 26.77 26.31 
Mean 36.45 38.73 36.48 35.80 37.82 
(sd) (31.27) (34.28) (31.06) (29.31) (35.35) 
(n) 1357 1324 1356 1355 4627 
       
Upper Income 
Median 42.66 45.93 42.73 42.95 29.83 
Mean 52.74 56.55 53.61 51.50 38.83 
(sd) (38.27) (40.86) (37.92) (34.27) (32.19) 
(n) 562 546 530 548 2736 
       
Middle income 
Median 23.55 23.47 23.42 23.28 24.05 
Mean 28.17 29.05 27.86 27.709 38.92 
(sd) (18.28) (20.95) (18.62) (18.22) (40.96) 
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(n) 498 491 531 508 1349 
       
Lower Income 
Median 16.43 15.76 16.62 15.94 18.75 
Mean 19.48 21.41 21.21 20.78 29.95 
(sd) (15.36) (20.85) (18.35) (19.80) (34.64) 
(n) 297 287 295 299 542 
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3.2.1.4. Power calculations. 
Power calculations were made in order to determine the level of statistical power that would be 
achieved at the conventional 5% confidence levels. Since all of the results would essentially be 
comparisons made between two groups (either different active treatments or an active treatment to 
the untreated control group)55 this calculation was based on the formula for the comparison of two 
means set out below.  
    
     
  
                 
 
         
 
which we can rearrange to give us a calculation in terms of power in the followi g way 
 
         
    
  
  
                
n2 is the control group's sample size while n1  is the treated group's sample size which we are solving 
for. Similarly    denotes the estimated likely variance for the control sample and    for the treated 
sample, while    denotes the mean proportional consumption for the control group and    for the 
treated group. As will be discussed later, consumption is measured as the household's daily average 
consumption for a particular month as a proportion of their daily average consumption over August - 
December 2009.        is the confidence level for a conventional confidence level "α" of 5% when 
large numbers are involved (1.96) and      is the critical statistic for the level of power desired, here 
80%,  when large numbers are involved (1.29). 
A challenge in calculating power was that while data would be generated monthly over a full year, 
2010, data upon which power calculations could be made was only available from August 2009 to 
December 2009 at the time of the calculations. Although not ideal since electricity consumption is 
expected to be seasonal and symmetric, drawing our power calculation from data for the last half of 
the year,  does probably capture the likely variation over an entire year. It is certainly better than no 
power calculation. 
                                                          
55
 Although households were to be measured each month, since they were to be mailed each month also, this 
rendered each successive after a mailing month a different treatment to the one before it since we would be 
observing the effect, potentially, of two different amounts of mailings received. 
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Estimates for the mean and variance in consumption for each treatment were drawn from this 
period). Power calculations are conducted for the typical variance of a typical month. Power 
calculations are conducted for several different effect sizes including the expected treatment effect 
of 2.5% observed in the OPower data by Allcott (2011). 
In terms of comparison at the overall sample level between a treatment and the control group this 
experiment is not expected to achieve a power of 80%, the conventional level of statistical power for 
these exercises (Ferraro and Price, 2011), at the 5% level to detect most reasonably expected effect 
sizes. This is particularly true for comparisons amongst the lower income groups and between 
treatments. As a result this study will be cautious in its interpretation of results for these 
comparisons. 
 
Power calculations. 
Groups being compared to the control group Effect size 
Control 
group 
(sample 
size) 
Compared to 
individual mailed 
treatments within 
the... 
(assumed 
minimum sample 
size of one mailed 
treatment cell) 
1% 2% 2.5% 3% 4% 5% 
(n=5510) Total sample   (n=1397) 0.06 0.13 0.15 0.21 0.32 0.44 
(n=3060) Upper income   (n=569) 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.20 
(n=1769) Middle income   (n=505) 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.21 0.29 
(n=681) Lower income   (n=296) 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.13 
         
Comparisons between individual cells of treated 
groups 
      
 Total sample   (n=1397) 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.21 0.30 
 Upper income   (n=569) 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.20 
 Middle income   (n=505) 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.22 
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 Lower income   (n=296) 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 
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3.2.2. Fieldwork. 
Households were mailed as part of this field experiment from the beginning of January 2010 until 
the end of December 2010.  
During the fieldwork period one of the primary challenges was to get the correct feedback to the 
correct households as determined by the sample framework. In order to do this a number of 
possibilities were explored but, in the end, it was found that to effect this process at the company 
who would print the inserts (as well as the city's electricity and rates bills) was likely to work best. As 
a result, over the fieldwork period, the inserts were printed out at the printing company responsible 
for printing and mailing the electricity and rates bills for the city of Cape Town56. The printing 
company was able to automatically match the inserts and bills so that the insert bearing a particular 
household’s information was mailed with that household’s electricity bill.  
Once the inserts had been printed, matched to their bills and placed together with those bills into 
unsealed envelopes ready for sealing and mailing a team of four university students checked a 
sample of the batches that had been prepared for mailing. At the printers, the sum total of 
envelopes to be mailed were split into several batches, with each batch being normally 50 envelopes 
or less.  For every batch, the two top and the two bottom envelopes were checked as well as two 
further envelopes pulled at random from the rest of the batch. In this way generally at least 10% of 
each batch was checked. If a mismatched insert was discovered in a sample, then the whole batch 
from which it was taken was checked to see if mismatches had occurred systematically.  Where 
systematic mismatches were discovered, The printing company re-matched the bills and inserts, 
which were then checked again. Mismatches were discovered only very seldom, four times in the 
whole year, which speaks strongly about the accuracy of the matching process. 
Unfortunately not all households in the sample were mailed each month, there were a variety of 
reasons for this, sometimes a household was not mailed its insert if the city wished to include 
another insert with its bill, such as when rates rebates are due or some other communication 
specific to the household needed to be made. In these circumstances many such households' bills 
would be diverted to relevant city insert procedures and would skip this study's insert procedure, 
                                                          
56
 Lithotech. 
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ultimately being mailed that month without its treatment insert. On another occasion, in the middle 
of the year, systematic printing and matching errors, unanticipated at the outset, were discovered 
when the bills and their matched inserts entered the checking process57. Since correcting these 
errors required roughly a week, it was decided to mail households their electricity bills without their 
intended inserts so that these households could receive their bills in reasonable time, rather than 
suffer complications arising from electricity bills unduly delayed while a solution was sought! 
Households could also drop out of the treatment sample if, during the fieldwork period they 
changed from consuming electricity on a credit basis to consuming electricity on a prepaid basis. 
3.3. Estimation sample. 
Once the fieldwork was complete and data was available for estimation, it needed to be decided 
who to include in the estimation sample. There were a number of criteria for inclusion in the 
estimation sample which sought to ensure that the consumption figures measured were true 
readings and not estimations, that households and not businesses were included, that only 
households with consistent membership were likely to be included and that there would be as little 
bias as possible between the control and treatment samples in terms of initial consumption. We will 
discuss these now. 
 
3.3.1. Consumption outliers. 
 Households with consumption that was very different to the consumption found in the rest of the 
sample, were excluded from analysis. These were households typically in the top or bottom 5 
percentiles of the consumption distribution. They were excluded since their large consumption 
values severely biased estimates of the average treatment effect. 
Specifically this meant that households that in any month consumed more than 5 times their daily 
average for the pre-treatment period were excluded. Households that consumed more than 200 
kWh or less than 3 kWh per day on average in the pre-treatment period or the treatment period fell 
firmly into the tails of the consumption distribution and were excluded. Another bias that needed to 
be controlled for was households that were unusually distant from the norm reported to the in 
terms of consumption. The great differences between these households and the norm bias the 
estimates of the average treatment effects estimated upon the interaction between the specific 
treatment and the difference between the household's consumption and the reported norm. 
                                                          
57
 The consumption figures on the electricity bills were suddenly quite different from that on the inserts. 
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The estimation sample for each month in the treatment period is expressed in terms of the pre-
treatment consumption in table 3.3.2 below. The pre-treatment sample displays decreased bias in 
terms of the untreated control group that was selected after fieldwork began although the bias is 
still significant. The unmailed control group has a significantly higher pre-treatment consumption 
than all the other groups in August and October and significantly higher than the NDI treatment in 
July. In February the unmailed control group has a significantly lower pre-treatment consumption 
than all treatments. In August the NDI treatment is slightly but significantly above the CD treatment 
in terms of pre-treatment daily average consumption of the households in each respective 
treatment. 
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Table 3.3.1. Pre-treatment average daily consumption for the each months 
estimation sample 
 
CD CDI ND NDI UN 
Feb       mean 37.90272 37.75656 37.78975 37.26859 32.95459 
(sd) (36.75156) (33.9276) (36.0155) (35.72448) (31.20395) 
n 375 359 382 384 3407 
      March 32.58764 32.84359 32.08038 31.59595 32.9908 
 
(28.68919) (27.23796) (27.09159) (26.84557) (31.22723) 
 
922 907 885 945 3399 
      April 32.82002 33.48453 32.25187 32.17043 32.95218 
 
(29.57751) (27.89212) (28.1171) (27.83278) (31.20472) 
 
796 783 792 822 3414 
      May 33.74475 34.02719 33.15854 33.53999 33.47724 
 
(29.10667) (29.01151) (29.20035) (29.24205) (31.39605) 
 
709 689 689 725 3328 
      June 33.71587 33.9394 33.21606 32.29029 34.40461 
 
(31.92697) (29.28075) (30.54632) (27.93835) (32.08966) 
 
629 625 623 678 3105 
      July 33.10217 33.46353 32.18952 31.93702 34.35337 
 
(29.2645) (27.43801) (28.00637) (27.48587) (31.90128) 
 
828 804 838 880 3185 
      August 29.80986 28.78837 28.02435 26.60141 33.83449 
 
(23.84846) (19.37722) (20.48719) (16.79725) (31.65186) 
 
360 367 381 412 3256 
      September 34.2562 33.60344 32.6289 32.28966 33.87135 
 
(29.59548) (26.82833) (28.61119) (27.34659) (31.86076) 
 
803 807 811 852 3231 
      October 27.36757 27.18888 26.24531 25.42278 33.25476 
 
(22.89298) (18.89134) (19.44101) (16.73259) (31.48297) 
 
557 561 565 600 3369 
      November 33.52249 33.84031 33.731 33.52731 33.30471 
 
(29.28754) (27.56606) (29.06618) (28.15285) (31.4974) 
 
818 810 718 756 3365 
      December 31.47055 31.68648 31.19115 30.92846 32.74262 
 
(28.3757) (26.17953) (27.091) (26.24784) (31.22831) 
 
960 929 943 981 3457 
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3.4. Estimation of treatment effects: Variables of interest and their expected influence upon 
consumption. 
The behaviour that was targeted by the treatments in this study was the consumption of electricity 
by households. Consumption, in particular differences in consumption between households in 
various treatments, is thus the measure used to assess the impact of treatments in this study. 
Measures of consumption will thus be the dependant variable in the analysis. 
 In terms of explaining the behaviour of household electricity consumption there are various 
variables of interest. These are the treatment-related variables, whose explanatory power with 
respect to consumption we wish to analyse, and the climatic variables which are likely to predict 
electricity consumption generally.  
Before we move on to discussing these variables, a word first about what is meant by "month" in the 
estimation phase and about the subscript notation used. 
As described in the fieldwork section, consumption for households consuming electricity on a credit 
basis are read at different times of the month. This affects what is meant by the term "month" in the 
estimation process. The term "month" does not refer here necessarily (or even most often) to a 
calendar month but rather to the period of time between two meter readings with the month 
named after the calendar month in which the second reading occurred. Thus the period that this 
study refers to as the January 2010 pre-treatment period may in fact contain more days from 
December 2009 if a household's meter is read in the first half of January 2010 than if it is read in the 
second half of January 2010 and yet still be called January 2010 consumption. A similar situation 
holds for each month's consumption. 
Since the data is panel data we use subscript                 to indicate individual households58 
and the subscript                    to indicate month in the conventional fashion. 
3.4.1. Measuring consumption. 
The measure of household electricity consumption used for analysis in chapter 4 will be  two similar 
proportional  measures. The reason for this is the bias that exists between the mailed treatment 
cells and the control group. These two measures are termed "annual proportional consumption" 
and ‘monthly proportional consumption". This section will briefly describe how these two 
measures are calculated and describe how they should improve comparison. 
                                                          
58
 Or put more strictly, electricity accounts. 
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We begin with the most simple measure of consumption which is just the absolute amount of 
electricity consumed by a household in a month period. We express consumption simply as:  
                                          . Consumption is the aggregate amount of 
electricity consumed by a household since it's last meter reading and is measured in  kilowatt-hours 
(kWh). 
We now calculate the households' average daily consumption  on a monthly basis as            
  
             
                
 
                                                     is the number of days since the last 
meter reading.59 
Monthly proportional consumption is simply the average consumption in a month during 
the treatment period            divided by its average daily consumption over the August 2009 
to January 2010 pre-treatment period, or 
                   
                          
               
 
              
              
             
                   
              
             
 
 
Similarly annual proportional consumption is calculated as 
                    
 
              
               
               
                   
               
               
 
 
              
              
             
                   
              
             
 
 
The denominator of                    and                   is calculated in a similar 
method to the denominators of the other proportional measures, of climatic variables, whose 
calculations will be described later in this chapter. In all of these cases the denominator 
calculates the pre-treatment daily average of some variable of interest. In other words, the 
calculations are the same in all respects except for the climatic aspect being measured. In the 
interests of brevity then, this sort of calculation of the pre-treatment average is denoted 
                 . 
                                                          
59
 The negative or undefined values of         
  
 resulting from differently signed               and 
                 or a zero value for                   are possible (when meter readings are estimated) 
but excluded from the estimation sample by the estimation sample criteria for average household 
consumption described in section 3.3.2 above. 
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The reason for adopting a proportional measure of consumption as the basis of comparison between 
the treatment and control cells rather than just absolute consumption is that the control cell had a 
pre-treatment level of absolute consumption that was significantly different to the mailed 
treatments. This could well signal that households were likely to naturally continue consuming 
significantly different amounts of electricity (Bruhn & Mckenzie, 2009). 60 In order to eliminate this 
difference, it was decided to calculate a households consumption during the treatment period as a 
proportion of its historic pre-treatment consumption. In this we assume that households are likely to 
follow similar patterns of consumption through the year. This would lead to their consumption being 
similar, as a proportion of pre-treatment consumption, at the same time of the year if there was no 
other systematically different influence at work, such as an experimental treatment. Assuming this 
to be true, then differences in proportional consumption (annual and monthly in this paper's 
terminology) would indicate differences due to receiving the various experimental treatments or 
not. 
3.4.2. Treatment variables. 
Each household was assigned a treatment variable, that was constant across all months for that 
household, based upon which treatment it had been ascribed to. Each treatment variable assumed a 
value of 1 if the household was in the treatment and a value of zero if it was not. There were thus 
four treatment variables as below and an untreated control group. 
      
                                                               
           
  
      
                                                                         
           
  
      
                                                                        
           
  
       
                                                                                  
           
  
       
                                      
           
  
From previous research, discussed in the chapter on social norms, we suspect that in addition to 
matters of comfort - such as being warm enough, fed enough and entertained enough - there is a 
further determinant of a household's electricity consumption in situations when the household is 
                                                          
60
 It could thus signal that these households were different in terms of their size and stock of electric 
appliances, which would be key determinants of electricity consumption. 
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explicitly compared to the consumption of an average household     . In such circumstances we 
expect households to maximise utility, all else being equal, by minimising the difference between 
their own consumption and the reported level of average consumption. In other words 
                                     
specifically 
                                                
Thus we expect a household to increase its consumption, and thus its proportional consumption, 
more than it otherwise would have, if it is reported as having consumed less than the average 
household in the city or it neighbourhood. Similarly, we expect a household to decrease its 
proportional consumption if it is reported as having consumed more than the average in proportion 
to the percentage it is above the average household in the city or it neighbourhood. In order to test 
this we construct variables that capture how far each household's reported consumption was above 
or below the average as a percentage of the household's own) consumption. Each of these variables 
interacts with the specific treatment type.   
We thus have 
          
                                                                           
                                                                           
  
            
                                                                           
                                                                            
  
and 
            
                       
                 
       
 
 
which are combined as below 
                                           and                                        
which interact with the treatment variables in the estimation phase. 
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The likely relationship of these treatment variables to the consumption variable                   
can be thought of as follows. 
If households maximise utility  in the fashion described above then, where      is a vector of other 
explanatory variables that a household responds to in order to optimise comfort and     is the error 
term, we have 
 
                                                                             
wherein we expect       and                              . 
In order to factor in the effect of the injunctive norm (     we must expand the utility function to 
include perceived social approval. If we continue to assume an additive utility function, 
incorporating  that a household wishes to maximise perceived social approval subject to comfort and 
distance from the norm we have the following utility function61 
                                                                    
               
Now if                             =                              such that 
                                 
                                   
                                    
 
then when  some households are receiving injunctive norms with their feedback and some are not, 
we have: 
                                                                                        
 
  
                                   
     <    for households reported below the norm. For households reported as having consumed 
above the norm, the expected relationship between    and     is unclear beyond              . 
In order to assess the impact of varying social distance (city vs neighbourhood effects) upon a 
household's reaction to this feedback we need to expand the utility function further to include social 
distance as an element determining utility. Since we suspect that households are likely to respond in 
                                                          
61
 An additive function is used for the sake of tractability, the form does not jeopardise the generality of the 
point though.  
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direct proportion to the social distance between the reported norm62 and the household’s own 
consumption,  we augment the utility function as follows: 
                                                                               
                                      
                                                            
where  
             
                    
                  
  
and  
        
                  
                    
  
since each injunctive and non-injunctive treatment is combined separately with a neighbourhood 
and a city level norm we have 
                                                                             
                                                            
                                                          
                                                                       
                  
                                                                      
                                                                 
              
 
From which we expect                                for households reported as having 
consumed more than the norm. For households reported as having consumed less than the norm we 
expect             >0 and              . 
In order to avoid inappropriately large amounts of multicollinearity when estimating these 
relationships, separate regressions are run comparing each treatment to the same control sample in 
the estimation phase. 
3.4.3. Cumulative number of times that a household has been mailed a treatment. 
                                                          
62
 Both injunctive and descriptive norms. 
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Previous studies of how a household's energy consumption reacts to feedback about how the 
household's energy consumption compares to an average level of consumption found that the 
treatment effect did not decline as a function of how many times a household had been mailed 
(Alcott, 2011). This make sense for two reasons. First, the value of the reported average is new every 
month. Second, the behaviourally active component is the comparison itself, so long as there is a 
difference between household and average, we can expect the household to consume differently to 
what it would otherwise have done. In terms of the comparison itself, the households are not 
consuming more and more of the same good with each mailing but rather most are consuming 
different comparisons with each mailing. 
There are however, for each treatment, elements beyond the actively changing comparison that 
remain steady. These include the electricity saving tips and the general format of the treatment. It 
might be that the marginal effectiveness of these unchanging elements will decline as people tire of 
receiving the inserts. Considering that electricity savings tips take up half of the space on each of the 
inserts, and are clearly labelled "Tips that may help you to use less electricity", it is very likely that 
households will have perceived this as the unchanging element of the treatments. These tips are also 
generic to each treatment. As a result, when comparisons with the control group are made, it is 
necessary to include a variable, in addition to the treatment-specific variables, that will be able to 
capture this element that is shared between treatments.  
 It will be interesting to see if households react to cumulative mailings in a manner consistent with 
declining effectiveness of successive mailings or the opposite, or if they react at all. 
In order to capture this effect we thus have, interacting with each treatment for each household, a 
variable,             , that measures how many times a household has been mailed at any time t 
                                                   
Consistent with the above thought, we assume an interaction of the following nature63  in terms of 
our utility function 
                                                                                       
Thus, if we gather the various other treatment-specific terms into     
64we can express the electricity 
consumption function as 
                                                          
63
 Again the broader point that the marginal utility of acting to close the gap reported on the treatment inserts 
is declining with the number of inserts received is dependent upon the function capturing this in a declining, 
monotonic fashion rather than the specific way it does this. 
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                                                +           
It is difficult to say a priori what the nature of the difference in the effect of cumulative mailing of 
the various treatments will be, if any. 
3.4.4. Climatic variables.  
Climate will likely have a significant influence upon the electricity consumption of households. There 
are three particular climatic elements which are likely to influence household electricity 
consumption, these are: the amount of daylight minutes each day, the amount of rainfall and 
temperature. In order to preserve scaling with the proportional consumption variable, the climactic 
variables are also all average daily values for each month expressed as proportions of January 2010 
pre-treatment levels. Information for all climatic variables is only available at a city level. Values for 
climatic variables at the household level are determined on the basis of climatic measurements done 
between the two meter reading dates that delineate a month's consumption for a household. 
Temperature is measured in terms of heating degree days (HDD) and cooling degree days (CDD). 
Heating and cooling degree days are calculated as the number of degrees Fahrenheit that the 
temperature is below or above balance point temperature. Balance point temperature is defined as 
the temperature at which temperature-sensitive energy demand is minimised (Ruth and Lin, 2006). 
Deviations from balance point temperature require increased energy use in order to bring the 
household temperature back to balance point. Every degree Fahrenheit below balance point 
temperature requires one HDD of energy to raise the temperature of the home back to balance 
point temperature. Similarly every degree Fahrenheit above balance point temperature requires a 
CDD of energy to cool the home back to balance point temperature. Most studies use a balance 
point temperature of 65oF (Ruth & Lin, 2006). In order to maintain comparability with these studies, 
65oF is also used as the balance point temperature here.65 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
64                                                                                                           
                                                                                                 } 
65 Although in many studies balance point temperature is assumed to be 65oF (Ruth & Lin, 2006) this is a 
somewhat arbitrary value since the actual balance point temperature would depend upon many factors which 
would vary between households. These would be factors such as: size of house, insulation, efficiency of 
refrigerators, geographic situation with respect to aspect. There is also the consideration of variation in the 
temperatures which household members find comfortable. Apart from varying between individual people, 
there is some evidence that these “comfort” temperatures vary between countries (Nicol & Humphreys, 
2002). Ruth and Lin (2006) also identify variation across states within the USA. There are however no clear 
indications of what might constitute a reasonable balance point temperature in Cape Town, which is another 
reason why 65
o
F is used. 
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As mentioned, the specific variable used as a measure of temperature over a particular month in this 
study is the average daily heating/cooling degree days for a household that month as a proportion of 
the average daily heating/cooling degree days for that household in the January pre-treatment 
period. The calculations  for average daily heating/cooling degree days and their expression as a 
proportion of January pre-treatment levels are as below. 
            
     
                
                             
     
                
 
thus 
             
        
                   
                  
                  
         
                    
   
 
with                                                    
and                                                   
For rainfall, a similar procedure converts the average daily millimetres of rainfall for a month to that 
average expressed as a proportion of the average daily millimetres of rainfall in January 2010.  
We thus have:  
             
                
                
 
and from this 
                   
          
                     
     
with                                                      
The amount of daylight in a day was measured as the minutes of civil twilight66 in a day. Again, for 
each household in each month, we  calculate the average daily minutes of daylight for a month and 
                                                          
66 Civil Twilight is the period when the sun is no more than 6 degrees below the horizon at either sunrise or 
sunset. The horizon should be clearly defined and the brightest stars should be visible under good atmospheric 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
88 
 
from these averages then express each month's average daily minutes of daylight as a proportion of 
January 2010's average daily minutes of daylight as below. 
                 
           
                
 
and from this 
                       
          
                     
     
with                                                                    . 
In terms of our assumed utility function:   
                                                                                      
the         term captures the sense of general material well-being that a person or a household 
wishes to feel, that is, the amount of entertainment, food, warmth, washed and ready clothing which 
maximises their utility, all else being equal. As such         is a function, directly and indirectly, of the 
climatic variables as indicated below. Again, for the sake of tractability, the relationship between 
comfort and the climatic variables is expressed additively. Nevertheless, so long as the parameters 
express a monotonic relationship in the indicated direction between the parameter's climatic variable 
and        , other functional forms are equivalent. 
                                                                          
with                              and           .  
we expand the        term in our consumption function to capture this relationship 
                                                +             
thus becomes 
                                                                                      
                                                                  
wherein we expect                                and            . 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
conditions (i.e. no moonlight, or other lights). One still should be able to continue with ordinary outdoor 
activities. 
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3.5. Estimation of the treatment effects: Estimation techniques used.  
Two methods were used in order to assess which, if any, of the various treatments were likely to 
have affected households' consumption. The two methods used were the sign test and random 
effect regressions. The sign test is a non-parametric measure and the random effect regressions are 
parametric measures. In both cases the treatment effect was assessed by comparing the treated 
sample to the control sample. 
In all cases we wish to see whether the relative socioeconomic level of a household's suburb would 
modify any treatment effect and so analysis is split by these socioeconomic groups. Given that we 
expect households to respond to being compared to an average level of consumption by changing 
their consumption towards that average, analysis always takes account of whether a household was 
reported as above or below the average. 
3.5.1 Fixed effect versus Random effect regressions. 
Since households were mailed treatments on a monthly basis and we have data on consumption for 
those months, it is appropriate that we estimate treatment effects using a panel data method.  . 
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Table 3.5.1.Within and Between variation for variables of interest. 
Variable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
prop_precons_da overall 1.118844 1.140136 1.13E-05 4.999924 N =   71010 
 
between 
 
1.063034 0.00166 4.967099 n =    7582 
 
within 
 
0.535276 -2.96572 5.336827 T =  9.3656 
       
CD_pdiff_norm_above overall 0.820741 6.774877 0 99.79395 N =   71010 
 
between 
 
5.174521 0 67.703 n =    7582 
 
within 
 
4.619062 -66.8823 90.02182 T =  9.3656 
       
CD_pdiff_norm_below overall 6.295817 34.90928 0 399.6921 N =   71010 
 
between 
 
29.99908 0 247.6796 n =    7582 
 
within 
 
21.98751 -241.384 334.338 T =  9.3656 
       CDI_pdiff_norm_above overall 0.88319 6.969426 0 99.92434 N =   71010 
 
between 
 
5.368581 0 60.75448 n =    7582 
 
within 
 
4.746172 -59.8713 90.12448 T =  9.3656 
       CDI_pdiff_norm_below overall 6.199174 35.09752 0 399.6443 N =   71010 
 
between 
 
30.18811 0 279.8243 n =    7582 
 
within 
 
22.03555 -273.625 297.9643 T =  9.3656 
       ND_pdiff_norm_above overall 0.977679 7.727965 0 395.7784 N =   71010 
 
between 
 
5.296978 0 72.40186 n =    7582 
 
within 
 
5.830982 -71.4242 328.2254 T =  9.3656 
       ND_pdiff_norm_below overall 4.333964 27.41358 0 399.5742 N =   71010 
 
between 
 
21.23906 0 244.2898 n =    7582 
 
within 
 
19.95784 -239.956 346.9059 T =  9.3656 
       NDI_pdiff_norm_above overall 0.958433 7.292432 0 163.1431 N =   71010 
 
between 
 
5.124216 0 70.03453 n =    7582 
 
within 
 
5.421478 -69.0761 142.266 T =  9.3656 
       NDI_pdiff_norm_below overall 4.819013 29.29336 0 399.8933 N =   71010 
 
between 
 
23.18255 0 257.2778 n =    7582 
 
within 
 
21.13244 -252.459 348.5557 T =  9.3656 
       cumu_mail overall 2.368455 3.144713 0 10 N =   71010 
 
between 
 
2.717849 0 10 n =    7582 
 
within 
 
1.566738 -3.38155 7.618455 T =  9.3656 
       prop_precdd overall 1.00498 1.281126 0 4.771705 N =   71010 
 between 
 
0.318455 0 4.09616 n =    7582 
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within 
 
1.255616 -1.46485 4.852499 T =  9.3656 
Table 3.5.1.1.Within and Between variation for variables of interest (continued) 
       prop_prehdd_da overall 1.524098 3.857352 0 117.7955 N =   70986 
 
between 
 
2.362019 0.005265 46.17566 n =    7580 
 
within 
 
2.798987 -44.423 74.33734 T = 9.36491 
       prop_premin_da overall 0.900414 0.113042 0.669142 1.093525 N =   71010 
 
between 
 
0.029023 0.746886 1.09007 n =    7582 
 
within 
 
0.110426 0.693266 1.120699 T =  9.3656 
       prop_prerain_da overall 0.693179 0.938012 0 33.91765 N =   71010 
 
between 
 
0.538017 0.010795 12.63801 n =    7582 
 
within 
 
0.720746 -11.4226 24.80776 T =  9.3656 
       N = Total sample size aggregated across all periods 
n= Total number of unique households 
T= Mean number of  months that each household's consumption appears in the data 
 
In order to decide which approach to adopt to estimating treatment effects in the panel, the data 
should first be examined, in particular the nature of the within and between variation of the 
dependent monthly consumption variable and the various potential explanatory variables. Table 
3.5.1 above reports data for the nature of variation of these variables of interest. Suburb indicators 
are not reported since they are constant for our sample through the year and thus exhibit no within 
variation.67 As observed in the table 3.5.1, there is a large degree of both within and between 
variation in the consumption, treatment and climatic variables. Accordingly, we should use an 
approach that captures this. 
The Random Effects estimator (RE) is able to control for both within and between variation through 
calculating a weight (  ) in a feasible general least squares manner. The weight   serves to weight 
the between or FE estimator in the RE approach, essentially rendering the RE approach a weighted 
mixture of BE and FE. In the case of all variation being within variation    , and in the case of all 
variation being between variation    . As such the RE approach seems a logical candidate for 
estimating the treatment effect in data such as that described above. Indeed looking at the values of 
  for RE regressions over this data suggested that there would be significant difference between the 
                                                          
67
 Households that moved neighbourhoods (almost none) over the year were omitted from the analysed 
sample.  
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RE and FE approaches, although with theta usually at around 0.815, this difference would not be 
very great.   
However the RE estimator is valid only under more stringent assumptions than the FE estimators. In 
terms of the generic individual effects model for panel data where  
                   
we have a time invariant error component,    , and a time variant component,     . Within the FE 
framework  may be correlated with the regressors     since it is dealt with by the FE estimation 
anyway. The time varying error component     may not be correlated with regressors    .  However, 
within the RE framework it is necessary that                             , in other words that 
the time invariant error component also be distributed independently of the regressors    . 
 To test whether these assumptions hold, a  Hausman type test is conducted. Since not all accounts 
in the actively treated sample were mailed every month the panel in this case is unbalanced. This 
means that the usual approach of Arellano (1993) and Wooldridge (2002, pp. 290-91), using a Wald 
test, needs to be extended since it is valid only in balanced panels. Schaffer and Stillman (2010) 
generalise from the approach of Arellano (1993) and Wooldridge (2002) supply such an extension by 
estimating    for every observation. 
The result of these Hausman tests, for every regression reported in chapter 4 provides strong 
evidence that the additional independence assumptions of the RE estimator are not met. As such, 
the FE estimators have priority in interpretation. 
Nevertheless both RE and FE estimates are reported. Although the statistical evidence weighs in 
favour of the FE approach for this dataset, it does have one drawback that should cause pause. In 
this dataset no household changes suburb over the year period. This renders the suburb time-
invariant for each household. Since the households suburb cannot be included in FE regression 
estimating the household level  treatment effect. 
Bruhn and Mckenzie (2009) make a compelling case for the inclusion of dummy variables that 
explicitly signal systematic variation in an experimentally generated dataset. Excluding these, where 
they can be included explicitly may introduce bias into coefficient estimates, such as those 
estimating the treatment effect. The suburb indicators perform that role in this dataset. Across all 
non-FE regressions they explain a significant amount of variation. This is to be expected in light of 
the discussion in chapter 1.  Since similar people and households that are similar in many respects 
may cluster together in neighbourhoods (and hence suburbs) and may just as significantly be then 
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subject to very similar suburb level influences (such as services, crime, quality of education, 
transport costs) we would expect there to be significant differences between suburbs. Since the 
suburbs in this dataset are non-contiguous with each other, it is likely that these differences would 
quite marked. Finally, we know that the households in these suburbs have different income 
characteristics, since they were selected upon that basis.  
As a result, while the coefficients calculated from the FE approach are preferred in terms of  
interpreting the analysis, both RE and FE results are reported since the RE approach allows suburbs 
to be included explicitly. 
Since the standard errors around the parameter estimates are likely to vary substantially robust 
estimates of the standard errors are used. Since these are also likely to vary in some fashion at the 
neighbourhood level due to unobserved neighbourhood level characteristics, the standard errors are 
allowed to cluster at the neighbourhood level. 
3.5.1.1. Comparing treated households to untreated households: Regression specifications.  
The four treatments are compared to the control group in four separate regressions for each income 
group. In each case the dependant variable is                    Thus for treatment CD, in an 
estimation sample consisting of control group households and households treated with CD we have: 
                                                                         
                                                          
                                                      
                                                                             
            
where      is the vector of climatic variables and     is the composite error term. 
This equation is estimated separately in each income bracket to produce estimates of treatment, 
effects amongst upper, middle and lower income suburbs of households.  
3.5.1.2. Expected results of comparing treated households to untreated households. 
Given theory and previous studies discussed in chapter one, we would expect that households 
reported as having consumed above the norm will lower their consumption towards that norm in 
the following month, or a at least increase their consumption by less than the control households in 
the following month to leave them consuming more than control households in the following month 
in terms of their average daily consumption as a proportion of their January 2010 consumption. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
94 
 
Similarly we would expect that households reported as having consumed below the norm will 
increase their consumption in the following month or at least decrease their consumption by less 
than control group households, driven in both cases by a behavioural tendency for people to 
conform to reported norms. 
Given this, we expect that for the two descriptive-only norm treatments that all else being equal, 
       and        
and        and        
We also expect that for households receiving feedback that they had consumed less than average a 
positive injunctive norm () will mitigate against the tendency for these households to increase 
their consumption in the following month or at least decrease their consumption by less than 
control group households, by reinforcing their pro-social behaviour. 
When injunctive norms are introduced we thus expect that  
             and            
Introducing a socially closer norm, such as a neighbourhood norm rather than a city level norm, 
should intensify any reaction to the reported norm. We thus expect, for all income groups that: 
              and               amongst injunctive norms, and  
            and             amongst descriptive norms.  
We also expect         for each type of treatment. 
. 
3.5.1.3. Comparing various treatments: Regression specifications.  
When we compare the various mailed treatments to each other, we will mainly be interested  in 
comparing the influence of varying social distance and the influence of an injunctive norm.  
To analyse both questions we make use of the following framework. As discussed earlier, we are 
assuming that if we report to households how their consumption compares to a average household's 
consumption then their consumption in the following month will be a function of the difference 
between their own consumption and the average household's in the following fashion.  
                                                   
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
95 
 
Where        indicates the household's consumption,      indicates the average household's 
consumption and     is a vector of other consumption-influencing variables, such as the climatic 
variables discussed in chapter 3. This implies that if households tend towards the norm, that     .  
When we introduce varying social distance and the varying presence of an injunctive norm we 
assume that the tendency for household's to move their own consumption towards the norm may 
be augmented or curtailed by the introduction of a socially closer average and/or the introduction of 
an injunctive norm in the following fashion. 
                                                                             
With       a dummy indicating whether the household was mailed an injunctive norm or not,        a 
dummy indicating whether the household was mailed a neighbourhood level average (1) or a city 
level average (0) and            an interaction of those two terms. For the sake of space only the 
results of the Fixed Effect regressions reported (in table 4.3) since the FE estimator is the most 
appropriate for this data. As before, these regressions are run over the whole year's data as well as 
over the two halves of the year in order to take account for potentially different variation in 
treatment effect. 
3.6. Summary. 
In order to test whether reporting social norms would alter households' electricity consumption a 
natural field experiment was designed and executed in the city of Cape Town from January to 
December 2010. Originally the experiment was designed to test the effect of varying social distance 
and of including an injunctive norm, making for four treatments. However soon after fieldwork 
began interest in the effect of the various treatments relative to households was piqued. This meant 
that while treatments were randomised amongst the four mailed treatments, the control was not 
randomly allocated. In order to account for the bias that arose as a result of this incomplete 
randomisation with respect to the unmailed control, consumption is measured as a proportion of 
pre-treatment consumption levels 
In order to test whether social distance would modify the influence of reporting social norms, two 
sorts of descriptive norms were used: city level norms (for the socially distant treatments) and a 
neighbourhood level norm (for the socially close treatments). For each of these, half of the 
households receiving inserts received feedback that was augmented with an injunctive norm. In total 
there were 4 treatment cells (CD, CDI, ND, NDI) with similar numbers of households in each. 
Households who were not allocated to any insert treatment but which were from the same suburbs 
as the treated households formed the control sample. 
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The experiment was conducted amongst a sample of households that included suburbs 
representative of the lower, middle and upper thirds of the city's income distribution. The norms 
were reported to households upon A4 inserts included with their electricity bills. There was a brief 
problem in the middle of fieldwork that necessitated a change in the background calculation 
methodology of the printing company in order to be solved. However mailing largely continued 
through the fieldwork period. Data will be examined for any break around this period. 
 
We expect to find that the neighbourhood level treatments elicit stronger reactions than the city 
level treatments. We expect that households who are reported as having consumed above the norm 
will reduce their consumption toward the reported norm in the subsequent month. We expect to 
observe that the injunctive norm will curb any boomerang effects that are present in the data. Thus 
we expect that households who are reported as having consumed below the average will increase 
their consumption in the subsequent month but that this effect will either be moderated or entirely 
reversed by the augmenting the descriptive norm with an injunctive norm. 
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Chapter 3 Appendix: Treatment Inserts. 
CD (Below) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
The average household in Cape Town used 925 KwH of electricity last month. 
Your household used 128.000 KwH of electricity last month. 
Your household consumed less than the average. 
Tips that may help you to use less electricity: 
Use less hot water. If you can. take a sho ... ·ar ra ther than a bath Use as little hot water as possible whether 
showering or bathing. Stack your dishes and wash them in one large load, rather than washing many smaller loads. If 
you go away for the weekend, switch your geyser off. The recommended temperature to set your geyser's thermostat 
to is 5S"C. Check what your the rmostat is set to . Please ask a professional for help if you are not sure how to do this. 
Use your big appliances tess often. Hang up washing to dry as tumble dryers use a very large amount of electricity 
Use stove plates and ollens for only as long as required to (.-ook your food . Cook on as Iowa heal a possible. II is 
cheaper to boil waler in a kettle than on a slave . Once water is boiling, only a low heat is required on a slave 10 keep it 
boiling. Boil only the water you need 
Conserve Heat: Closing the curtains helps greatly in keeping a room warm. Close the curtains in the early evening 
Use heaters and air conditioners only when you are in the room and be sure to keep the room's doors and curtains 
closed as thiS helps to relain Ihe heat . Whe never possible and convenient, use an extra pullover or a blanket instead 
of a heater 
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CD (Above) 
  
The average household in Cape Town used 925 KwH of electricity last month . 
Your household used 961.000 KwH of electricity last month. 
Your household consumed more than the average. 
Tips that may help you to use less electricity: 
Use less hot water. If you can , take a shower rather than a bath . Use as little hot water as possible whether 
showerin g or ba thing. Stack your dishes and wash them in one large load, rather than washing many smaller loads. If 
you go away for the weekend, switch your geyser off. The recommended temperature to set your geyser's thermostat 
to is 5SoC. Check wha t your thermostat is set to . Please ask a professional for help if you are not sure how to do this. 
Use your big appliances less often. Hang up washing to dryas tumble dryers use a very large amount of electricity. 
Use stove plates and ovens for only as long as required to cook your food. Cook on as Iowa heat a possible. It is 
cheaper to boil water in a kettle than on a stove . Once water is boiling, only a low heat is required on a stove to keep it 
boiling. Boil only the water you need. 
Conserv e Heat : Closing the curtains helps greatly in keeping a room warm. Close the curtains in the early evening. 
Use hea ters and air conditioners only when you are in the room and be sure to keep the room's doors and curtains 
closed as this helps to retain the heat. Whenever possible and convenient, use an extra pullover or a blanket instead 
of a heater. 
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CDI (Below) 
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CDI (Above) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The .=age hou,e/-okl .. Cope T""", uoed 92 5 KwH of electric"", I. ot month. 
Your I>ousetdd used 9&1 .000 Kw~ of eloctrei!j last march . 
• • t , 
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ND (Below) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The average household in your neighbourhood used 1630.752 Kwh of electricity last month. 
Your household used 1628.000 KwH of electricity last month. 
Your household consumed less than the average. 
TIps that may help you to use less electriCity: 
Use less hot water . If you can, lake a shower rather than a bath Use as lillie hot water as possible whelhe. 
showering or bathing. Slack your dishes and wash Ulelll in one large load , rather than washing many smaller loads. If 
you go away for the weekend, switch your geyser off. The recommended temperature to set your geyse r's thermostat 
to is 55°C Check what your the rmo:'l tat i:'l :'let to. Please a:'lk a profe:'l :'l lonal for help if you am not sure how to do thi:'l 
Usc your big appliances le ss often. Hang up washing to dryas tumble dryers use a very large amount of electricity. 
Use stove plates and ovens for only as long as required to cook your food . Cook on as Iowa heat a possible. It is 
cheaper to boil wate r in a kettle than on a stove _ Once water i:'l bolling , only a low heat i:'l mquired on a stove to keep it 
boiling . Boil only the water you need 
Conserv e Heat: Closing the curtains helps greatly in keeping a room warm . Close the curtains in the early evening. 
U:'le heatem ann air conditicmern only when you are in the room and be :'lure to keep the room':'l doom and curtain:'l 
closed as this helps to retain the heat Whenever possible and convenient, use an extra pulb ver or a blanket instead 
of a heater . 
"' ... - ."""" wo , _~ .... , -' .... .. ... . I' '''' ' '''''' '''' 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
102 
 
ND (Above) 
 
 
 
 
  
The average household in your neighbourhood used 749.087 Kwh of electricity last month. 
Your household used 1012.000 KwH of electricity last month. 
Your household consumed more than the average. 
Tips that may help you to use less electricity: 
Use less hoi waler. If you Gan . take a :;hnwer rather than a hmh. U:;e a:; little hot waler a:; po:;:; ihle whether 
showering or bathing. Slad\. your dishes and wasl them in one large load, rather than washing many smaller loads. II 
you go away for the weekend. switch your geyser off. The recommended temperature to set your geysers them10stat 
to is 55°C. Check what your thermostat is set to . Please ask a professional for help if you are not sure how to do this. 
Use your big appliances less often. Hang up washing to dryas tumble dryers use a very large amount of electricity. 
Use stove plales and ovens for only as long as required to cook your food. Cook on as low a heat a possible. It IS 
cheaper to boil water in a kelUe than on a stove . Once water is boil ing, only a low heal is required on a stove to keep il 
boling . Boil only the water you need . 
Conserve Heat: Closing the curtains helps greatly in keeping B room warm Close the curtains in the eBrly evening. 
Use heaters and air conditioners only .... 'hen you are in the room and be sure to keep the room's doors and curtains 
d osed a:; thi:; helps 10 retain the herll Whenever possihle :'Ind r..onvenienl ; use rln extm pullover or :'I hl:'lnkel insle:'ld 
of a heater . 
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NDI (Above) 
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Chapter 4 
Analysis and Results. 
 
This chapter presents the results of the analysis outlined in chapter 3. It has two major 
sections. First we will look at whether there was a difference in consumption between the 
control group and the various mailed treatments. In doing this the apparently different 
effect of mailings amongst the various income groups is noted as well as an indication that 
reactions to the mailed treatments may have changed from the sixth mailing. From here we 
move on to an analysis of whether the various mailed treatments differed from each other. 
In particular we are interested to see whether there was any significant difference in 
consumption that could be due to varying social distance or the presence of an injunctive 
norm. 
4.1 Treatment effects for the whole year compared to the control group. 
As discussed in the methodology section, the preferred metric for comparison of 
consumption between the various mailed treatments and control group is that of 
proportional consumption. To recapitulate further: in this section, as in the rest of this 
chapter, there are two measures of proportional consumption that are used. The first is 
average daily consumption during the treatment period as a proportion of consumption 
during the entire pre-treatment period, which will be referred to as "annual proportional 
consumption" . The second is average daily consumption in a treatment-period month as a 
proportion of the average daily consumption in the entire pre-treatment period, which will 
be referred to as "monthly proportional consumption".  
Examining the difference between the mean annual proportional consumption values for 
the various household treatment groups, shown in the histogram below, we find there is a 
significant and large difference in consumption between control group and the mailed 
groups. The difference between the control group and the mailed treatments is significant 
at the 1% level and smaller.  
Examining the consumption of the various mailed treatment groups reveals only one 
difference in consumption that is significant, that is between CD and ND. Although we 
analyse this more in section 4.3, it seems from these figures that, contrary to expectation, 
the more socially distant City Descriptive norm (CD) achieved a lower level of consumption 
than did the Neighbourhood Descriptive norm (ND). The significance of this difference is 
somewhat sensitive to whether one calculates an unweighted average, in which case it is 
significant at the 5% level, or weights suburbs equally (as above), where the t-stat for this 
difference is 1.775, indicating significance at the 10% level.  
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Figure 4.1.1 
 
* Average daily consumption over treatment period as a proportion of average daily consumption in the pre-
treatment period  
A simple OLS cross sectional regression (reported in table 4.1.1) controls for variation 
specific to suburbs in a more conventional regression fashion, (not the equal-weighting 
approach in figure 4.1.1). These regressions confirm that there is a significant difference in 
consumption between the control sample when and all of the treated samples at the overall 
year level. 
Table 4.1.1: Estimated treatment effects compared to the control 
group in terms of the estimated effect upon annual 
average proportional consumption                                 
(full regression results in the appendix) 
 OLS OLS 
(Robust) 
CD -0.4603754 -0.4603754 
 (0.0606044)*** (0.0570777)*** 
CDI -0.4167257 -0.4167257 
 (0.0611908)*** (0.0596710)*** 
ND -0.3500760 -0.3500760 
 (0.0610709)*** (0.0605511)*** 
NDI -0.3946388 -0.3946388 
 (0.0599847)*** (0.0626385)*** 
Standard errors shown in brackets underneath 
coefficient estimates 
 * p<0.1; ** p<0.05;  *** p<0.01 
Figure 4.1.2 below shows the mean annual proportional consumption values for the 5th to 
95th percentiles for each treatment group. The relative percentile distributions suggest that 
much of the difference between the mailed treatment groups and the control group derives 
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from differences observed in the upper percentiles, especially percentiles 60 and above. 
Similarly, the difference between the ND and CD treatment appears to be driven by 
differences in consumption amongst households in the upper half of percentiles. The 
relative distribution of the ND and CD treatments diverges between roughly the 65th and 
85th percentile, with ND showing slightly higher consumption on average in that range.  
 
Figure 4.1.2  
 
*Average daily consumption for the treatment period as a proportion of average daily consumption in the pre-
treatment period  
 
In terms of the variance of the treatment effect over time, the data is somewhat noisy for 
various treatments. Monthly proportional consumption (shown in figure 4.1.2) figures 
differed between treatments through different periods of the year. The period in which 
there seems to have been the clearest effect is during the four months after the initial 
mailing. After this period it seems that the city level treatments become increasingly more 
effective than the neighbourhood level treatments.  Figure 4.1.3 suggests that the 
households receiving the city level treatments achieved lower monthly proportional 
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consumption than the control group for much of the year. In contrast, and unexpectedly, 
the neighbourhood level treatments did not always consume less than the control, for most 
of the July - October period they seem to have consumed either the same or, sometimes, in 
excess of the control.  
Figure 4.1.3 
 
Regression analysis was used to analyse overall treatment effects at the month to month 
level and to take advantage of the panel nature of the data. As discussed in the 
methodology, these regressions attempt to control for various confounds that may be 
present in the data.  
One of the more important potential confounds is that which may exist between social 
distance and the reported difference between a household's consumption and the norm to 
which they are compared. If we expect, as described in the literature review of social norms 
and the methodology chapter, that households will change their consumption in proportion 
to the degree to which their consumption differs from the reported normal consumption, 
then we may have a situation where declining social distance is positively correlated with 
declining differences between household and reported normal consumption and the two 
elements confound each other. As discussed in the methodology section it is for this reason 
that we include a measure of the difference between the household's reported 
consumption and the reported normal consumption, specifically the difference as a 
percentage of the household's own reported consumption. 
Since data for the norms was drawn from the real world, it is plausible that the reported 
difference between household consumption and the norm will on average be greater when 
the norm is a city norm as opposed to a neighbourhood norm since households are likely to 
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be more similar in many respects to other households in the neighbourhood than to other 
households in the city. Figure 4.1.4 below suggests that this was the case mainly for 
households that were reported as being below the norm, with the differences between 
households receiving city norms noticeably greater than that for neighbourhood level norms 
between mailing number 6 and 10. Although somewhat hidden by the line graph's scale, 
there is also a relatively large difference in percentage difference form mailings 1 to 5 
between city and neighbourhood treatment households when they were reported as having 
consumed more than the norm. Given this data it seems that we should control for this 
confound. 
Figure 4.1.4 
 
The regression results in table 4.1.2 reports two model specifications. In one specification 
monthly proportional consumption is modelled as a function of being mailed any treatment, 
while the other specification models monthly proportional consumption as a function of 
treatment-specific variables. Both are run over the analysis sample (control and treated) for 
the entire year. Since the "mailed" variable is "1" if the household was mailed last month 
and "0" if the household was in the control group, the mailed variable is essentially time 
invariant for each household; as such it cannot be estimated by the FE estimator. For the FE 
estimator results it is thus plausible to interpret the estimated relationship between 
cumulative mailings received and consumption as incorporating an effect beyond just the 
average effect of receiving an additional mailing, but as encompassing something of the 
difference between being mailed at all or being in the control group too.  
The regression results in table 4.1.2 indicate two major types of treatment effect. The most 
dominant effect seems to be cumulative in nature. The relationship between additional 
treatment mailings received and consumption relative to the control is significant and  
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Table 4.1.2 Estimated treatment effects compared to the control group amongst all income groups 
 RE RE (robust) FE FE (robust) 
Specific treatments     
L.CD_pdiff_norm_above -0.0016533 -0.0016533 -0.0006902 -0.0006902 
 (3.33)*** (4.59)*** (1.31) (1.85)* 
L.CD_pdiff_norm_below 0.0000001 0.0000001 -0.0000036 -0.0000036 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.73) (1.72)* 
L.CDI_pdiff_norm_above -0.0018652 -0.0018652 -0.0007213 -0.0007213 
 (3.77)*** (4.88)*** (1.37) (1.90)* 
L.CDI_pdiff_norm_below 0.0000133 0.0000133 -0.0000309 -0.0000309 
 (0.41) (0.25) (0.92) (0.48) 
L.ND_pdiff_norm_above 0.0004388 0.0004388 0.0006418 0.0006418 
 (2.14)** (1.01) (3.11)*** (1.50) 
L.ND_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000004 -0.0000004 -0.0000005 -0.0000005 
 (0.20) (0.29) (0.26) (0.38) 
L.NDI_pdiff_norm_above 0.0000250 0.0000250 0.0003552 0.0003552 
 (0.10) (0.05) (1.39) (0.90) 
L.NDI_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000012 -0.0000012 -0.0000015 -0.0000015 
 (0.42) (0.23) (0.51) (0.28) 
L.cumu_mail -0.0178553 -0.0178553 -0.0144496 -0.0144496 
 (12.04)*** (9.84)*** (9.39)*** (7.23)*** 
     
   0.75 0.75   
    0.81 0.81   
    0.83 0.83   
     
Generic Mailing     
L.mailed -0.2142120 -0.2142120   
 (8.31)*** (7.30)***   
L.cumu_mail -0.0138290 -0.0138290 -0.0140950 -0.0140950 
 (9.01)*** (7.00)*** (9.21)*** (7.11)*** 
     
   0.76 0.76   
    0.82 0.82   
    0.83 0.83   
Standard errors shown in brackets underneath coefficient estimates 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05;  *** p<0.01 
negative for all estimators. Put simply, the more treatment mailings a households received 
over the year, the less it would consume relative to the control group. This suggests that 
one of the most important elements of these treatments may have been cumulative.  
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The other result in the regressions in table 4.1.2 is somewhat unexpected. In the sample as a 
whole, it is the City level treatments which seem to have proved the more effective, even 
when controlling for difference between a household's consumption and the value of the 
average reported to it. In particular it is households who received feedback that they had 
consumed more than an average household in the City that responded with a significant 
decline in consumption; households who received feedback that they had consumed less 
than an average city level household did not consume significantly more or less than the 
control group. Neither of the neighbourhood level treatments were associated with 
significantly lower levels of consumption than the control group. Given the indications of 
the prior literature this is somewhat unexpected.  
4.2. Overall treatment effects compared to the control group differ by income. 
So far we have considered effects relative to the control group at the level of the total 
sample. However, the results also seem to have varied with income level. Figure 4.2.1 shows 
the relative results for each treatment among the three major income groups.  
Figure 4.2.1  
 
* Average daily consumption over treatment period as a proportion of average daily consumption in the pre-
treatment period  
From figure 4.2.1 we can see that it is amongst the upper and middle income suburbs where 
the difference between treated and control households appears to have been the greatest 
over the entire year. In both these suburban income groups the difference between each 
treatment and the control is significant at the 1% level. While there appears to be a strong 
treatment effect amongst households in the middle and upper income suburbs there is no 
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significant difference between the various mailed treatments themselves. This suggests, for 
households in the upper and middle income suburbs at least, that the treatment effect is 
something which is associated with an element that is generic to the various treatments 
rather than any of the differences between them. 
Unlike households in the upper and middle income suburbs, mailed households in the lower 
income suburbs did not consume significantly less than the control group. It seems that 
households in this income bracket receiving the neighbourhood level treatments consumed 
more than those receiving the city level treatments. In particular both neighbourhood level 
treatments are associated with significantly higher consumption (at the 5% level) than is the 
case with the CD (City Descriptive only) treatment (but not the CDI treatment). Given the 
close similarity amongst treatments in the other income groups, this variation explains why 
neighbourhood treatments appeared to underperform the city level treatments in the 
overall sample.  
Judging by the significant differences in consumption, portrayed in figure 4.2.1 above, it 
seems clear that there was a significant average treatment effect in terms of the overall 
year period. This treatment effect, for the overall year, was not observed amongst all 
income groups but was only found amongst the middle and upper income groups. 
We now turn to look at the treatment effect at the month level. Here we are able to take 
advantage of the panel nature of this dataset and incorporate much richer data than was 
tractable in the cross sectional analysis of the overall year. This enables us to control for the 
potential confound between social distance and the difference between a household's 
consumption and the value of the reported average discussed in section 4.1. As discussed in 
chapter 3 (section 3.5.1), although Random effects and Fixed Effect estimators are reported 
(both estimated with and without robust clustered standard errors) the Fixed Effect 
estimators with robust standard errors are probably the most appropriate estimators for 
this data. Regressions were run over the whole year as well as the two halves of the year for 
each income group. Analysis for the two periods in the year are reported in addition to the 
whole year since it seems, from roughly month 6, that the variance in consumption of 
various groups seems to change. The change in fieldwork strategy (slight though it was) that 
occurred around this period is another reason that it is sensible to do that. In addition to the 
treatment-specific variables, the regression models also control for the climatic variables 
discussed in chapter 3. 
As we examine the regression results for each income group the identification of specific 
treatment effects becomes a lot less clear. What we observe seems to be an untidy weaving 
of complex relationships that in their aggregate produce the clear results of section 4.1. This 
is most likely a combination of a large degree of natural variance in the consumption data 
and what appears to be a high degree of similarity in effect between the various treatments. 
Overall however, the regressions seem to be consistent with a description of the treatment 
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effect as being significantly cumulative in nature and being strongest amongst the upper 
and middle income suburbs. However the detail is not emphatic in this regard. 
Making use of the month to month data to make comparisons between treatments it seems 
that for the upper income group (table 4.2.1) the CD treatment was the most significant 
treatment influence upon consumption. This is unexpected. Looking regression run on data 
for the overall year obscures another important influence upon consumption which was the 
cumulative effect of receiving any treatments. For the upper income group receiving more 
and more mailings initially lowered consumption, on average, relative to the control group. 
However in the second half of the year it seems that this effect began to go the other way, 
with additional mailings increasing consumption, on average, relative to the control group. 
This pattern implies that, at least upper income households, may tire, after some time, of 
receiving inserts with their electricity bill and begin to act in opposition to them. 
Middle income households were also significantly influenced by the mailed treatments in a 
cumulative fashion when we consider the whole year period. The coefficient of -0.013 upon 
the cumulative mailing repressor indicates that on average, each additional mailing reduced 
consumption below the control group 1.3 percentage points. However as table 4.2.2 
suggests, this effect seems to reverse sometime in the second half of the year. This is much 
like the pattern observed in the upper income households and may suggest similar forces at 
work in the middle income households.  This might have been something that was especially 
influenced by the two city level treatments and the neighbourhood descriptive treatment, 
ND. These three treatments seem to decline in effectiveness from the first to the second 
half of the year amongst middle income households. 
Unlike the other treatments amongst the middle income suburbs, the NDI treatment seems 
to have become a stronger mode ating influence upon consumption in the latter half of the 
year. The reaction of households to this format of being reported as having consumed more 
than the norm was especially strong in the second half of the year. This result suggests that 
the NDI format is the most desirable format of the four treatments for continuous norms-
based consumption reporting, at least amongst middle income households. 
Households in the lower income suburb sample appear to have been subject to two sorts of 
treatment influences: the moderating cumulative effect of receiving any sort of treatment 
and the declining effectiveness of the city level treatments. The significant coefficient on the 
cumulative mailing regressor in table 4.2.3 suggests the familiar cumulative effect. The City 
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Table 4.2.1. Estimated treatment effects compared to the control group amongst Upper income suburbs 
Influence upon Proportional Monthly Consumption 
Specific treatments RE RE (robust) FE FE (robust) FE (robust) FE (robust) 
     Mailings 1-5 Mailings 6 - 11 
L.CD_pdiff_norm_above -0.0022624 -0.0022624 -0.0008931 -0.0008931 -0.0007879 -0.0010019 
 (3.83)*** (4.99)*** (1.38) (1.71)* (0.0012316) (0.0006232) 
L.CD_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000007 -0.0000007 -0.0000046 -0.0000046 0.0001262 -0.0000058 
 (0.15) (0.88) (0.93) (5.00)*** (0.0001707) (0.0000227) 
L.CDI_pdiff_norm_above -0.0020209 -0.0020209 -0.0005681 -0.0005681 -0.0002470 -0.0002413 
 (3.67)*** (5.73)*** (0.95) (1.59) (0.0007166) (0.0004257) 
L.CDI_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000600 -0.0000600 -0.0000839 -0.0000839 -0.0001167 -0.0001203 
 (1.35) (0.70) (1.87)* (0.87) (0.0000867) (0.0001307) 
L.ND_pdiff_norm_above -0.0002791 -0.0002791 0.0003241 0.0003241 -0.0006301 -0.0001075 
 (0.59) (0.79) (0.66) (0.94) (0.0006002) (0.0005142) 
L.ND_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000003 -0.0000003 -0.0000003 -0.0000003 -0.0000130 -0.0000005 
 (0.18) (0.25) (0.15) (0.21) (0.0000138) (0.0000022) 
L.NDI_pdiff_norm_above -0.0003468 -0.0003468 0.0002705 0.0002705 -0.0005407 -0.0003540 
 (0.77) (0.84) (0.59) (0.65) (0.0006388) (0.0004850) 
L.NDI_pdiff_norm_below 0.0000004 0.0000004 0.0000005 0.0000005 -0.0000057 0.0000017 
 (0.16) (0.08) (0.18) (0.09) (0.0000554) (0.0000048) 
L.cumu_mail -0.0100302 -0.0100302 -0.0025020 -0.0025020 -0.0513893 0.0201796 
 (4.86)*** (4.57)*** (1.16) (1.05) (0.0055049)*** (0.007051)*** 
    0.81 0.81     
       
Generic mailing       
       
L.mailed -0.4277227 -0.4277227     
 (12.67)*** (11.60)***     
L.cumu_mail -0.0019171 -0.0019171 -0.0021672 -0.0021672 -0.0510011 0.0206217 
 (0.90) (0.81) (1.02) (0.92) (0.0054775)*** (0.0069725)*** 
    0.81 0.81     
Standard errors shown in brackets underneath coefficient estimates 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05;  *** p<0.01 
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Table 4.2.2. Estimated treatment effects compared to the control group amongst middle income suburbs 
Influence upon Proportional Monthly Consumption 
Specific Treatments RE RE (robust) FE FE (robust) FE (robust) FE (robust) 
     Mailings 1-5 Mailings 6 - 11 
L.CD_pdiff_norm_above -0.0009893 -0.0009893 -0.0001081 -0.0001081 0.0008386 0.0003457 
 (1.05) (1.57) (0.11) (0.18) (0.0007228) (0.0008743) 
L.CD_pdiff_norm_below 0.0000062 0.0000062 0.0000047 0.0000047 0.0000002 0.0000067 
 (0.49) (1.03) (0.38) (0.74) (0.0000062) (0.0000013)*** 
L.CDI_pdiff_norm_above -0.0020137 -0.0020137 -0.0007177 -0.0007177 -0.0008846 -0.0000264 
 (1.87)* (2.32)** (0.64) (0.89) (0.0009301) (0.0017331) 
L.CDI_pdiff_norm_below 0.0000937 0.0000937 0.0000540 0.0000540 -0.0012571 0.0000235 
 (1.74)* (2.47)** (0.98) (0.90) (0.0003296)*** (0.0000723) 
L.ND_pdiff_norm_above -0.0014228 -0.0014228 -0.0008124 -0.0008124 -0.0018099 -0.0011725 
 (1.89)* (2.17)** (1.06) (1.20) (0.0010924)* (0.0008868) 
L.ND_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000021 -0.0000021 -0.0000128 -0.0000128 0.0000034 -0.0001160 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.57) (0.68) (0.0000413) (0.0000772) 
L.NDI_pdiff_norm_above -0.0023537 -0.0023537 -0.0014233 -0.0014233 -0.0015025 -0.0013936 
 (3.04)*** (4.34)*** (1.79)* (2.46)** (0.0012281) (0.0007025)** 
L.NDI_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000368 -0.0000368 -0.0000453 -0.0000453 0.0000422 -0.0003024 
 (1.64) (1.28) (2.02)** (1.42) (0.0000112)*** (0.0001076)*** 
L.cumu_mail -0.0165133 -0.0165133 -0.0131154 -0.0131154 0.0060221 0.0170021 
 (6.16)*** (5.21)*** (4.72)*** (3.68)*** (0.0092222) (0.0097211)* 
       
    0.82 0.82     
       
Generic mailing       
       
L.mailed -0.1838915 -0.1838915     
 (4.10)*** (3.51)***     
L.cumu_mail -0.0133031 -0.0133031 -0.0132245 -0.0132245 0.0052152 0.0127483 
 (4.79)*** (3.74)*** (4.78)*** (3.71)*** (0.0091355) (0.0097458) 
       
    0.82 0.82     
Standard errors shown in brackets underneath coefficient estimates 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05;  *** p<0.01 
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Table 4.2.3 . Estimated treatment effects compared to the control group amongst lower income suburbs 
Influence upon Proportional Monthly Consumption 
Specific Treatments RE RE (robust) FE FE (robust) FE (robust) FE (robust) 
     Mailings 1-5 Mailings 6 - 11 
L.CD_pdiff_norm_above 0.0007860 0.0007860 0.0009797 0.0009797 -0.0023178 0.0049517 
 (0.49) (0.85) (0.61) (1.15) (0.0007938)*** (0.0015662)*** 
L.CD_pdiff_norm_below 0.0000218 0.0000218 -0.0000264 -0.0000264 0.0000332 -0.0000448 
 (0.38) (0.51) (0.46) (0.87) (0.0001128) (0.0000324) 
L.CDI_pdiff_norm_above 0.0004186 0.0004186 0.0010823 0.0010823 -0.0000022 0.0029269 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.65) (0.73) (0.0027416) (0.0015426)* 
L.CDI_pdiff_norm_below 0.0000083 0.0000083 -0.0000950 -0.0000950 -0.0000863 -0.0001264 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.97) (1.21) (0.0000425)** (0.0001765) 
L.ND_pdiff_norm_above 0.0006798 0.0006798 0.0007589 0.0007589 0.0014679 0.0006797 
 (2.41)** (1.26) (2.69)*** (1.41) (0.0016712) (0.0004873) 
L.ND_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000203 -0.0000203 -0.0000509 -0.0000509 0.0000158 -0.0000095 
 (0.44) (0.34) (1.10) (0.82) (0.0000686) (0.0000804) 
L.NDI_pdiff_norm_above 0.0004872 0.0004872 0.0005923 0.0005923 -0.0027034 0.0007274 
 (1.27) (0.88) (1.54) (1.17) (0.0020851) (0.0007746) 
L.NDI_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000234 -0.0000234 -0.0000315 -0.0000315 0.0000152 0.0000413 
 (0.81) (0.49) (1.07) (0.62) (0.0000523) (0.0000710) 
L.cumu_mail -0.0259588 -0.0259588 -0.0284823 -0.0284823 0.0012247 0.0067839 
 (6.90)*** (5.72)*** (7.32)*** (5.70)*** (0.0140139) (0.0154729) 
       
    0.81 0.81     
       
Generic mailing       
       
L.mailed 0.1740466 0.1740466     
 (2.48)** (2.24)**     
L.cumu_mail -0.0281271 -0.0281271 -0.0282909 -0.0282909 0.0001791 0.0069812 
 (7.24)*** (5.67)*** (7.31)*** (5.69)*** (0.0138224) (0.0154877) 
       
    0.81 0.81     
Standard errors shown in brackets underneath coefficient estimates 
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* p<0.1; ** p<0.05;  *** p<0.01  
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level treatments seem to have initially been a moderating influence upon consumption, 
particularly for households above the norm in the CD format and below the norm in the CDI 
format. However, in the second half of the year the influence of the city level treatments 
seems to have reversed from one of moderating consumption to one that promoted 
consumption, particularly if households were reported as having consumed more than 
average. 
Within each income group we see hints of the busy complexity by which reference to social 
norms may likely influence consumption. However, when we step back we observe a 
pattern that suggests that there was a lot more similarity than difference between the 
various treatments over most of the treatment period. The most important treatment effect 
seems to have been cumulative in nature and generic to all treatments. Nevertheless we do 
see hints that the neighbourhood level treatments began to perform a stronger moderating 
role than the city level treatments in the latter months of the treatment period. 
4.3.Specific differences in effects between mailed treatments 
One of the questions this project originally sought to address was whether there would be a 
relatively different effect between varying the social distance between the household and 
the norm it was compared to and if the presence of an injunctive norm would reduce the 
tendency of those households reported as having consumed less than the norm to raise 
their consumption toward the norm. In these final two sections we examine those 
questions. 
To analyse both questions we make use of the following framework. As discussed in chapter 
3 we are assuming that if we report to households how their consumption compares to a 
average household's consumption then their consumption in the following month will be a 
function of the difference between their own consumption and the average household's in 
the following fashion.  
                                      
Where        indicates the household's consumption,      indicates the average 
household's consumption and     is a vector of other consumption-influencing variables, 
such as the climatic variables discussed in chapter 3. This implies that if households tend 
towards the norm, that     .  
When we introduce varying social distance and the varying presence of an injunctive norm 
we assume that the tendency for household's to move their own consumption towards the 
norm may be augmented or curtailed by the introduction of a socially closer average and/or 
the introduction of an injunctive norm in the following fashion. 
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With       a dummy indicating whether the household was mailed an injunctive norm or 
not,        a dummy indicating whether the household was mailed a neighbourhood level 
average (1) or a city level average (0) and            an interaction of those two terms. For 
the sake of space only the results of the Fixed Effect regressions reported (in table 4.3) since 
the FE estimator is the most appropriate for this data. As before, these regressions are run 
over the whole year's data as well as over the two halves of the year in order to take 
account if potentially different variation in treatment effect. 
Table 4.3 presents no evidence of any consistently significant difference between 
treatments along the vectors of social distance or the presence of injunctive norms. The 
pattern of influence of these treatment elements seems inconsistent across time and 
income groups and is not significant at the overall year level for any income group.  
Neighbourhood and injunctive treatments seem to have been somewhat significant 
influences upon consumption in the first half of the year and only amongst the middle and 
lower income groups. It seems that these specific influences may have worn off as the year 
went on, since they are no longer significant in the second half of the year for households in 
these income groups.  
When the relationship to consumption was significant, both injunctive norms and socially 
closer averages appear to have moderated consumption, which is the expected direction of 
influence. In the case of varying social distance this provides a weak indication that when 
social distance significantly influences the effect a social norm has upon consumption it is 
more influential if the norm is socially closer to the household than if it is not. Of course, this 
data gives only the weakest indication of this (one half of the year for one demographic 
group). Whether this social distance effect is one that is just very small or is hidden by the 
large variance in the sample is difficult to tell. However the indication for future research in 
this vein is clear: a larger sample will be needed to analyse the effect of varying social 
distance. 
It is worth considering how the injunctive norm behaved when it did appear to significantly 
influence consumption. The fact that    <0 provides some evidence that the injunctive norm 
is behaving in the expected fashion. Having accounted for the direct influence of        
      by itself, through   , a    <0 is consistent with the theory that the presence of an 
injunctive norm is likely to work against the tendency for households that consumed below 
the reported average to raise their consumption. At the same time a    <0 is also consistent 
with the theory that injunctive norms will not alter the direction of the household's change 
in consumption as it alters its consumption back towards the norm it was reported as having 
consumed more than. The overriding conclusion from this data though is that the injunctive 
norm did not significantly influence household consumption generally. This is either because 
it just simply does not normally act in this way, or (more likely) that the effect is too small to 
be detected in a sample this size given the large amount of natural variation in 
consumption. 
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Table  4.3. Specific differences between mailed treatments by income group - (FE, robust standard errors).  
Influence upon Proportional Monthly Consumption 
Whole year  All income Upper income Middle income Lower income 
   -0.0007213 -0.0003458 -0.0006839 -0.0008805 
 (0.0001177)*** (0.0001682)** (0.0002275)*** (0.0001956)*** 
   0.0001091 -0.0000125 0.0003626 -0.0004675 
 (0.0001593) (0.0002305) (0.0002767) (0.0003158) 
   -0.0002542 -0.0003421 -0.0003331 -0.0001434 
 (0.0001747) (0.0003262) (0.0003002) (0.0002895) 
    0.0000486 0.0003218 -0.0001548 -0.0000294 
 (0.0002317) (0.0003787) (0.0003967) (0.0004685) 
Mailings 1-5 All income Upper income Middle income Lower income 
   -0.0001201 -0.0002655 0.0004901 0.0000392 
 (0.0001962) (0.0002073) (0.0004580) (0.0003434) 
   -0.0002216 0.0001459 -0.0004438 -0.0007852 
 (0.0002453) (0.0003449) (0.0005053) (0.0004319)* 
   -0.0003956 0.0004359 -0.0009603 -0.0006609 
 (0.0002813) (0.0004020) (0.0005731)* (0.0004710) 
    0.0005834 -0.0004652 0.0012244 0.0010231 
 (0.0003426)* (0.0005143) (0.0006480)* (0.0006219) 
Mailings 6-11 All income Upper income Middle income Lower income 
   -0.0004158 -0.0001872 -0.0004637 -0.0003243 
 (0.0001654)** (0.0002501) (0.0003030) (0.0002760) 
   0.0000150 0.0000859 0.0002187 -0.0007428 
 (0.0002305) (0.0003336) (0.0003727) (0.0005198) 
   -0.0001526 -0.0005702 -0.0000718 0.0000222 
 (0.0002454) (0.0005024) (0.0004256) (0.0003733) 
    0.0000038 0.0006461 -0.0002815 -0.0002689 
 (0.0003349) (0.0005709) (0.0005662) (0.0007301) 
Standard errors shown in brackets underneath coefficient estimates 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
121 
 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05;  *** p<0.01   
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The interaction between the injunctive norm and the social distance regressor appears to 
have only mattered significantly once, for middle income households in the first half of the 
year. In that instance the interaction appears to have had the result of raising consumption 
above what it would normally have been. Why this was the case is difficult to say. We would 
expect households to react more strongly to injunctive feedback from people more like 
them. However, perhaps the nature of those others in the community plays some role in 
how injunctive comparisons with them are received. The middle income suburbs in Cape 
Town are mostly in the Cape-flats area. The Cape flats is an area that has a long standing 
and grave problem with inter-personal crime, specifically gangs. It could be that households 
in this area, when they react to injunctive comparisons to their neighbours, may be more 
likely to project this anti-social description upon the referenced neighbour and react anti-
socially themselves. Again, it is difficult to verify this given our data and the inconsistency of 
the response over time. 
The strongest and most significant influence upon consumption amongst the treatments 
over the whole year appears to have been the difference between the household's 
consumption and the reported norm (              , captured in   . The regression 
results for the overall year find that      for all income groups. This implies that, as 
expected, households will tend to move their consumption towards the reported norm; 
raising it if they are below and reducing it if they are above.  
This is an interesting result since it strongly suggests that households do respond to being 
compared to averages. It implies that moderations in consumption are more likely to be 
induced by reporting to households that they consumed more than the average, that that 
they consumed less than the average. 
The general pattern of the regression results suggest that this tendency is something that is 
found in all households. The effect is mainly only observable when considering it over the 
whole year. This may be a function of a larger sample size that is achieved if one considers 
the whole year's worth of data rather than just one half of it. 
Since this is an element that is common to all of the treatments this is also consistent with 
the analysis that compared the mailed treatments to the control group. There the most 
important treatment factor seemed to be the fact that one was merely mailed one of the 
treatments - it did not matter very much which one.  
4.4. Conclusion. 
Households in eleven different Cape Town suburbs, spanning the major income brackets 
found in the city, were randomly allocated to receive one of four different inserts with their 
electricity bill for 2010. Each of these treatments compared the household's consumption to 
that of an average household for the same period. These treatments made use of two 
different degrees of social distance (city vs. neighbourhood) with half including injunctive 
norms and half not. 
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Analysis of the consumption of the households in the various treatments did not reveal any 
significant difference between treatments in terms of the different degrees of social 
distance, nor did injunctive norms seem to exert any detectable influence upon 
consumption.  
The element that did emerge as a significant influence upon consumption for households in 
the various treatments was the difference in consumption between the household and the 
average reported to it. Specifically, households were found to significantly adjust their 
consumption towards the reported norm. This is consistent with theory and prior work on 
the topic of social norms generally. It is interesting that this element alone seemed to 
influence consumption rather than whether the average was for the neighbourhood or the 
city. 
Assessing the difference in consumption between mailed households and households in the 
control was hampered by the fact that households were not allocated to the control group 
in the same, random, fashion as households were allocated to the various mailed 
treatments. Nevertheless some feasible analysis was possible considering that the control 
households were all drawn from the same suburbs, that consumption was measured in a 
proportional fashion and that various other covariates such as suburb and climate were 
controlled for. 
Comparisons between the mailed treatments and the control group reveal that there seems 
to have been a difference in consumption between the mailed and control households. This 
difference appears to mainly derive from some element that is generic to the mailed 
treatments and to be exerted in a cumulative fashion. There are two elements that could be 
said to be generic to all mailed treatments: the tips and the fact that each household is 
being compared to an average. It is impossible to identify one of these elements as the 
source of influence to the exclusion of the other in comparisons to the control group. Given 
the significance of the difference between the household's consumption and the average 
reported to it amongst mailed households, it is almost certainly a significant factor 
accounting for differences in proportional consumption of household in the control and 
mailed groups. 
Indications from the second half of the year that city level treatments may have been 
declining in effectiveness while neighbourhood level treatments were increasing in 
effectiveness are intriguing. However, analysis of that question is beyond the scope of this 
project and perhaps beyond the ability of this data to answer.  
The most important conclusion that this analysis argues for is the fact that norms appear to 
be effective influences upon consumption.  
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Appendix: Chapter 4. 
Fixed Effects regressions amongst all income groups for the whole year: Influence upon Annual proportional 
consumption 
 FE FE (Robust) 
CD -0.4603754 -0.4603754 
 (0.0606044)*** (0.0570777)*** 
CDI -0.4167257 -0.4167257 
 (0.0611908)*** (0.0596710)*** 
ND -0.3500760 -0.3500760 
 (0.0610709)*** (0.0605511)*** 
NDI -0.3946388 -0.3946388 
 (0.0599847)*** (0.0626385)*** 
treated_da_prop_hdd 0.0148949 0.0148949 
 (0.0183528) (0.0082104)* 
treated_da_prop_cdd 0.2485411 0.2485411 
 (0.7668215) (0.6522683) 
treated_da_prop_rain -0.0659630 -0.0659630 
 (0.0768890) (0.0336942)* 
treated_da_prop_min 6.3695910 6.3695910 
 (6.9301890) (5.3690677) 
Athlone -0.5585746 -0.5585746 
 (0.1160115)*** (0.1386295)*** 
Bonthewul -0.2313747 -0.2313747 
 (0.1098185)** (0.1273887)* 
Constantia -1.3369619 -1.3369619 
 (0.0926212)*** (0.0906847)*** 
Durbanville -1.1643265 -1.1643265 
 (0.0936875)*** (0.0980095)*** 
Grassy_Park -0.6036786 -0.6036786 
 (0.1016696)*** (0.1094482)*** 
Heideveld -0.0930520 -0.0930520 
 (0.1472195) (0.1801948) 
Langa 0.1603058 0.1603058 
 (0.1436152) (0.1715265) 
Mannenberg -0.1751117 -0.1751117 
 (0.1268271) (0.1430885) 
Pinelands -0.5906657 -0.5906657 
 (0.1314260)*** (0.1349402)*** 
Salt_River -0.4705786 -0.4705786 
 (0.1259327)*** (0.1378155)*** 
Tamboerskloof -0.1771541 -0.1771541 
 (0.1192532) (0.1303329) 
_cons -3.5927228 -3.5927228 
 (5.5116770) (4.2430277) 
R
2
 0.07 0.07 
N 7,586 7,586 
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Estimated treatment effects compared to the control group amongst all income groups. 
Proportional monthly 
consumption 
RE RE (Robust) FE FE (Robust) 
L.CD_pdiff_norm_above -0.0016533 -0.0016533 -0.0006902 -0.0006902 
 (0.0004970)*** (0.0003599)*** (0.0005259) (0.0003730)* 
L.CD_pdiff_norm_below 0.0000001 0.0000001 -0.0000036 -0.0000036 
 (0.0000047) (0.0000017) (0.0000050) (0.0000021)* 
L.CDI_pdiff_norm_above -0.0018652 -0.0018652 -0.0007213 -0.0007213 
 (0.0004945)*** (0.0003822)*** (0.0005256) (0.0003789)* 
L.CDI_pdiff_norm_below 0.0000133 0.0000133 -0.0000309 -0.0000309 
 (0.0000328) (0.0000534) (0.0000334) (0.0000647) 
L.ND_pdiff_norm_above 0.0004388 0.0004388 0.0006418 0.0006418 
 (0.0002052)** (0.0004336) (0.0002063)*** (0.0004291) 
L.ND_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000004 -0.0000004 -0.0000005 -0.0000005 
 (0.0000021) (0.0000014) (0.0000021) (0.0000015) 
L.NDI_pdiff_norm_above 0.0000250 0.0000250 0.0003552 0.0003552 
 (0.0002535) (0.0004622) (0.0002559) (0.0003937) 
L.NDI_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000012 -0.0000012 -0.0000015 -0.0000015 
 (0.0000029) (0.0000052) (0.0000029) (0.0000053) 
L.cumu_mail -0.0178553 -0.0178553 -0.0144496 -0.0144496 
 (0.0014828)*** (0.0018150)*** (0.0015383)*** (0.0019985)*** 
prop_precdd_da 0.0126592 0.0126592 0.0152851 0.0152851 
 (0.0024852)*** (0.0026176)*** (0.0025040)*** (0.0027057)*** 
prop_prehdd_da 0.0051427 0.0051427 0.0053493 0.0053493 
 (0.0009179)*** (0.0011665)*** (0.0009224)*** (0.0011698)*** 
prop_premin_da -1.5308173 -1.5308173 -1.5714521 -1.5714521 
 (0.0292724)*** (0.0364089)*** (0.0294771)*** (0.0374904)*** 
prop_prerain_da -0.0185216 -0.0185216 -0.0180758 -0.0180758 
 (0.0038070)*** (0.0046238)*** (0.0038129)*** (0.0045583)*** 
Athlone -0.6771813 -0.6771813   
 (0.0518695)*** (0.0611158)***   
Bonthewul -0.2429845 -0.2429845   
 (0.0639940)*** (0.0784372)***   
Constantia -1.1035623 -1.1035623   
 (0.0553768)*** (0.0564456)***   
Durbanville -0.9320356 -0.9320356   
 (0.0450054)*** (0.0524888)***   
Grassy_Park -0.6021489 -0.6021489   
 (0.0539989)*** (0.0632107)***   
Heideveld -0.4014742 -0.4014742   
 (0.0715722)*** (0.0803843)***   
Langa -0.1328928 -0.1328928   
 (0.0706041)* (0.0856409)   
Mannenberg -0.3224151 -0.3224151   
 (0.0604190)*** (0.0732561)***   
Pinelands -0.6857512 -0.6857512   
 (0.0558561)*** (0.0635942)***   
Salt_River -0.5299525 -0.5299525   
 (0.0577589)*** (0.0699582)***   
Tamboerskloof -0.2522311 -0.2522311   
 (0.0557898)*** (0.0678436)***   
_cons 3.1817001 3.1817001 2.5391980 2.5391980 
 (0.0454512)*** (0.0606398)*** (0.0246024)*** (0.0321652)*** 
Chi2 7,043.59 3,721.72   
F   486.92 254.37 
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00. 
R2 . . 0.10 0.10 
R2_O 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.02 
R2_B 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.01 
R2_W 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Rho 0.76 0.76 0.80 0.80 
θ_50 0.81 0.81   
N 67,534 67,534 67,534 67,534 
N_Clusters . 7,575 . 7,575 
 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Estimated treatment effects compared to the control group amongst all income groups. 
Proportional monthly 
consumption 
RE RE (Robust) FE FE (Robust) 
L.mailed -0.2142120 -0.2142120   
 (0.0257760)*** (0.0293448)***   
L.cumu_mail -0.0138290 -0.0138290 -0.0140950 -0.0140950 
 (0.0015345)*** (0.0019748)*** (0.0015309)*** (0.0019814)*** 
prop_precdd_da 0.0157378 0.0157378 0.0152936 0.0152936 
 (0.0025113)*** (0.0027076)*** (0.0025042)*** (0.0027053)*** 
prop_prehdd_da 0.0050194 0.0050194 0.0053652 0.0053652 
 (0.0009169)*** (0.0011587)*** (0.0009224)*** (0.0011711)*** 
prop_premin_da -1.5634955 -1.5634955 -1.5723880 -1.5723880 
 (0.0295143)*** (0.0374749)*** (0.0294667)*** (0.0374860)*** 
prop_prerain_da -0.0190173 -0.0190173 -0.0181527 -0.0181527 
 (0.0038014)*** (0.0046410)*** (0.0038126)*** (0.0045603)*** 
Athlone -0.7229919 -0.7229919   
 (0.0525622)*** (0.0614346)***   
Bonthewul -0.2470183 -0.2470183   
 (0.0645343)*** (0.0786556)***   
Constantia -1.1162290 -1.1162290   
 (0.0556239)*** (0.0567772)***   
Durbanville -1.0297873 -1.0297873   
 (0.0467672)*** (0.0537226)***   
Grassy_Park -0.6014925 -0.6014925   
 (0.0544487)*** (0.0635175)***   
Heideveld -0.4181269 -0.4181269   
 (0.0721934)*** (0.0809271)***   
Langa -0.1434983 -0.1434983   
 (0.0712065)** (0.0860030)*   
Mannenberg -0.3378661 -0.3378661   
 (0.0609513)*** (0.0736847)***   
Pinelands -0.6857022 -0.6857022   
 (0.0563175)*** (0.0639346)***   
Salt_River -0.5931134 -0.5931134   
 (0.0587302)*** (0.0710141)***   
Tamboerskloof -0.3065262 -0.3065262   
 (0.0566214)*** (0.0675173)***   
_cons 3.3480668 3.3480668 2.5383583 2.5383583 
 (0.0500257)*** (0.0661902)*** (0.0245265)*** (0.0321000)*** 
Chi2 7,088.78 3,731.16   
F   1,262.45 659.49 
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 . . 0.10 0.10 
R2_O 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.01 
R2_B 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.01 
R2_W 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Rho 0.76 0.76 0.80 0.80 
θ_50 0.82 0.82   
N 67,534 67,534 67,534 67,534 
N_Clusters . 7,575 . 7,575 
 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Estimated treatment effects compared to the control group amongst upper income suburbs 
Proportional monthly 
consumption 
RE RE (Robust) FE FE (Robust) FE (Robust) 
mailings 1-5 
FE (Robust) 
mailings 6-11 
L.CD_pdiff_norm_above -0.0022624 -0.0022624 -0.0008931 -0.0008931 -0.0007879 -0.0010019 
 (0.0005907)*** (0.0004532)*** (0.0006486) (0.0005228)* (0.0012316) (0.0006232) 
L.CD_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000007 -0.0000007 -0.0000046 -0.0000046 0.0001262 -0.0000058 
 (0.0000046) (0.0000008) (0.0000049) (0.0000009)*** (0.0001707) (0.0000227) 
L.CDI_pdiff_norm_above -0.0020209 -0.0020209 -0.0005681 -0.0005681 -0.0002470 -0.0002413 
 (0.0005506)*** (0.0003528)*** (0.0005999) (0.0003573) (0.0007166) (0.0004257) 
L.CDI_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000600 -0.0000600 -0.0000839 -0.0000839 -0.0001167 -0.0001203 
 (0.0000445) (0.0000860) (0.0000449)* (0.0000961) (0.0000867) (0.0001307) 
L.ND_pdiff_norm_above -0.0002791 -0.0002791 0.0003241 0.0003241 -0.0006301 -0.0001075 
 (0.0004758) (0.0003546) (0.0004879) (0.0003444) (0.0006002) (0.0005142) 
L.ND_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000003 -0.0000003 -0.0000003 -0.0000003 -0.0000130 -0.0000005 
 (0.0000019) (0.0000014) (0.0000019) (0.0000014) (0.0000138) (0.0000022) 
L.NDI_pdiff_norm_above -0.0003468 -0.0003468 0.0002705 0.0002705 -0.0005407 -0.0003540 
 (0.0004500) (0.0004135) (0.0004609) (0.0004146) (0.0006388) (0.0004850) 
L.NDI_pdiff_norm_below 0.0000004 0.0000004 0.0000005 0.0000005 -0.0000057 0.0000017 
 (0.0000026) (0.0000052) (0.0000026) (0.0000052) (0.0000554) (0.0000048) 
L.cumu_mail -0.0100302 -0.0100302 -0.0025020 -0.0025020 -0.0513893 0.0201796 
 (0.0020647)*** (0.0021929)*** (0.0021519) (0.0023882) (0.0055049)*** (0.0070510)*** 
prop_precdd_da 0.0149075 0.0149075 0.0198539 0.0198539 0.0230263 -0.2719996 
 (0.0029808)*** (0.0031095)*** (0.0029992)*** (0.0031801)*** (0.0029208)*** (0.0145685)*** 
prop_prehdd_da 0.0047694 0.0047694 0.0048200 0.0048200 0.0075588 0.0029340 
 (0.0010211)*** (0.0013059)*** (0.0010270)*** (0.0012824)*** (0.0026462)*** (0.0014075)** 
prop_premin_da -1.2993180 -1.2993180 -1.3552365 -1.3552365 -1.3095370 -0.4598688 
 (0.0357028)*** (0.0451237)*** (0.0358932)*** (0.0462127)*** (0.0720607)*** (0.0632938)*** 
prop_prerain_da -0.0090408 -0.0090408 -0.0085695 -0.0085695 -0.0047403 0.0475790 
 (0.0044348)** (0.0055237) (0.0044520)* (0.0053847) (0.0075723) (0.0127698)*** 
Constantia -0.8667151 -0.8667151     
 (0.0495228)*** (0.0557263)***     
Durbanville -0.6737763 -0.6737763     
 (0.0401451)*** (0.0506204)***     
Pinelands -0.4396939 -0.4396939     
 (0.0497141)*** (0.0630584)***     
_cons 2.7025315 2.7025315 2.1303159 2.1303159 2.1256906 1.3409126 
 (0.0462329)*** (0.0674031)*** (0.0303199)*** (0.0392344)*** (0.0660903)*** (0.0521599)*** 
Chi2 3,028.81 1,631.52     
F   202.28 114.87 42.30 96.54 
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 . . 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.15 
R2_O 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 
R2_B 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 
R2_W 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.15 
Rho 0.74 0.74 0.79 0.79 0.85 0.79 
θ_50 0.81 0.81     
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N 33,422 33,422 33,422 33,422 15,118 18,304 
N_Clusters . 3,621 . 3,621 3,603 3,588 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Estimated treatment effects compared to the control group amongst upper income suburbs 
Proportional monthly 
consumption 
RE RE (Robust) FE FE (Robust) FE (Robust) 
mailings 1-5 
FE (Robust) 
mailings 6-11 
L.mailed -0.4277227 -0.4277227     
 (0.0337651)*** (0.0368638)***     
L.cumu_mail -0.0019171 -0.0019171 -0.0021672 -0.0021672 -0.0510011 0.0206217 
 (0.0021347) (0.0023536) (0.0021326) (0.0023591) (0.0054775)*** (0.0069725)*** 
prop_precdd_da 0.0200855 0.0200855 0.0198609 0.0198609 0.0229607 -0.2717924 
 (0.0030038)*** (0.0031842)*** (0.0029990)*** (0.0031794)*** (0.0029034)*** (0.0145442)*** 
prop_prehdd_da 0.0045458 0.0045458 0.0048320 0.0048320 0.0075784 0.0029270 
 (0.0010185)*** (0.0012878)*** (0.0010267)*** (0.0012829)*** (0.0026464)*** (0.0014072)** 
prop_premin_da -1.3522176 -1.3522176 -1.3547150 -1.3547150 -1.3090147 -0.4610135 
 (0.0358793)*** (0.0461924)*** (0.0358666)*** (0.0461465)*** (0.0719617)*** (0.0632585)*** 
prop_prerain_da -0.0100475 -0.0100475 -0.0086151 -0.0086151 -0.0048201 0.0477620 
 (0.0044227)** (0.0055648)* (0.0044503)* (0.0053825) (0.0075661) (0.0127521)*** 
Constantia -0.7647010 -0.7647010     
 (0.0503748)*** (0.0544563)***     
Durbanville -0.7559277 -0.7559277     
 (0.0407431)*** (0.0501872)***     
Pinelands -0.3307456 -0.3307456     
 (0.0506671)*** (0.0620568)***     
oL.mailed   0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 
   (0.0000000) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) 
o.Constantia   0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 
   (0.0000000) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) 
o.Durbanville   0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 
   (0.0000000) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) 
o.Pinelands   0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 
   (0.0000000) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) 
_cons 2.9139515 2.9139515 2.1264414 2.1264414 2.1213535 1.3366799 
 (0.0494326)*** (0.0720858)*** (0.0301223)*** (0.0390111)*** (0.0659265)*** (0.0519655)*** 
Chi2 3,171.18 1,672.50   . . 
F   524.39 292.45   
P 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 . . 
R2 . . 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.15 
R2_O 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 
R2_B 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 
R2_W 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.15 
Rho 0.74 0.74 0.79 0.79 0.85 0.79 
θ_50 0.81 0.81   . . 
N 33,422 33,422 33,422 33,422 15,118 18,304 
N_Clust . 3,621 . 3,621 3,603 3,588 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Estimated treatment effects compared to the control group amongst middle income suburbs 
Proportional monthly 
consumption 
RE RE (Robust) FE FE (Robust) FE (Robust) 
mailings 1-5 
FE (Robust) 
mailings 6-11 
L.CD_pdiff_norm_above -0.0009893 -0.0009893 -0.0001081 -0.0001081 0.0008386 0.0003457 
 (0.0009410) (0.0006284) (0.0009598) (0.0006161) (0.0007228) (0.0008743) 
L.CD_pdiff_norm_below 0.0000062 0.0000062 0.0000047 0.0000047 0.0000002 0.0000067 
 (0.0000125) (0.0000060) (0.0000125) (0.0000063) (0.0000062) (0.0000013)*** 
L.CDI_pdiff_norm_above -0.0020137 -0.0020137 -0.0007177 -0.0007177 -0.0008846 -0.0000264 
 (0.0010787)* (0.0008670)** (0.0011155) (0.0008035) (0.0009301) (0.0017331) 
L.CDI_pdiff_norm_below 0.0000937 0.0000937 0.0000540 0.0000540 -0.0012571 0.0000235 
 (0.0000540)* (0.0000379)** (0.0000552) (0.0000601) (0.0003296)*** (0.0000723) 
L.ND_pdiff_norm_above -0.0014228 -0.0014228 -0.0008124 -0.0008124 -0.0018099 -0.0011725 
 (0.0007516)* (0.0006545)** (0.0007671) (0.0006772) (0.0010924)* (0.0008868) 
L.ND_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000021 -0.0000021 -0.0000128 -0.0000128 0.0000034 -0.0001160 
 (0.0000220) (0.0000177) (0.0000223) (0.0000187) (0.0000413) (0.0000772) 
L.NDI_pdiff_norm_above -0.0023537 -0.0023537 -0.0014233 -0.0014233 -0.0015025 -0.0013936 
 (0.0007754)*** (0.0005422)*** (0.0007949)* (0.0005779)** (0.0012281) (0.0007025)** 
L.NDI_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000368 -0.0000368 -0.0000453 -0.0000453 0.0000422 -0.0003024 
 (0.0000224) (0.0000288) (0.0000224)** (0.0000318) (0.0000112)*** (0.0001076)*** 
L.cumu_mail -0.0165133 -0.0165133 -0.0131154 -0.0131154 0.0060221 0.0170021 
 (0.0026807)*** (0.0031683)*** (0.0027814)*** (0.0035639)*** (0.0092222) (0.0097211)* 
prop_precdd_da 0.0138803 0.0138803 0.0164152 0.0164152 -0.0002787 -0.2961602 
 (0.0046780)*** (0.0053886)*** (0.0047139)*** (0.0056007)*** (0.0044889) (0.0178393)*** 
prop_prehdd_da 0.0066059 0.0066059 0.0069268 0.0069268 -0.0127866 -0.0010382 
 (0.0020218)*** (0.0032358)** (0.0020291)*** (0.0032707)** (0.0048857)*** (0.0028680) 
prop_premin_da -1.6649417 -1.6649417 -1.7100497 -1.7100497 -0.3061280 -0.8600320 
 (0.0547515)*** (0.0747868)*** (0.0552035)*** (0.0775084)*** (0.1190236)** (0.1033607)*** 
prop_prerain_da -0.0285492 -0.0285492 -0.0283367 -0.0283367 0.0867706 0.0577350 
 (0.0078399)*** (0.0115654)** (0.0078142)*** (0.0114093)** (0.0158960)*** (0.0209151)*** 
Athlone -0.0798457 -0.0798457     
 (0.0541838) (0.0544947)     
Bonthewul 0.3604601 0.3604601     
 (0.0671586)*** (0.0736561)***     
Heideveld 0.1961986 0.1961986     
 (0.0752316)*** (0.0755637)***     
Salt_River 0.0699531 0.0699531     
 (0.0605137) (0.0642853)     
_cons 2.7066898 2.7066898 2.7179556 2.7179556 1.4719583 1.9194155 
 (0.0606263)*** (0.0862220)*** (0.0463344)*** (0.0706073)*** (0.1132939)*** (0.0838148)*** 
Chi2 2,308.21 1,211.43     
F   178.62 91.80 18.93 90.88 
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00. 0.00. 0.00. 
R2 . . 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.20 
R2_O 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 
R2_B 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
R2_W 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.20 
Rho 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.89 0.79 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
131 
 
θ_50 0.82 0.82     
N 22,435 22,435 22,435 22,435 10,039 12,396 
N_Clust . 2,607 . 2,607 2,590 2,582 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Estimated treatment effects compared to the control group amongst middle income suburbs 
Proportional monthly 
consumption 
RE RE (Robust) FE FE (Robust) FE (Robust) 
mailings 1-5 
FE (Robust) mailings 
6-11 
L.mailed -0.1838915 -0.1838915     
 (0.0448708)*** (0.0524441)***     
L.cumu_mail -0.0133031 -0.0133031 -0.0132245 -0.0132245 0.0052152 0.0127483 
 (0.0027753)*** (0.0035528)*** (0.0027658)*** (0.0035639)*** (0.0091355) (0.0097458) 
prop_precdd_da 0.0168302 0.0168302 0.0163909 0.0163909 -0.0003961 -0.2999446 
 (0.0047309)*** (0.0056085)*** (0.0047135)*** (0.0056017)*** (0.0044699) (0.0178241)*** 
prop_prehdd_da 0.0064486 0.0064486 0.0069483 0.0069483 -0.0127999 -0.0010133 
 (0.0020186)*** (0.0032131)** (0.0020288)*** (0.0032715)** (0.0049090)*** (0.0028699) 
prop_premin_da -1.6982161 -1.6982161 -1.7118769 -1.7118769 -0.3036414 -0.8434660 
 (0.0552855)*** (0.0774578)*** (0.0551583)*** (0.0774133)*** (0.1194088)** (0.1034701)*** 
prop_prerain_da -0.0289310 -0.0289310 -0.0285797 -0.0285797 0.0873070 0.0570990 
 (0.0078172)*** (0.0115698)** (0.0078080)*** (0.0114284)** (0.0160400)*** (0.0208859)*** 
Athlone -0.1172701 -0.1172701     
 (0.0558915)** (0.0556590)**     
Bonthewul 0.3549936 0.3549936     
 (0.0682087)*** (0.0735949)***     
Heideveld 0.1829671 0.1829671     
 (0.0764816)** (0.0763123)**     
Salt_River 0.0166464 0.0166464     
 (0.0629916) (0.0674485)     
_cons 2.8491350 2.8491350 2.7163321 2.7163321 1.4561097 1.9093002 
 (0.0713461)*** (0.1037314)*** (0.0462502)*** (0.0705094)*** (0.1136898)*** (0.0837353)*** 
Chi2 2,312.04 1,199.12     
F   462.43 237.12 42.22 232.59 
P 0.00 0.00 . . . . 
R2 . . 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.20 
R2_O 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 
R2_B 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 
R2_W 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.20 
Rho 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.89 0.79 
Thta_50 0.82 0.82     
N 22,435 22,435 22,435 22,435 10,039 12,396 
N_Clusters . 2,607 . 2,607 2,590 2,582 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Estimated treatment effects compared to the control group amongst Lower income suburbs 
Proportional monthly 
consumption 
RE RE (Robust) FE FE (Robust) FE (Robust) 
mailings 1-5 
FE (Robust) 
mailings 6-11 
L.CD_pdiff_norm_above 0.0007860 0.0007860 0.0009797 0.0009797 -0.0023178 0.0049517 
 (0.0016018) (0.0009206) (0.0016191) (0.0008507) (0.0007938)*** (0.0015662)*** 
L.CD_pdiff_norm_below 0.0000218 0.0000218 -0.0000264 -0.0000264 0.0000332 -0.0000448 
 (0.0000567) (0.0000427) (0.0000574) (0.0000303) (0.0001128) (0.0000324) 
L.CDI_pdiff_norm_above 0.0004186 0.0004186 0.0010823 0.0010823 -0.0000022 0.0029269 
 (0.0016443) (0.0016099) (0.0016690) (0.0014840) (0.0027416) (0.0015426)* 
L.CDI_pdiff_norm_below 0.0000083 0.0000083 -0.0000950 -0.0000950 -0.0000863 -0.0001264 
 (0.0000942) (0.0000704) (0.0000980) (0.0000783) (0.0000425)** (0.0001765) 
L.ND_pdiff_norm_above 0.0006798 0.0006798 0.0007589 0.0007589 0.0014679 0.0006797 
 (0.0002824)** (0.0005378) (0.0002816)*** (0.0005369) (0.0016712) (0.0004873) 
L.ND_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000203 -0.0000203 -0.0000509 -0.0000509 0.0000158 -0.0000095 
 (0.0000461) (0.0000602) (0.0000461) (0.0000624) (0.0000686) (0.0000804) 
L.NDI_pdiff_norm_above 0.0004872 0.0004872 0.0005923 0.0005923 -0.0027034 0.0007274 
 (0.0003848) (0.0005545) (0.0003845) (0.0005075) (0.0020851) (0.0007746) 
L.NDI_pdiff_norm_below -0.0000234 -0.0000234 -0.0000315 -0.0000315 0.0000152 0.0000413 
 (0.0000290) (0.0000476) (0.0000294) (0.0000511) (0.0000523) (0.0000710) 
L.cumu_mail -0.0259588 -0.0259588 -0.0284823 -0.0284823 0.0012247 0.0067839 
 (0.0037637)*** (0.0045352)*** (0.0038915)*** (0.0049931)*** (0.0140139) (0.0154729) 
prop_precdd_da 0.0095754 0.0095754 0.0055699 0.0055699 -0.0216481 -0.5672197 
 (0.0080194) (0.0082182) (0.0081028) (0.0085833) (0.0074708)*** (0.0376847)*** 
prop_prehdd_da 0.0058847 0.0058847 0.0066982 0.0066982 -0.0225455 -0.0046222 
 (0.0031092)* (0.0034737)* (0.0031141)** (0.0037265)* (0.0075816)*** (0.0028205) 
prop_premin_da -2.0531916 -2.0531916 -2.0383826 -2.0383826 -0.3969800 -0.5688061 
 (0.0921299)*** (0.1088284)*** (0.0929763)*** (0.1130395)*** (0.2025962)* (0.1932608)*** 
prop_prerain_da -0.0486775 -0.0486775 -0.0490525 -0.0490525 0.0929419 0.0239576 
 (0.0116877)*** (0.0149951)*** (0.0116717)*** (0.0153748)*** (0.0292552)*** (0.0238352) 
Langa 0.1936195 0.1936195     
 (0.0871726)** (0.0899362)**     
Gugulethu 0.3435957 0.3435957     
 (0.0701713)*** (0.0738062)***     
_cons 3.3657466 3.3657466 3.4662086 3.4662086 1.9715822 2.1392295 
 (0.0919955)*** (0.1152972)*** (0.0751569)*** (0.0958568)*** (0.1976485)*** (0.1382125)*** 
Chi2 1,392.87 712.09     
F   112.00 55.54 13.55 56.00 
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 . . 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.24 
R2_O 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 
R2_B 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 
R2_W 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.24 
Rho 0.74 0.74 0.78 0.78 0.87 0.77 
θ_50 0.81 0.81     
N 11,677 11,677 11,677 11,677 5,185 6,492 
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N_Clusters . 1,347 . 1,347 1,328 1,341 
       
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Estimated treatment effects compared to the control group amongst Lower income suburbs 
Proportional monthly 
consumption 
      
L.mailed 0.1740466 0.1740466     
 (0.0703160)** (0.0777762)**     
L.cumu_mail -0.0281271 -0.0281271 -0.0282909 -0.0282909 0.0001791 0.0069812 
 (0.0038845)*** (0.0049597)*** (0.0038685)*** (0.0049747)*** (0.0138224) (0.0154877) 
prop_precdd_da 0.0056971 0.0056971 0.0052487 0.0052487 -0.0220768 -0.5620274 
 (0.0081380) (0.0085678) (0.0081029) (0.0085743) (0.0074699)*** (0.0368574)*** 
prop_prehdd_da 0.0060833 0.0060833 0.0066057 0.0066057 -0.0225196 -0.0051837 
 (0.0031022)** (0.0035250)* (0.0031144)** (0.0037084)* (0.0075761)*** (0.0028237)* 
prop_premin_da -2.0305087 -2.0305087 -2.0567594 -2.0567594 -0.3890042 -0.5832869 
 (0.0928654)*** (0.1115578)*** (0.0925966)*** (0.1120951)*** (0.2024317)* (0.1913621)*** 
prop_prerain_da -0.0484422 -0.0484422 -0.0488224 -0.0488224 0.0932498 0.0341084 
 (0.0116456)*** (0.0150112)*** (0.0116607)*** (0.0152896)*** (0.0293164)*** (0.0241611) 
Langa 0.1874689 0.1874689     
 (0.0886757)** (0.0900323)**     
Gugulethu 0.3333762 0.3333762     
 (0.0715525)*** (0.0736620)***     
oL.mailed   0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 
   (0.0000000) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) 
o.Langa   0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 
   (0.0000000) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) 
o.Gugulethu   0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 
   (0.0000000) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) 
_cons 3.2468374 3.2468374 3.4810916 3.4810916 1.9642564 2.1466147 
 (0.1069089)*** (0.1323655)*** (0.0747584)*** (0.0952519)*** (0.1977468)*** (0.1362860)*** 
Chi2 1,399.02 710.66     
P 0.00 0.00 . . . . 
R2 . . 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.24 
R2_O 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 
R2_B 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
R2_W 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.24 
Sigma_U 1.12 1.12 1.21 1.21 1.26 1.23 
Sigma_E 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.49 0.68 
Rho 0.75 0.75 0.78 0.78 0.87 0.77 
Thta_5 0.72 0.72     
Thta_50 0.81 0.81     
Thta_95 0.83 0.83     
N 11,677 11,677 11,677 11,677 5,185 6,492 
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N_Clust . 1,347 . 1,347 1,328 1,341 
F   288.09 143.35 31.18 144.60 
Tcon   . . . . 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
136 
 
Specific differences between mailed treatments: All income groups - (FE, robust standard errors).  
Influence upon Proportional Monthly Consumption 
 Whole year Mailings 1-5 Mailings 6-11 
pdiff_norm -0.0007213 -0.0001201 -0.0004158 
 (0.0001177)*** (0.0001962) (0.0001654)** 
mru_pdiff_norm 0.0001091 -0.0002216 0.0000150 
 (0.0001593) (0.0002453) (0.0002305) 
injunctive_pdiff_norm -0.0002542 -0.0003956 -0.0001526 
 (0.0001747) (0.0002813) (0.0002454) 
mru_inj_pdiff_norm 0.0000486 0.0005834 0.0000038 
 (0.0002317) (0.0003426)* (0.0003349) 
prop_precdd_da 0.0333289 -0.0000907 -0.3191215 
 (0.0031592)*** (0.0035133) (0.0225250)*** 
prop_prehdd_da 0.0430438 -0.0123299 -0.1428050 
 (0.0050491)*** (0.0117132) (0.0474347)*** 
prop_premin_da -1.4821961 0.0318719 -1.8440373 
 (0.0578706)*** (0.0938789) (0.3837425)*** 
prop_prerain_da -0.0496510 0.1389961 0.0787651 
 (0.0077874)*** (0.0186980)*** (0.0195040)*** 
_cons 2.2823019 0.9677151 2.9839587 
 (0.0563045)*** (0.0846892)*** (0.4360729)*** 
F 205.65 46.01 206.51 
P 0.00. 0.00 0.00. 
R2 0.12 0.05 0.20 
R2_O 0.05 0.03 0.05 
R2_B 0.04 0.04 0.00 
R2_W 0.12 0.05 0.20 
Rho 0.80 0.89 0.78 
N 31,040 13,699 17,341 
N_Clusters 4,047 4,020 3,999 
 
 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
137 
 
Specific differences between mailed treatments: Upper income suburbs  
 (FE, robust standard errors).  
Influence upon Proportional Monthly Consumption 
 Whole year Mailings 1-5 Mailings 6-11 
pdiff_norm -0.0003458 -0.0002655 -0.0001872 
 (0.0001682)** (0.0002073) (0.0002501) 
mru_pdiff_norm -0.0000125 0.0001459 0.0000859 
 (0.0002305) (0.0003449) (0.0003336) 
injunctive_pdiff_norm -0.0003421 0.0004359 -0.0005702 
 (0.0003262) (0.0004020) (0.0005024) 
mru_inj_pdiff_norm 0.0003218 -0.0004652 0.0006461 
 (0.0003787) (0.0005143) (0.0005709) 
prop_precdd_da 0.0318981 0.0072799 -0.1710699 
 (0.0033479)*** (0.0041550)* (0.0244153)*** 
prop_prehdd_da 0.0665614 0.0905841 0.1146552 
 (0.0059742)*** (0.0204663)*** (0.0419288)*** 
prop_premin_da -0.8396733 0.0398571 0.5177546 
 (0.0672913)*** (0.1100682) (0.3310459) 
prop_prerain_da -0.0630082 -0.0465951 0.1049686 
 (0.0100631)*** (0.0293215) (0.0264549)*** 
_cons 1.3799058 0.6218178 0.0275437 
 (0.0636631)*** (0.0985123)*** (0.3782728) 
F 70.32 10.99 69.61 
P            0.00. 0.00             0.00. 
R2 0.09 0.03 0.17 
R2_O 0.05 0.01 0.04 
R2_B 0.05 0.01 0.01 
R2_W 0.09 0.03 0.17 
Rho 0.78 0.89 0.76 
N 12,460 5,566 6,894 
N_Clusters 1,615 1,607 1,591 
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Specific differences between mailed treatments: Middle income suburbs -  
(FE, robust standard errors).  
Influence upon Proportional Monthly Consumption 
 Whole year Mailings 1-5 Mailings 6-11 
pdiff_norm -0.0006839 0.0004901 -0.0004637 
 (0.0002275)*** (0.0004580) (0.0003030) 
mru_pdiff_norm 0.0003626 -0.0004438 0.0002187 
 (0.0002767) (0.0005053) (0.0003727) 
injunctive_pdiff_norm -0.0003331 -0.0009603 -0.0000718 
 (0.0003002) (0.0005731)* (0.0004256) 
mru_inj_pdiff_norm -0.0001548 0.0012244 -0.0002815 
 (0.0003967) (0.0006480)* (0.0005662) 
prop_precdd_da 0.0301443 0.0052113 -0.2703780 
 (0.0058707)*** (0.0063611) (0.0294287)*** 
prop_prehdd_da 0.0254833 -0.0228505 -0.0984974 
 (0.0082048)*** (0.0147671) (0.0504901)* 
prop_premin_da -1.6625714 0.1447758 -1.6498869 
 (0.0979623)*** (0.1513562) (0.4215292)*** 
prop_prerain_da -0.0207817 0.1968309 0.1113945 
 (0.0122762)* (0.0269313)*** (0.0317221)*** 
_cons 2.4886109 0.9014110 2.7183182 
 (0.0960158)*** (0.1377686)*** (0.4764602)*** 
F 87.07 24.01 87.76 
P            0.00. 0.00             0.00. 
R2 0.13 0.07 0.22 
R2_O 0.04 0.00 0.05 
R2_B 0.02 0.00 0.00 
R2_W 0.13 0.07 0.22 
Rho 0.79 0.89 0.78 
N 11,208 4,892 6,316 
N_Clusters 1,510 1,503 1,491 
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Specific differences between mailed treatments: Lower income suburbs -  
(FE, robust standard errors).  
Influence upon Proportional Monthly Consumption 
 Whole year Mailings 1-5 Mailings 6-11 
pdiff_norm -0.0008805 0.0000392 -0.0003243 
 (0.0001956)*** (0.0003434) (0.0002760) 
mru_pdiff_norm -0.0004675 -0.0007852 -0.0007428 
 (0.0003158) (0.0004319)* (0.0005198) 
injunctive_pdiff_norm -0.0001434 -0.0006609 0.0000222 
 (0.0002895) (0.0004710) (0.0003733) 
mru_inj_pdiff_norm -0.0000294 0.0010231 -0.0002689 
 (0.0004685) (0.0006219) (0.0007301) 
prop_precdd_da 0.0328168 -0.0050944 -0.6126694 
 (0.0086580)*** (0.0097516) (0.0458215)*** 
prop_prehdd_da 0.0416970 -0.1172891 -0.5492301 
 (0.0130525)*** (0.0304106)*** (0.0791477)*** 
prop_premin_da -2.3161956 0.1113460 -5.3821122 
 (0.1538370)*** (0.2254244) (0.7284144)*** 
prop_prerain_da -0.1401341 0.3730304 -0.0246419 
 (0.0224943)*** (0.0574557)*** (0.0423513) 
_cons 3.5503699 1.3723761 7.5172112 
 (0.1524145)*** (0.2087046)*** (0.8028071)*** 
F 63.64 21.15 61.57 
P            0.00. 0.00             0.00. 
R2 0.14 0.09 0.25 
R2_O 0.05 0.02 0.06 
R2_B 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2_W 0.14 0.09 0.25 
Rho 0.78 0.87 0.77 
N 7,372 3,241 4,131 
N_Clusters 922 910 917 
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Chapter 5. 
Conclusion. 
Most of the electricity consumed by households in South Africa is consumed by households that are 
in one of the major municipalities (such as Johannesburg, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, Durban, 
Bloemfontein, Pietermaritzburg and Cape Town). Many of these households consume electricity that 
is bought on a credit basis, receiving a bill for the electricity consumed. This bill represents an 
opportunity for Eskom and the municipalities (who often buy electricity from Eskom and sell it on to 
households) to manage household electricity consumption down. One of the methods for doing this 
that is beginning to be investigated around the world, but most notably in the USA, is to report to 
households the average level of electricity of consumption for a household and then to compare the 
households to that average. This approach has been found to be successful in the USA (Alcott, 2011 
& Schultz et al, 2007). 
Originally this study also sought to examine two possible determinants of the effectiveness of 
reporting social norms and whether a similar strategy would prove successful in a major South 
African municipality - Cape Town - where many households are likely to be much poorer than the 
households in the USA studies. These two possible determinants were the social distance between 
the household and the norm to which they were compared and the communication of social 
approval or dissaproval - via injunctive norms. 
However during the course of the fieldwork interest grew in what the difference in consumption 
between households receiving the mail and those not receiving any mails at all would be. The 
ecological cost of generating electricity in South Africa is great. Given the long lead time to changing 
from a coal-intensive energy mix to one dominated by cleaner sources of energy, this is likely to 
remain the case for a long time. At the same time, the electricity generation and distribution 
infrastructure in South Africa is capacity constrained, with the threat of black outs often looming. For 
these two reasons assessing the degree to which household electricity consumption could be 
reduced though this sort of reporting is desirable. 
Comparisons between the various mailed treatments do not provide evidence that either the 
injunctive norm or the two degrees of social distance employed in this study made any significant 
difference to consumption. However, they do provide evidence that households respond in a 
significant fashion, when made aware of their own consumption via social comparisons. This is 
consistent with findings from earlier work in the field. This finding suggests that one of the most 
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important elements of norms feedback that households respond to is this difference itself, generic 
to all treatments in this project, rather than other elements that surround it. 
In comparisons with the unmailed control group this study noted what seemed to feasibly be a 
treatment effect. Households in the unmailed control group consumed more (as a proportion of 
their pre-treatment consumption) than treated households. Lower consumption amongst treated 
households seemed to be a function of some element that was generic to all of the mailed 
treatments (either tips, or difference in consumption compared to a norm, or both) and which 
worked cumulatively. 
What remains the most astounding result of this research, as well as other research like it (Allcott, 
2011, Schultz 2007, Violette et al, 2009), is that the electricity consumption of households can be 
influenced by merely reporting normative levels of consumption and comparing households to those 
norms.  
That this is found to be effective in the case of electricity accords with a growing literature in 
behavioural economics around the influence of social norms as well as findings from social 
psychology. Taken together with the broader literature, this research suggests that reporting social 
norms may be an effective way for Eskom and municipalities to mitigate household electricity 
consumption in South Africa. 
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